Brumfield v. Cain

• Decision Date: 18 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–1433.,13–1433.
• Citation: 576 U.S. 305,192 L.Ed.2d 356,135 S.Ct. 2269
• Parties: Kevan BRUMFIELD, Petitioner v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

576 U.S. 305

135 S.Ct. 2269

192 L.Ed.2d 356

Kevan BRUMFIELD, Petitioner

v.Burl CAIN, Warden.

No. 13–1433.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 30, 2015.

Decided June 18, 2015.

Michael B. DeSanctis, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Premila Burns, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent.

Nicholas J. Trenticosta, Susan Herrero, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, Michael B. DeSanctis, Counsel of Record, Amir H. Ali, Adam G. Unikowsky, R. Trent McCotter, Leah J. Tulin, David A. Wishnick, Jan E. Messerschmidt, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Thomas R. McCarthy, William S. Consovoy, J. Michael Connolly, Consovoy McCarthy PLLC, Arlington, VA, Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney, Premila Burns, Counsel of Record, Assistant District Attorney, Monisa L. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), this Court recognized that the execution of the intellectually disabled contravenes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. After Atkins was decided, petitioner, a Louisiana death-row inmate, requested an opportunity to prove he was intellectually disabled in state court. Without affording him an evidentiary hearing or granting him time or funding to secure expert evidence, the state court rejected petitioner's claim. That decision, we hold, was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Petitioner was therefore entitled to have his Atkins claim considered on the merits in federal court.

I

Petitioner Kevan Brumfield was sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of off-duty Baton Rouge police officer Betty Smothers. Brumfield, accompanied by another individual, shot and killed Officer Smothers while she was escorting the manager of a grocery store to the bank.

At the time of Brumfield's trial, this Court's precedent permitted the imposition of the death penalty on intellectually disabled persons. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). But in Atkins, this Court subsequently held that "in light of ... ‘evolving standards of decency,’ " the Eighth Amendment " ‘places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender." 536 U.S., at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) ).¹ Acknowledging the "disagreement" regarding how to "determin[e] which offenders are in fact" intellectually disabled, the Court left "to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences." 536 U.S., at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (internal quotation marks omitted; some alterations in original).

The Louisiana Supreme Court took up the charge of implementing Atkins ' mandate in State v. Williams, 2001–1650 (La.11/1/02), 831 So.2d 835. The court held that "a diagnosis of mental retardation

has three distinct components: (1) subaverage intelligence, as measured by objective standardized IQ tests; (2) significant impairment in several areas of adaptive skills; and (3) manifestations of this neuro-psychological disorder in the developmental stage." Id., at 854 (relying on, inter alia, American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (10th ed. 2002) (AAMR), and American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (rev. 4th ed. 2000) (DSM–IV)); see also La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.5.1(H)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2015) (subsequently enacted statute governing Atkins claims adopting the three Williams criteria). The Williams court also clarified that "not everyone faced with a death penalty sentence" would "automatically be entitled to a post-Atkins hearing"; rather, it would "be an individual defendant's burden to provide objective factors that will put at issue the fact of mental retardation." 831 So.2d, at 857. Borrowing from the state statutory standard for determining when a pretrial competency inquiry is necessary, the court held that an Atkins evidentiary hearing is required when an inmate has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a " ‘reasonable ground’ " to believe him to be intellectually disabled. See id., at 861 ; see also id., at 858, n. 33 (characterizing the requisite showing as one raising a " ‘reasonable doubt’ ").²

Shortly after the Williams decision, Brumfield amended his pending state postconviction petition to raise an Atkins claim. He sought an evidentiary hearing on the issue, asserting that his case was "accompanied by a host of objective facts which raise the issue of mental retardation." App. 203a.

In support, Brumfield pointed to mitigation evidence introduced at the sentencing phase of his trial. He focused on the testimony of three witnesses in particular: his mother; Dr. Cecile Guin, a social worker who had compiled a history of Brumfield by consulting available records and conducting interviews with family members and teachers; and Dr. John Bolter, a clinical neuropsychologist who had performed a number of cognitive tests on Brumfield. A psychologist, Dr. Brian Jordan, had also examined Brumfield and prepared a report, but did not testify at trial. Brumfield contended that this evidence showed, among other things, that he had registered an IQ score of 75, had a fourth-grade reading level, had been prescribed numerous medications and treated at psychiatric hospitals as a child, had been identified as having some form of learning disability, and had been placed in special education classes. See id., at 203a–204a. Brumfield further requested "all the resources necessary to the proper presentation of his case," asserting that until he was able to "retain the services of various experts," it would be "premature for [the court] to address [his] claims." Id., at 207a.

Without holding an evidentiary hearing or granting funds to conduct additional investigation, the state trial court dismissed Brumfield's petition. With respect to the request for an Atkins hearing, the court stated:

"I've looked at the application, the response, the record, portions of the transcript on that issue, and the evidence presented, including Dr. Bolter's testimony, Dr. Guinn's [sic ] testimony, which refers to and discusses Dr. Jordan's report, and based on those, since this issue—there was a lot of testimony by all of those in Dr. Jordan's report.

"Dr. Bolter in particular found he had an IQ of over—or 75. Dr. Jordan actually came up with a little bit higher IQ. I do not think that the defendant has demonstrated impairment based on the record in adaptive skills. The doctor testified that he did have an anti-social personality or sociopath, and explained it as someone with no conscience, and the defendant hadn't carried his burden placing the claim of mental retardation at issue. Therefore, I find he is not entitled to that hearing based on all of those things that I just set out." App. to Pet. for Cert. 171a–172a.

After the Louisiana Supreme Court summarily denied his application for a supervisory writ to review the trial court's ruling, Brumfield v. State, 2004–0081 (La.10/29/04), 885 So.2d 580, Brumfield filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, again pressing his Atkins claim. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Brumfield could secure relief only if the state court's rejection of his claim was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2).

The District Court found that both of these requirements had been met. 854 F.Supp.2d 366, 383–384 (M.D.La.2012). First, the District Court held that denying Brumfield an evidentiary hearing without first granting him funding to develop his Atkins claim "represented an unreasonable application of then-existing due process law," thus satisfying § 2254(d)(1). Id., at 379. Second, and in the alternative, the District Court found that the state court's decision denying Brumfield a hearing "suffered from an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state habeas proceeding in violation of § 2254(d)(2)." Ibid.

The District Court further determined Brumfield to be intellectually disabled based on the extensive evidence it received during an evidentiary hearing. Id., at 406 ; see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1401, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (recognizing that federal habeas courts may "take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing" when § 2254(d) does not bar relief). This evidence included the results of various IQ tests—which, when adjusted to account for measurement errors, indicated that Brumfield had an IQ score between 65 and 70, 854 F.Supp.2d, at 392 —testimony and expert reports regarding Brumfield's adaptive behavior and "significantly limited conceptual skills," id., at 401, and proof that these deficits in intellectual functioning had exhibited themselves before Brumfield reached adulthood, id., at 405. Thus, the District Court held, Brumfield had "demonstrated he is mentally retarded as defined by Louisiana law" and was "ineligible for execution." Id., at 406.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 744 F.3d 918, 927 (2014). It held that Brumfield's federal habeas petition failed to satisfy either of § 2254(d)'s requirements. With respect to the District Court's conclusion that the state court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, the Fifth Circuit rejected the...