Bruner v. Dunaway

• Decision Date: 11 August 1982
• Docket Number: Nos. 81-5096,81-5097,s. 81-5096
• Citation: 684 F.2d 422
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
• Parties: Gerald C. BRUNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Wade DUNAWAY, et al., Defendants, Cross-Appellees, James Bates, Gregory Taylor, Christian Castellaw, Defendants-Appellants.

Page 422

684 F.2d 422

Gerald C. BRUNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Wade DUNAWAY, et al., Defendants, Cross-Appellees James Bates, Gregory Taylor, Christian Castellaw Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 81-5096, 81-5097.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued June 16, 1982.

Decided Aug. 11, 1982.

Robert H. Watson, Jr., McCampbell & Young, John Norris, Taylor & Groover, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants, cross-appellees.

Norbert J. Slovis, Locket, Slovis & Weaver, William S. Zwick, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.

Before MERRITT and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from the Eastern District of Tennessee wherein the plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant, Gerald C. Bruner (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff or Bruner) asserts as error the district court's grant of a new trial to defendants after a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants, cross-appellees are James Bates (Bates), Gregory Taylor (Taylor), Wade Dunaway (Dunaway), James Humphrey (Humphrey), Richard Ingram (Ingram), Steve Tinder (Tinder), Rick Fretz (Fretz) and Christian Castellaw (Castellaw). Bates, Taylor and Castellaw, having been found liable to the plaintiff after a second trial, are also appellants, contending that the trial judge erred in denying their alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial and remittitur.

The instant action arose out of incidents occurring on April 23, 1979. Plaintiff alleged in his initial complaint in the district court that, on that date, defendants Bates, Taylor, Dunaway, Humphrey, Ingram and Tinder, police officers for the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, defendant Fretz, a reserve police officer for that municipality, and defendant Castellaw, an explorer boy scout acting as a reserve police officer, deprived him of rights secured under the Constitution by subjecting him to severe beatings while in the custody of said officers. The action was instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff testified at the first trial that he was asleep in his automobile, which was parked adjacent to a school building, when Tinder woke him and requested that he exit the vehicle. Bruner testified that Tinder then began striking him with a flashlight or club and that, out of fear for his personal safety, he ran from the scene.

Thereafter, according to plaintiff's testimony, he stopped briefly at the home of Arthur Copeland (Copeland) erroneously believing it to be the residence of an acquaintance. After leaving Copeland's residence, Bruner fled into an alley where he was confronted by defendant Castellaw and struck on the head by an unidentified individual. ¹ Thereafter Bruner stated that he was repeatedly struck and kicked by other unidentified persons and he was dragged down the alley. Plaintiff was then placed into an ambulance and taken to the hospital for medical treatment.

The defendants each admitted their presence at various stages of the incident but, with the exception of Tinder and Castellaw, flatly denied striking the plaintiff in any manner.

Tinder testified that, while on patrol, he found Bruner asleep in an automobile parked behind a school building. Tinder ordered Bruner out of the automobile and began to frisk him. Bruner thereupon assaulted Tinder provoking the officer to strike Bruner with his nightstick, after which Bruner pushed the officer to the ground and fled the scene.

Castellaw testified that he was in the company of officers Bates and Taylor when he heard Tinder's call for help on the police radio. Upon receiving the call, Castellaw and the two officers initiated a search of the area and, after discovering the plaintiff, gave chase. Castellaw encountered Bruner in an alley where, according to Castellaw, Bruner attacked him and Castellaw struck Bruner in the side of the head with his flashlight.

Taylor testified that when he arrived in the alley Castellaw and Bruner were engaged in a struggle and he attempted to aid Castellaw in subduing the plaintiff. Bates, according to his testimony, arrived at the scene after Taylor and also sought to restrain Bruner.

Dunaway, Humphrey and Ingram each testified that they did not arrive at the scene until after Taylor, Bates and Castellaw had apprehended Bruner and that they (Dunaway, Humphrey, Ingram) did not assist or participate in subduing Bruner. Fretz testified that when he arrived at the alley Bruner was already handcuffed and that Fretz assisted other officers in restraining him. Fretz also testified that he assisted in placing Bruner in the ambulance.

The first trial resulted in a jury verdict for plaintiff against all defendants assessing damages in the amount of $300,000. The district court however, on motion of the defendants, set aside the jury verdict and ordered a new trial. The court's order provided, in pertinent part:

The suit is based upon an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as the Civil Rights Act. In order for any of the defendants to be held (liable) under that Act, personal involvement must be shown. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F.Supp. 277 (N.D.Ill.1969); Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F.Supp. 220, 223 (D.Colo.1966). The proof failed to show that defendants Bates, Taylor, Dunaway, Humphrey and Fretz were personally involved in injuring plaintiff.

The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the new trial order was denied and a new trial ensued.

At the close of the evidence of the second trial the district judge directed a verdict in favor of defendants Ingram, Dunaway and Humphrey. The City of Knoxville had previously been dismissed from the action. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff against defendants Bates, Taylor and Castellaw and assessed damages in the amount of $100,000. The jury found defendants Tinder and Fretz not liable to plaintiff.

Thereafter the defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, new trial or remittitur. The plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to defendants Tinder and Dunaway, a new trial limited to the issue of damages or, in the alternative, additur. The district judge denied the parties' respective motions and this appeal ensued.

With respect to the propriety of the district court's grant or denial of a new trial, the following principles, recently affirmed by this Circuit, govern this Court's review:

In ruling upon a motion for a new trial based on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, a district judge must compare the opposing proofs and weigh the evidence (Felton v. Spiro, 78 F. 576 (6th Cir. 1897) Taft, J.), General American Life Ins. Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 136 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1943), and "it is the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, if he is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence * * *."

"(C)ourts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdicts merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable." Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 412, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944); Werthan Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 202 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1953). Thus, while the district judge has a duty to intervene in appropriate cases, the jury's verdict should be accepted if it is one which could reasonably have been reached.

With respect to the applicable scope of review of a District Court decision granting or denying a new trial on the basis of the weight of the evidence, it is well settled that reversal may be predicated only upon an abuse of discretion.

TCP Industries, Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1981), quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 377 F.2d 49, 52-53 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913, 88 S.Ct. 239, 19 L.Ed.2d 260 (1967). Thus, the district court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on new trial motions. See generally 10 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice...