Brucker v. De Hart
Decision Date | 04 April 1919 |
Docket Number | 15208. |
Citation | 106 Wash. 386,180 P. 397 |
Parties | BRUCKER v. DE HART. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.
Action by Catherine C. Brucker, as administratrix of the estate of Margaret Farrell, deceased, against Leo De Hart. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
T. M. Vance and Geo. H. Funk, both of Olympia, for appellant.
Troy & Sturdevant and Geo. F. Yantis, all of Olympia, for respondent.
The plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Margaret Farrell, deceased, brought this action for the purpose of having a deed which the deceased, during her lifetime executed and delivered to the defendant, set aside, and for recovery of possession of real estate covered by the deed. The basis of the complaint is that the property covered by the deed was community property, and that when the deed was executed and delivered Margaret Farrell was mentally incompetent and was subject to undue influence. The defendant answered the complaint denying each of the three charges stated therein, and pleaded affirmatively that Margaret Farrell had held the title to the property, prior to the time of the conveyance, in trust for him. The affirmative plea in the answer was denied by reply. Upon the issues thus framed, the cause came on for trial before the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment as prayed for in the complaint. From this judgment the defendant appeals.
The property in controversy consists of two farms or ranches near South Bay in Thurston county. One is referred to as the 'old place,' and the other as the 'new place.'
Margaret Farrell and Charles Farrell were married in 1876. In 1881 they acquired the property referred to as the 'old place,' and title was taken in the name of Mrs Farrell. Subsequently, this property was mortgaged, and the title passed from the Farrells by foreclosure in 1900 and was acquired by one H. Waldo Foster. On April 30, 1901, Mrs. Inez Willey purchased the property from Mr. Foster for the purpose of enabling the Farrells to redeem or repurchase the same. Carrying out this intention, Mrs. Willey, on August 5th, entered into a contract by which she agreed to sell the land to Katie C. Farrell (now Mrs. Brucker) one of the daughters of Mr. and Mrs. Farrell. By this agreement the Farrells were placed in possession of the property. On December 12, 1903, this contract was assigned by Mrs. Brucker to Mrs. Farrell. On May 5, 1906, Mrs. Willey conveyed the property to Mrs. Farrell by a deed for a consideration of $2,200.
The title to that part of the property referred to as the 'new place' was acquired during the year 1900, and title thereto was taken in the name of Agnes E. Farrell, one of the two daughters of Mr. and Mrs. Farrell. On December 19, 1908, Agnes E. Farrell deeded the property to Margaret Farrell, her mother. There was also a deed from Daniel S. Lilly to Margaret Farrell dated April 28, 1904, for a consideration of $400 conveying property which was also included in the new place.
On November 26, 1917, Margaret Farrell conveyed all the land included in the cold place' and in the 'new place' which then stood in her name to Leo De Hart, the appellant, for a named consideration of $1. At this time Mrs. Farrell was suffering from the fatal disease from which, on December 30th following, she died. After her death, Catherine C. Brucker was appointed administratrix of her estate.
The appellant claims that he furnished the purchase price for both the old place and the new place when they were respectively acquired, and that Mrs. Farrell held the title in trust for him. The appellant had made his home with the Farrells for many years, having first come there when a young man. Much of the time he engaged in logging operations on his own account in the vicinity.
The principal question to be determined is whether the title to the property, including both the old place and the new place which were covered by the deed from Mrs. Farrell to the appellant, was held by her in trust for him. The trust, if one existed, was a resulting trust. Whether there was such a trust depends upon whether the appellant purchased the property and paid the consideration therefor from his own funds. To establish a trust of this character, the burden is upon the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Devlin v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington
... ... she suing as the representative of the deceased, her evidence ... was not adverse, but favorable, to the estate. Brucker v ... De Hart, 106 Wash. 386, 391, 180 P. 397; McFarland ... v. Department of Labor and Industries, 188 Wash. 357, ... 362, 62 ... ...
-
Mower v. Mower
... ... 1917, and argue that the opinion herein is contrary to the ... following cases: In re Cunningham Estate, 94 Wash. 191, 161 ... P. 1193; Brucker v. De Hart, 106 Wash. 386, ... 180 P. 397; O'Connor v. Slatter, 46 ... Wash. 308, 89 P. 885; Zackheim v. Zackheim ... (Colo. Sup.) 225, P. 268; ... ...
-
McFarland v. Department of Labor and Industries
... ... O'Connor v. Slatter, ... 46 Wash. 308, 89 P. 885; In re Cunningham's ... Estate, 94 Wash. 191, 161 P. 1193; Brucker v. De ... Hart, 106 Wash. 386, 180 P. 397. The statutory rule was ... formulated in recognition of the [188 Wash. 363] fact that ... ...
-
Makinen v. George
... ... and convincing, in order to establish a resulting trust, is ... the correct rule. Brucker v. De Hart, 106 Wash. 386, ... 180 P. 397. See, also, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, p ... 1398, § 458 ... We have ... ...