Bruggerman v. Hoerr

• Decision Date: 01 January 1862
• Parties: BERNHARD BRUGGERMAN vs. GEORGE PETER HOERR et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

7 Minn. 264

BERNHARD BRUGGERMAN vs. GEORGE PETER HOERR et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from order of district court, Blue Earth County.

Points and authorities for appellant: —

The district court erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury, finding the deeds, under which the respondents claim, fraudulent as against the appellant, and rendering judgment in favor of the respondents upon the answer of the jury to an interrogatory put to them by the counsel for the respondents. First, because the said interrogatory has not any foundation in the pleadings, and the counsel for the respondents had not the legal right to put it to the jury. The answer of the jury to that interrogatory is not responsive to any allegations contained in the pleadings. A verdict not responsive to the count is nugatory and void. Monell's Pr. 684; McCarty v. Hudson, 24 Wend. 291. Second, because the judgment of the appellant against Keck is admitted by the respondent in his answer. That is conclusive of Keck's legal and just indebtedness to the appellant, and gives him the right to attack the conveyances from Keck to Klugorty and respondent for fraud. The source or construction of that indebtedness could not be questioned or litigated in this action; that subject was res adjudicata. This case stands upon the same principle as a creditor's bill. It is, in fact, a creditor's bill, filed for the purpose of reaching the judgment debtor's property in the hands of his fraudulent grantee, making that grantee a party. In such cases, the judgment is conclusive against all the defendants, and no execution is necessary if the property sought to be reached is real estate. 2 Hoffman's Ch. Pr. 119, 120; Hone v. Woolsey, 2 Edw. 289; McElvaine v. Willis, 3 Paige, 506; 3 Paige, 320; Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige 65; Mit. Pl. 127. And the fraudulent grantees may be united in the same bill with the grantor. Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cow. 682.

Points and authorities for respondents: —

1. The conveyance to defendant Hoerr was upon a sale for a valuable consideration, and binding between the parties. In order to avoid a conveyance made for a valuable consideration as fraudulent as against creditors, it must be shown that the purchaser was a party to, or conversant with, the fraudulent intent. Waterbury v. Sturtevant, 18 Wend. 365; Cunningham v. Freeborn, 11 Wend. 253; Hanford v. Archer, 4 Hill, 271.

2. The purchaser must have notice of the indebtedness and the intent to defraud the creditor; the indebtedness must be an existing, legal and valid indebtedness, such as the creditor could have enforced in law, otherwise the purchaser would have no notice of any indebtedness. To entitle a creditor in equity to have a voluntary conveyance by his debtor set aside, he must prove, by competent evidence, the existence of his debt at the time of the conveyance and that he will be defrauded and a loser unless it be set aside. See cases above cited; also, King v. Clarke, 2 Hill Ch. 605; 1 U. S. Eq. Dig. 551.

3. The judgment in favor of Bruggerman against Keck, is not evidence of an indebtedness as against Hoerr; the purchase was made long before the judgment, and, therefore, the purchaser had no notice of any judgment; and unless there was a valid debt existing at the date of the conveyance, there could have been no creditor and no one defrauded. The judgment would, at farthest, only be evidence between the parties to that action of any fact, and would not bind defendant. Maybee v. Avery, 18 Johns. 352; Lawrence v. Hunt, 10 Wend. 81; Jackson v. Vedder, 3 Johns. 8; 3 Cow. 516.

4. Although the plaintiff claims an indebtedness prior to, and at the time of, the purchase, yet all the evidence goes to show, and the jury so find, that there was no indebtedness except for moneys advanced by Bruggerman to Keck upon a contract for the purchase of eighty acres of Keck's land before he pre-empted it; see verdict of jury, answers to interrogatories submitted by defendant. Such contracts are expressly forbidden by the pre-emption laws of 1841; a contract being in violation of law and public policy is void, and no indebtedness could have arisen by virtue of such contract. Chitty Cont. 670; Parsons Cont. 380.

Daniel Buck and A. G. Chatfield, for appellant.

Willard & Barney, for respondents.

EMMETT, C. J.

The plaintiff is a judgment creditor of one John Keck, and, as such, brings this action against him and his grantees, to set aside certain conveyances of Keck's real estate, which are alleged to have been made to defraud creditors, and particularly to defraud the plaintiff. The judgment which he recovered against Keck was rendered long after the execution of the conveyances against which he asks relief, hence it became important for the plaintiff to show the relation which he bore to Keck at the time they were made. And, to this end, he alleged in his complaint, that Keck was, at and prior to the making of said conveyances, indebted to him in a certain sum; that he, at a specified time, which was about the time the deeds bear date, commenced his action to recover said debt, and afterwards recovered judgment against said Keck for the amount thereof.

The defendant Hoerr, to whom all of the lands were conveyed, either by Keck himself, or Klugorty, his grantee, answers, denying all allegation of fraud, and that Keck was indebted to the plaintiff at the time the several conveyances mentioned were executed, and avers that he paid a fair and adequate consideration for the lands, setting forth the particulars thereof in detail; and that said lands, or a specified portion thereof, were at the time, occupied and claimed by said Keck as a homestead. The reply is chiefly directed to the allegations of the answer concerning the consideration paid by Hoerr for the lands, and the claim of a homestead therein by Keck.

On the trial, the case seems to have been submitted to the jury on certain written interrogatories, but the paperbooks furnished us do not inform us whether all the issues were submitted, or only the particular facts embraced in the several written interrogatories. The action itself is one in which the issues of fact should all be tried by the court, unless, by consent of parties or order of the court, they or specific facts involved therein are submitted to the jury, or referred.

The jury found specially, upon the interrogatories submitted to them, — that the several deeds were made with intent to defraud the plaintiff of his debt against Keck, — and that defendant Hoerr had notice of such indebtedness and intention to defraud, — and that he received the conveyances to himself in aid of Keck's fraudulent design. But they also found that the indebtedness of Keck to the plaintiff was for moneys advanced by plaintiff to purchase a portion of Keck's pre-emption claim before the same was pre-empted, and that Hoerr had no notice of any other indebtedness from Keck to the plaintiff. Upon...