Taylor v. Crockett

• Decision Date: 19 June 1894
• Citation: 27 S.W. 620
• Parties: TAYLOR v. CROCKETT.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

27 S.W. 620

TAYLOR v. CROCKETT.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 19, 1894.

APPEAL — REVIEW IN EQUITY — DEED — CONSIDERATION — UNDUE INFLUENCE — BURDEN OF PROOF.

1. In cases in equity the supreme court, on appeal, will review the facts; but, where the result turns upon the credibility of conflicting evidence, the court is disposed to give great weight to the findings of the trial judge.

2. The consideration of a deed is open to explanation upon an issue of fraud and undue influence in obtaining it.

3. A promise to pay taxes, and to contribute to the support of the grantor, is held to be a sufficient consideration, in equity, to support the conveyance of the land in dispute in this case.

4. In a suit to set aside a deed, as obtained by undue influence and fraud, the burden of proof is upon the party charging such misconduct. The evidence in the present case reviewed, and held insufficient to establish that charge.

(Syllabus by the Judge.)

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; John W. Henry, Judge.

Action by Mary Taylor against one Crockett to set aside a deed. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Kagy & Bremermann, for appellant. Traber, Vandiver & McNeil, for respondent.

BARCLAY, J.

Plaintiff brought this suit to set aside a conveyance of certain land in Kansas City, Mo. The deed attacked was made September 8, 1888, by plaintiff, Mary Taylor, and her husband, Adam Taylor (now deceased), to the defendant. The plaintiff's charge is that the deed was obtained by fraud, undue influence, and imposition upon the grantors, and without a full understanding of its nature and meaning. This charge is denied by defendant. Her answer sets up the facts mentioned later in this opinion as her defense. Upon these facts, plaintiff joined issue by a reply. The cause was tried by the court (Judge Henry). A finding and decree for the defendant ensued. Plaintiff appealed.

As this is a case of equitable cognizance, we have reviewed the facts fully, and conclude that the learned trial judge was entirely right in the judgment he pronounced. The testimony establishes certain facts beyond controversy. It may be well to state them separately from the conflicting evidence on other phases of the case. Adam and Mary Taylor were husband and wife. In 1880 they acquired a piece of land in Kansas City, taking the title to both as grantees. The lot had a frontage of 25 feet on Lydia avenue, and ran thence eastward, of even width, about 160 feet, to Grove street. September 8, 1888, plaintiff and Adam Taylor executed the deed in controversy to defendant, the sister of Adam. It was recorded November 3, 1888. It purported to convey the eastern portion of said lot, to a depth of 95 feet from Grove street, for the recited consideration of $100. It was duly acknowledged by both grantors, and no question is raised as to its formal sufficiency. Both grantors signed by means of marks. Adam Taylor was then about 80 years of age, and was in feeble health, but it is not claimed that he was mentally incapable of contracting. On the contrary, plaintiff asserts the validity of a will made by him on the same day, and claims title under that will. By the will he devised and bequeathed to Mary all his property, real and personal. This will was admitted to probate in Jackson county in due form, at plaintiff's instance, September 30, 1889, and is recorded there.

The rest of the case is composed of very conflicting accounts of the making of the deed, and of the facts leading up to it. The plaintiff denied ever having executed or acknowledged it, or having authorized any one to sign it for her. She asserts that defendant never paid anything to Adam or herself as a consideration therefor. She admitted that defendant put a house on the land, and had promised to take care of the old man, but asserted that defendant had never given him a cent for it. She declared that Adam wept when he learned that the land stood in defendant's name on the tax list. She admitted that she had put the will in a trunk, and kept it. We do not undertake to give all the details of the evidence. A mere outline will be sufficient for the purposes of this appeal. Plaintiff's son by a former marriage testified on her behalf. He corroborated his mother on the point that she had originally furnished the consideration for the purchase of the land; that Adam had no means, and was helpless, and an object of charity, in his latter days; that Adam was surprised on learning that the land was on the tax list as defendant's; that defendant then said "she didn't do it;" and that the truth about the title was discovered after Adam died, when plaintiff tried to borrow money on the land to pay his funeral expenses. Two other witnesses testified on the part of plaintiff touching an interview between Adam and the defendant, when the latter said she had "never bothered Adam's business, and hadn't been to...