Brumley v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 2428,2428 |
| Parties | Maxwood Clarence BRUMLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Maxwood Clarence Brumley, in pro. per.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and J. Terrell Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an order rendered by the Court of Record in Broward County, Florida, denying without an evidentiary hearing a motion filed by Maxwood Clarence Brumley, the appellant, pursuant to CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A., to vacate and set aside certain judgments and sentences of that court.
It appears from the record that the appellant was charged by an information dated 28 May 1963 with the crimes of escape while incarcerated for a felony and robbery. Both of the said crimes were alleged to have been committed on 27 May 1963. The appellant appeared before the Court of Record on 28 May 1963 and pled guilty to each count of the information. The court thereupon adjudged the appellant guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for ten years on the escape charge and for life on the robbery charge.
On 23 February 1968 the appellant filed a motion, pursuant to CrPR 1.850 to vacate the judgments and sentences. The court of record by an order rendered on 26 July 1968 denied the motion without evidentiary hearing. It is from this order that the present appeal has been taken.
The issue before this court is whether or not the trial court committed error in denying the defendant's motion without an evidentiary hearing.
CrPR 1.850 provides a convenient procedural means whereby a person in custody under a sentence imposed in violation of his constitutional rights may seek appropriate relief. The inquiry in connection with a motion under CrPR 1.850 which seeks relief from such a judgment and sentence is whether or not the sentence was imposed in violation of the constitutional rights of the prisoner; therefore, the motion need not allege matters relating to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Tolar v. State, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 1. A movant under CrPR 1.850, however, must allege facts sufficient to constitute a basis for the collateral relief sought. State v. Weeks, Fla.1964, 166 So.2d 892, 897.
Upon receipt of a motion to vacate, the trial court should initially determine whether or not the facts alleged in the motion, when considered to be true, sufficiently state a basis for collateral relief. If the facts state a sufficient basis for the collateral relief as a matter of law, then the trial court must examine the record of the proceedings in the cause. If the record conclusively demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to relief, the motion may be denied without a hearing. On the other hand, if the record does not conclusively refute those allegations in the motion which if taken as true would entitle the movant to relief, then an evidentiary hearing should be afforded the movant. State v. Weeks, supra.
In the present case, the appellant's motion alleged that while he was in custody of law enforcement officers on or about the day of his arraignment, the sheriff and a deputy sheriff of Broward County told him that if he defendant himself on the charges of escape and robbery, he would be charged with the 'capital' offense of kidnaping and that if he failed to 'cooperate', the gunshot wound from which he was then suffering would be 'made fatal' while he was en route to the hospital. As a result of these threats, the motion alleges, the appellant's pleas of guilty were not freely made.
The appellant also alleges that the public defender who was appointed to represent him in connection with the charges did not investigate the case, informed appellant that he could not help him, advised him to plead guilty, and told him that he could be charged with kidnaping, but did not inform the appellant that kidnaping was a non-capital felony. 1 Consequently, charges the appellant, the public defender did not render competent legal services. Finally, the appellant alleges that his arrest and arraignment were made in a 'passioned' environment by reason of news coverage provided by the press, radio and television.
The charges in the motion to vacate relative to the alleged inadequacy of counsel are basically conclusory and relate primarily to matters normally within the realm of a trial counsel's judgment. The amount of time and effort required to properly investigate a case is a matter necessarily within the realm of trial counsel's judgment. So too is the determination whether to advise a defendant to plead guilty. As to the allegations that the attorney advised the appellant that he could have been charged with kidnaping, it does not appear from the factual allegations in the motion that this was improper advice. Based on the foregoing, the allegations are not, in our opinion, sufficient as a matter of law to support a charge that the appellant was denied a right of competent counsel. Simpson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So.2d 224 and Mitchell v. United States, 1958, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787 (cert. den. 358 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81, 3 L.Ed.2d 86). It is also our opinion that the vague allegations charging that the arrest and arraignment of the appellant were made in a 'passioned' environment were bare conclusions of the pleader and were thus totally insufficient as a matter of law to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing under CrPR 1.850.
The allegations in the motion to vacate with respect to the alleged coercion applied to the appellant prior to his plea of guilty stand on a different basis than the other allegations in the motion. A plea of guilty should be entered freely and voluntarily. Roberts v. State, Fla.App.1962, 142 So.2d 152; Pope v. State, 1908, 56 Fla. 81, 47 So. 487; and Euziere v. United States, 10 Cir.1957, 249 F.2d 293. If a guilty plea results from threats by a sheriff or a deputy sheriff the plea is not voluntary and may be vacated under Criminal Procedure Rule 1.850. Jones v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 191; Reddick v. State, Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 340; Plymale v. State, Fla.App.1966, 182 So.2d 57; and Waley v. Johnston, 1942, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302.
The allegations in the motion that the appellant was threatened by the sheriff and a deputy sheriff that he would be tried on a capital charge of kidnaping if he sought to defend himself on the charges of escape and robbery, that his gunshot wound would be made fatal if he failed to cooperate, and that as a result his pleas of guilty were not freely given, clearly set forth facts which, if true, are sufficient to entitle the appellant to relief under CrPR 1.850 from the judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to the coerced pleas.
The record before the trial court does not conclusively refute these allegations; therefore, an...
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Footman v. Singletary, 91-5213
...does not have to evaluate the entire record if the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is insufficient, Brumley v. State, 224 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969), so we will not make the inference suggested by Footman that the state court evaluated the entire record in this case. F......
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Reliford v. State, 70--182
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Scarborough v. State, 72--648
...65. For his contention that he was psychologically coerced by his attorney to enter his plea of guilty, appellant cites Brumley v. State, Fla.App., 224 So.2d 447; Davis v. State, Fla.App., 242 So.2d 750, and Cooley v. State, Fla.App., 245 So.2d 679. In those cases the appellate court indica......