Bruggeman v. City of York
| Decision Date | 30 June 1917 |
| Docket Number | 129 |
| Citation | 102 A. 415,259 Pa. 94 |
| Parties | Bruggeman et al. v. City of York, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued May 15, 1917
Appeal, No. 129, Jan. T., 1917, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. York Co., August Term, 1914, No. 125, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Mary Ellen Bruggeman and John B Bruggeman v. City of York. Reversed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before Ross, J.
The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Verdict for the plaintiff Mary Ellen Bruggeman for $2,500 and for the plaintiff John B. Bruggeman for $100. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned, among others, was in refusing defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and is here entered for the defendant.
John L Rouse, City Solicitor, for appellant. -- It is clear that the existence of the mud of itself could not have caused the injury, and that plaintiff's act in sweeping the mud in and by itself could not have caused it, and the muddy condition of the street was therefore not the proximate cause of the accident. The proximate cause of an event is that which in a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new cause produces the event: Nirdlinger v. American District Telegraph Co., 245 Pa. 453; Herr v. City v. City of Lebanon, 149 Pa. 222; March v. Giles, 211 Pa. 17; Swanson v. Crandall, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 85.
Henry C. Niles, with him Michael S. Niles, Charles A. May and George E. Neff, for appellees. -- The negligent accumulation of the mud was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury: Glasgow v. Altoona, 27 Pa.Super. 55; Fischer v. Sanford, 12 Pa.Super. 435.
The wrongful act and its injurious effect was connected by an unbroken and continuous succession of events: Gudfelder v. Pittsburgh, Cin., Chgo. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 207 Pa. 629; Thomas v. Central R.R. Co. of N.J., v. Central R.R. Co. of N.J., 195 Pa. 511; King v. Lehigh Val. R.R. Co., 245 Pa. 25; Penna. R.R. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373; Sturgis v. Kountz, 165 Pa. 358.
Before BROWN, C.J., POTTER, STEWART, MOSCHZISKER and WALLING, JJ.
This is an action for personal injuries resulting, as alleged, from an accumulation of filth in a public street. In 1912, defendant city built the Eagle Engine House on a lot located on the west side of Jessop Place, between Jackson street and Rose alley in said city, and in so doing raised the grade of the lot, and to make a convenient roadway thereto filled up the brick gutter on the north side of the property. The land descended to the west and raising the grade of the lot and stopping up the gutter caused the water in wet weather to overflow the street and make a large pool sometimes covering parts of the adjoining lots, especially plaintiffs' lot located on the northeast corner of Jessop Place and Rose alley. The gutter extended from the east down Rose alley across Jessop Place, and seemed to be in the nature of an open sewer; for when the stagnant water, caused by the filling of the lot and gutter as above stated, would evaporate, germ laden filth with foul odors would be there found. This would seem to have constituted a nuisance, which the defendant, although having notice, failed to abate until after the occurrence in question.
On October 21, 1912, the plaintiff, Mrs. Bruggeman, took a broom and went out to clean up some of the filth so deposited in the alley in front of her home, and, in an effort to remove a coil of wire which had become lodged in the pavement or gutter, she pushed it with the broom so that it sprang back and in so doing sent a splash of the street mud into her face and left eye, thereby causing, as the jury found, the loss of the sight thereof. There was nothing to indicate that defendant was in any manner responsible for the presence of the wire in the street. The trial judge submitted the case to the jury, including the questions of negligence, proximate cause, etc. The jury found for the plaintiffs and the court overruled defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and entered judgment on the verdict; hence this appeal.
In our opinion defendant's motion for judgment should have been granted on the ground that the negligence complained of was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. "A proximate cause, in the law of negligence, is such a cause as operates to produce particular consequences without the intervention of any independent unforeseen cause without which the injuries would not have occurred": 21 American and English Encyclopedia of Law (2 Ed.) 485. "A proximate cause is one which, in actual sequence, undisturbed by any independent cause, produces the result complained of": Behling v. Southwest Penna. Pipe Lines, 160...
To continue reading
Request your trial