Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n

• Decision Date: 23 May 1929
• Docket Number: 2807.
• Citation: 277 P. 798,51 Nev. 372
• Parties: BRUCE v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASS'N.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

277 P. 798

51 Nev. 372

BRUCE v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASS'N.

No. 2807.

Supreme Court of Nevada

May 23, 1929

Appeal from District Court, Washoe County; Thomas F. Moran, Judge.

Action by Daniel H. Bruce, as administrator of the estate of Leslie M. Bruce, deceased, against the Young Men's Christian Association. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Brown & Belford and E. F. Lunsford, all of Reno, for appellant.

A Grant Miller, of Reno, for respondent.

COLEMAN J.

The plaintiff sued to recover damages on account of the death of Leslie M. Bruce, which was the result of injuries received while using the gymnasium of the defendant, of which he was a member. While climbing and swinging on a rope attached to a screw bolt which was fastened to the ceiling or a joist, the bolt pulled out, causing the deceased to drop to the floor falling on his head.

The defendant pleaded several defenses, among others that it is a charitable institution, and hence not liable in damages. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and an order denying a motion for a new trial, an appeal has been taken.

The first alleged error to be considered is the ruling of the trial court in sustaining the objection to certain evidence tending to show that the defendant is a charitable organization.

Article 8, § 2, of our Constitution, provides that property of all corporations shall be subject to taxation, except that corporations formed for municipal charitable, religious, or educational purposes may be exempted by law. Our Legislature in 1911 enacted a statute exempting all property of Young Men's Christian Associations used for the purposes of such associations. Stats. 1911, p. 127; R L. § 3842.

The evidence which was rejected was offered to support an affirmative defense pleaded in the answer to the following effect: That the principal objects for which the defendant was formed, as stated in its articles of incorporation, are to develop the Christian character of its members and to improve the spiritual, mental, social, and physical conditions of young men; that defendant has no capital stock; that no person has or can derive private pecuniary profit therefrom, and that it has never paid and does not pay any salary or compensation to any of its directors or officers, or to any persons except employees; that the building belonging to defendant and used by it in promoting its chief aim was erected on land donated to the defendant in order that said building might be erected thereon; and that said building was erected and equipped with funds secured from gifts, donations, and contributions made by individuals impelled by charitable, benevolent, and philanthropic motives; that, in furtherance of its primary purposes, the defendant has carried on in said building religious courses of instruction along educational lines, and has had addresses and lectures on educational, moral, social, and other subjects; that it maintained a gymnasium and conducted gymnasium classes therein and maintained a swimming pool and other facilities for sports and physical exercise, and has conducted and permitted others to conduct social activities therein; that defendant, in order to promote its primary purposes, frequently permitted members of the general public, who were not members thereof, to use its said building, including its gymnasium, swimming pool, and general facilities, free of charge, or at a nominal charge, and that all of the members of defendant were and are entitled to use all of its facilities, and that they pay membership dues which in amount are wholly insufficient to cover the cost of maintenance and of carrying on its activities, which said members are entitled to enjoy.

We think the court committed prejudicial error in rejecting the evidence offered. While we do not think it necessary to pass upon the question as to whether the Legislature in passing the act in question conclusively determined the defendant to be a charitable institution, it is certainly indicative of that idea. The defendant is not a municipal corporation, nor is it religious or educational, and, since it had authority to exempt only one other class of institutions, and those charitable, a strong inference may be drawn that such was the class in which the Legislature in adopting the act in question placed the defendant. But aside from the classification which the Legislature made, if any, we are clearly of the opinion that the defendant is a charitable organization in case the tendered proof is established. In the case of Little et al. v. Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 96 N.E. 1032. Ann. Cas. 1912D, 425, was presented the identical question here confronting us. The court said: "It will be seen that this is not an alms-giving organization. But that is not decisive of the question raised. Charity in the legal sense 'is not confined to mere alms-giving or the relief of poverty and distress, but has a wider signification, which embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness of man.' Braley, J., in New England Sanitarium v. Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 342, 91 N.E. 385, 387. The association carries on a work which is intended and adapted for the improvement and elevation of young men, not only to bring them under good influences, but to promote their moral, mental and physical welfare. It incurs expense for this purpose, for meeting which it relies mainly upon charitable contributions. In its essence, though not giving charity in the narrow sense of that word, it is a benevolent or charitable institution within the meaning of those words in the statute"-citing cases.

Mr. Justice Gray, in Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.) 539, defined a charity as follows: "A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature."

This definition was approved in Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 49 N.E. 527, 40 L. R. A. 730, 63 Am. St. Rep. 241. We heartily approve of this definition. In what better way, we may observe, than that adopted by the Young Men's Christian Association, and similar organizations, may the young be assisted in establishing themselves for life, and as good citizens who will contribute to the promotion of good government? It is to the interest of society and government to promote the highest type of citizenry, and an organization which contributes to this end lessens the burden of government. If this were a doubtful question, every presumption should be resolved in favor of the conclusion reached. We entertain no doubt concerning the point involved, from a consideration of sound reasoning, and the weight of authority is in line with this view. Carter v. Whitcomb, 74 N.H. 482, 69 A. 779, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 733; Philadelphia v. Women's Christian Ass'n, 125 Pa. 572, 17 A. 475; Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 83 N.W. 924, 52 L. R. A. 123; Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Spencer, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 249; Goodell v. Union Ass'n, etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32. It is not necessary that an institution give alms to constitute it charitable in character. 5 R. C. L., p. 374, par. 119; Dingwell v. Seymour (Cal. App.) 267 P. 327.

Does the fact that the defendant is a charitable institution, of itself, warrant a judgment in its favor?

There are many decisions in this country holding in accord with the contention of appellant. These decisions hark back to the case of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Reprint, 1508, as an authority establishing the doctrine.

That case grew out of the refusal of the trustees of a hospital, endowed for the benefit of poor fatherless boys, to receive a boy qualified for admission. Three opinions were written in that case. Lord Cottenham observed: "The question then comes to this,-whether by the law of Scotland a person who claims damages from those who are managers of a trust fund, in respect of their management of that fund, can make it liable in payment. It is obvious that it would be a direct violation, in all cases, of the purposes of a trust, if this could be done; for there is not a person who ever created a trust fund that provided for payment out of it of damages to be recovered from those who had the management of the fund. No such provision has been made here. There is a trust, and there are persons intended to manage it for the benefit of those who are to be the objects of the charity. To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose."

It will be noted that the learned jurist stated the question in the first sentence quoted and then proceeded to answer it. The question, as stated, is whether a trust fund can be held liable for the mismanagement of the trust by the trustees. The basis of his conclusion is that to allow damages would be a diversion of trust funds to a purpose other than that intended by the creator of the fund, and, incidentally, to indemnify trustees for their own wrongdoing.

To say that we have had great difficulty in reaching a conclusion in this case would not be an exaggeration. However, after much study and analysis of ...