Bruce v. State
| Decision Date | 01 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 60,60 |
| Citation | 351 Md. 387,718 A.2d 1125 |
| Parties | Nathaniel Steven BRUCE v. STATE of Maryland. , |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Denise Oakes Shaffer, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.
Rachel Marblestone Kamins, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER and WILNER, JJ., and ROBERT L. KARWACKI, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.
KARWACKI, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.
We granted certiorari in this criminal case to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the accused's request that the members of the jury be interrogated to ascertain whether any of them had been prejudiced. The request was prompted by an electronic bulletin board erected inside the entrance of the courthouse which showed the names of the cases being tried and the courtrooms in which the trials were to be held. The bulletin board on the day the accused's trial was to be held disclosed that he had two other criminal cases pending that day.
Nathaniel Steven Bruce, the petitioner, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery, and the use of a handgun in the commission of that robbery. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years for the robbery with a deadly weapon and to a consecutive 20 year sentence for the handgun violation. These judgments were affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion. We issued a writ of certiorari on the petition of the accused.
The evidence produced before the jury was sufficient to establish the facts which were summarized by the Court of Special Appeals as follows:
"On June 19, 1995, Shawn Conner and Albert Margolius were working at Silver Hill Liquors in Prince George's County. Two men entered the store. Conner testified that one of the men asked for the correct time. When Conner looked toward the man, he saw a handgun pointed toward him, and he was instructed to open the cash registers and get down on the floor.
The man holding the gun came behind the counter and Conner observed him for approximately thirty seconds. He gave the following description of the gunman to the police: a dark skinned, black male, 5 feet 7 inches tall, with bad teeth, three to four days' growth of facial hair, wearing a blue and yellow shirt and shorts, white socks, black shoes and a hat. From a group of police photographs, Conner identified appellant as the man with the gun. He repeated the identification at trial.
Albert Margolius testified that appellant pulled a "Tec-9"1 from inside his sweater, pointed it at Margolius and said, "Okay, let's go, you know what to do." The second robber ordered both employees to get down on the floor, and appellant went behind the counter and took between $12,000 and $14,000 from the safe and the registers. Margolius said his observation of appellant lasted about four seconds. He identified appellant as the man with the gun after reviewing a series of thirty-two photographs, and repeated the identification at trial.
This case was called for trial on April 16, 1996. After the members of the panel of prospective jurors were examined on their voir dire and after the parties exercised their challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, a jury of twelve with two alternate jurors was selected. Thereafter, the trial judge appointed a foreperson of the jury and gave the jury a brief introductory explanation of what would occur at trial. It was then decided to recess for the day and to begin the trial on the following morning. The trial court advised the jury inter alia that:
The jury which was then deliberating in the jury room of the courtroom where the instant case was to be tried was empaneled in one of the two other cases pending against the petitioner. In light of that, the following colloquy took place between defense counsel and the trial judge:
MR. McCARTHY: That was my thought, Your Honor. But I would ask that we wait perhaps--what time do they have to leave to catch the early trip?
THE DEPUTY SHERIFF: Now, five minutes.
MR. McCARTHY: We would ask that they suspend deliberations until tomorrow morning, Your Honor. Before being released, that they be instructed to come back to that room rather than the jury lounge tomorrow morning so that there isn't a problem of the new jury and the old jury running into each other because of the name confusion.
THE COURT: All right, let's do that, then.
(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m. the trial adjourned for the day.)"
When the case resumed on April 17, 1996, defense counsel and the trial judge engaged in the following colloquy:
"Your Honor, there is another problem, I am not entirely sure how to address it. Back in the days of printed dockets when the documents were simply put up, when a person had multiple charges, they did not put case numbers next to it, they just put his name and the courtroom, and that was a standard order done by the Administrative Judge at that time to avoid the problem we have here.
Published this morning is the fact that there are three charges, three cases pending against this man.
THE COURT: Published where?
MR. McCARTHY: On the TV thing on the first floor and ground floor. It's published to any juror looking for any information.
THE COURT: Do you have any knowledge that any juror has been looking for any information?
MR. McCARTHY: Your Honor, it is put where they can't help it when they pass it.
THE COURT: Well, I can tell you this, that the jury that is out in the case that was concluded yesterday except for, of course, deliberation, was given very express instructions as to where to be today and what time. They would have no occasion or need to consult with anything on the board.
The jury that was chosen yesterday afternoon was told by me that they should report to the jury lounge and they will await instructions from the bailiff as to where to go for the commencement of this trial. They would have had no need to look at anything on the electronic board.
The electronic bulletin is primarily there for the convenience of the litigants, not jurors. Jurors know that they are to report to the jury lounge.
Unless you have some information that a juror or jurors--
MR. McCARTHY: Without directly questioning the jury, I don't know whether or not they have obtain--I think the possibility, even though it's not addressed after this case in terms of a mistrial, which I think would be appropriate, I think the Court needs to talk to the assignment office and correct what I think is a real problem which had been corrected before, before they put up these electronic bulletin boards.
The COURT: Well, your motion for a mistrial is denied".
Bruce asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused, prior to ruling on the motion for mistrial, to interrogate the jurors who had been empaneled in the instant case as to whether they had observed the electronic bulletin board when entering the courthouse, and if so, whether they had noticed that he had two other criminal cases pending in addition to the case which they had been sworn to decide. He claims that the information imparted on the bulletin board amounted to other crimes evidence against him the admission of which was potentially highly prejudicial. Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 407, 614 A.2d 949, 953 (1992); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669-70, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976).
While it is true that this Court has recognized the potential prejudicial effect of other crimes evidence, it is equally clear that the conduct of a criminal trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Cook, 338 Md. 598, 615, 659 A.2d 1313, 1322 (1995); Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 673, 637 A.2d 117, 123 (1994); State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 277, 604 A.2d 489, 493, (1992); Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 220 596 A.2d 1024, 1032 (1991); Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 405, 583 A.2d 218, 227 (1990) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 86 (1991); Owens-Corning v. Baltimore City, 108 Md.App. 1, 28, 670 A.2d...
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