Brundage v. Hahn
Decision Date | 21 August 1997 |
Docket Number | No. B099119,B099119 |
Citation | 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 830,57 Cal.App.4th 228 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 7 A.D. Cases 286, 24 A.D.D. 821, 10 NDLR P 289, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6740, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,923 Catherine BRUNDAGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Kenneth P. HAHN, as Assessor, etc., Defendant and Respondent. |
Collins, Collins, Muir & Traver and John J. Collins, Pasadena, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Catherine Brundage appeals from the summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles Office of the Assessor in this employment discrimination action. Brundage sued County for terminating and refusing to reinstate her because of a mental disability. We conclude Brundage was terminated and not reinstated because she abandoned her job. That this job abandonment may have been the result of a previously undisclosed manic-depressive (bipolar) disorder does not constitute either disability discrimination or a refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation to a mental disorder. We affirm.
Brundage was employed by County as a deputy assessor from June 1988. Brundage was often absent from work for medical appointments, and received medical leave for a 14-day drug rehabilitation program in July and August 1993. She requested and received emergency vacation from November 22 to 24, 1993. Because of the Thanksgiving holiday, she was not due to return to work until November 29, 1993. She did not return.
A County employee telephoned Brundage's mother on December 2, 1993, and was told Brundage was still on vacation.
On December 7, 1993, a letter was sent to Brundage informing her that, unless she returned to work by December 13, or gave reasons justifying her absence, she would be deemed to have resigned her position. This letter was returned to County, as Brundage had moved.
On December 14, 1993, County sent another letter to Brundage, at both her old and new address, informing her that she was Brundage was not home to receive this letter. Instead, she was "gambling, eating, talking to people and driving around" in Nevada. In September 1993, she had been diagnosed as manic-depressive (bipolar disorder), but had not informed the County of this diagnosis. On November 10, 1993, Brundage's prescribed dosage of Prozac had been doubled. Brundage believed that the change in her prescription had triggered a manic episode, which had caused her disappearance and inability to contact County. However, she had been able to contact her mother. At one time during her disappearance, Brundage had telephoned her mother, who had informed her that County had called.
deemed to have resigned as of November 29, 1993. She was informed that she could obtain reinstatement within 20 days of the date of her resignation, if she provided good cause. She was told to request reinstatement in writing by December 20, 1993, and to provide evidence that she had been unable to work or communicate with County due to compelling circumstances beyond her control.
On January 1, 1994, Brundage presented herself at a hospital emergency room. She was admitted to the hospital. On January 7, 1994, she called her supervisor, Steve Rojas, and told him she was in a mental hospital. Rojas referred her to Nathan Schlossman, the acting senior personnel technician. On January 10, 1994, Brundage telephoned Schlossman and informed him she was in a mental hospital and she had been driving around aimlessly for the past six weeks due to a problem with her medication. She had not returned to her apartment so had not received notification of her deemed resignation. Schlossman told Brundage she was no longer employed by County and informed her of her civil service reinstatement rights. A meeting to discuss Brundage's reinstatement request was arranged when Brundage was discharged from the hospital.
The meeting was held on January 27, 1994. Brundage was given an opportunity to explain her absence. Her evidence consisted of a letter from John E. Nelson, M.D., which stated, in its entirety: County was not persuaded. Schlossman believed the letter was insufficient to justify Brundage's absence and failure to contact County. County wanted Brundage examined by an independent psychotherapist. Brundage consented to the evaluation, and also released her medical records to County.
On January 31, 1994, County wrote to Occupational Health Services, requesting a medical/psychological evaluation of Brundage. County sought this evaluation
Mark Reaves, Ph.D., performed the evaluation at the request of Occupational Health Services. He reported that Brundage's "history suggests that the alleged mania was precipitated by the loss of a romantic relationship, but [Brundage] believes that Prozac caused the episode." Although Reaves concluded Brundage's current symptoms did not preclude a return to work, his evaluation did not address the extent to which Brundage may have been willfully negligent and accountable during her absence.
By letter of April 19, 1994, Brundage's request for reinstatement was denied. Brundage was informed that the information she had provided was "not of a sufficient or convincing nature" to justify reinstatement. Further, her request was denied because it was untimely under the applicable civil service rules, which allow a reinstatement request within 20 days of the deemed resignation.
Brundage's appeal to the Civil Service Commission was denied. She then brought this action.
Brundage brought this action against County under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seg.) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") (Gov. Code § 12900 et seq.), alleging County discriminated against her on the basis of disability. Particularly, she alleged County committed discriminatory acts in denying her reasonable accommodation, harassing her after she requested reasonable accommodation, terminating her and denying her reinstatement.
County moved for summary judgment on the ground Brundage could not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. County contended it had received no notice of Brundage's disability until after Brundage had been terminated, and Brundage's post-termination request for reinstatement was too late to be considered a request for reasonable accommodation.
Brundage opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground the denial of reinstatement constituted a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. Additionally she argued that, because her absence was caused by her disability, the termination based on her absence was likewise based on her disability.
The trial court granted the motion. Judgment was entered. Brundage filed a timely notice of appeal.
"The policy underlying motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues is to ' "promote and protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless trials." ' " (Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 323, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 296.)
"Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The motion and the opposition to the motion "shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken." (Id. subd. (b).) Separate statements setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the parties contend are undisputed must be included. (Ibid.) "Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing shall be deemed waived." (Ibid.) (Id. subd. (c); KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1028, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 431.)
A defendant or cross-defendant meets his or her burden upon a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication if that party has proved "one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met...
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