Suarez Cestero v. Pagan Rosa, No. CIV. 97-2251(JP).
| Decision Date | 11 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 97-2251(JP). |
| Citation | 198 F.Supp.2d 73 |
| Parties | Surima SUAREZ CESTERO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Daniel PAGAN ROSA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
A.J. Bennazar-Zequeira, A.J. Bennazar Law Offices, Hato Rey, PR, Laura Gonzalez-Lugo, Hato Rey, PR, for plaintiffs.
Carlos J. Morales-Bauza, San Juan, PR, Leticia Ramirez-Rangel, Commonwealth Dept. of Justice, Fed. Litigation Div., San Juan, PR, for Daniel Pagan-Rose, defendant.
Daniel Pagan-Rosa, San Juan, PR, pro se.
Miguel A. Pagan-Rivera, Hato Rey, PR, for Ferdin Carrasquillo-Ayala, defendant.
Carlos J. Morales-Bauza, San Juan, PR, Marie L. Cortes-cortes, Dept. of Justice, Fed. Litigation Div., San Juan, PR, for Pedro Toledo, Carmelo Correa, Evelyn Roig-Bonilla, Ingrid Llorens-Orlandi, defendants.
Pursuant to this Court's Opinion and Order of July 20, 2001, requesting briefs regarding the issues of preclusion and qualified immunity (docket No. 143), the Court has received briefs and replies from Plaintiffs (docket No. 170 and 197), co-Defendants Secretary Daniel Pagán Rosa, Police Superintendent Pedro Toledo Dávila, Commander Carmelo Correa, and Mayor Ferdin Carrasquillo, all in their personal capacity (docket No. 181), and Mayor Ferdín Carrasquillo in his official capacity (docket No. 161, 174 and 198). In the instant Opinion and Order the Court considers the merits of the aforementioned briefs.
The Court has before it two unresolved issues, which are both dispositive as to whether the Court can proceed with this case. The first is whether a state court decision in a related case, involving some of the parties to this cause of action, prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction in this case. The second issue is whether the co-Defendants in this case, Superintendent Pedro Toledo Dávila, Colonel Carmelo Correa, and Secretary Daniel Pagán Rosa, in their personal capacities, and Mayor Ferdín Carrasquillo, in his personal and official capacity, are immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. If either of these questions is answered affirmatively, the case will be dismissed. In the alternative that both questions are answered negatively, then the case shall proceed unhindered by these considerations.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that Plaintiffs' claims are not precluded by the Commonwealth court's decision, and also holds that the co-Defendants cannot avail themselves of the defense of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.
Although this Court has already discussed in depth the background of this case in its Opinion and Order of July 20, 2001, the Court believes it necessary to further delve into the particulars of the claim filed in the Commonwealth court.
The factual background shows that Plaintiffs in this action are the heirs of Marcial Suárez and Encarnación Fuentes, as well as the Estate of Marcial Suárez and the Estate of Encarnación Fuentes (collectively hereinafter "the Estates"). The Estates are the owners of a parcel of land located in the Medianía Baja Ward of the Municipality of Loíza (hereinafter "the property"). Attorney Surima Suárez (hereinafter "attorney Suárez"), a member of both Estates, has a contract with the Estates for the removal of sand from the property. Plaintiffs allege that the sand removal was the first phase of a residential project that was being developed by the Estates called "Lago del Palmar", which would consist of several residential housing buildings surrounding a large lake.
To that end, Plaintiffs identified and advertised the project, and allegedly obtained all the permits necessary from all the relevant government agencies for its completion. Plaintiffs also obtained an additional governmental permit to extract sand, took out insurance in the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), and posted a performance bond in the amount of Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine Thousand Dollars ($879,000.00). Plaintiffs commenced with the sand removal phase of the project in January 1997.
On April 29, 1997, the Municipality of Loíza, through its Mayor Ferdín Carrasquillo Ayala, filed a civil action in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Carolina Part, Civil No. FPE97-0332(401) (hereinafter the "Commonwealth court", or the "Commonwealth case") to enjoin Plaintiffs from further sand removal. The Municipality alleged that the Lago del Palmar project was a false front for sand removal and that attorney Suárez never intended to complete the same. The Municipality also claimed that the sand removal project was operating illegally because Plaintiffs had not obtained all the necessary permits, and further alleged irreparable harm to the flora, fauna and ecosystem of the area. The Municipality sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), as well as a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin Plaintiffs from further sand removal from the property.
On May 8, 1997, attorney Suárez was served with process in said case. The documents served also stated that the Commonwealth court had set a hearing regarding the Municipality's TRO request for May 12, 1997. On that same day and thereafter, specifically on May 9, and 12, 1997, picketing took place at the entrance of Plaintiffs' property. Trucks and machinery owned by the Municipality of Loíza were parked at the entrance to the property, where they allegedly blocked the entrance and departure of trucks and of people working on the project and prevented any further sand removal. Mayor Carrasquillo and co-Defendant Colonel Correa, the Puerto Rico Police Commander for that area, were present.
The Estates answered the Complaint on the same day they were served, May 8, 1997, and at that same time filed a counterclaim against the Municipality of Loíza, alleging the picketing the Mayor had organized and sponsored on the property was illegal, seeking a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin the Mayor from carrying out and participating in any further illegal acts. The Estates also prayed for a hearing to assess damages allegedly suffered by the Estates as a result of said actions. Attorney Suárez claimed she and others who were inside the property were illegally detained (the phrase used in their Answer was "held hostage") at the property for a number of hours that day, because Mayor Carrasquillo's men did not let anyone in or out of the project.
In addition, on that same day co-Defendant Daniel Pagán, Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and the Environment (hereinafter "DNRE"), allegedly contacted attorney Suárez and asked her to voluntarily stop the activities she was carrying out at the project. Attorney Suárez refused, stating she had valid permits issued pursuant to law to carry out the sand removal activities.
On May 9, 1997, the Police were allegedly detouring trucks arriving at the property to carry out the sand, and were instructing them to leave the area. Plaintiffs allege that the Police told attorney Suárez that they were acting pursuant to orders. Shortly thereafter, Mayor Carrasquillo arrived at the scene and once again mobilized the townspeople and blocked the entrance and exit to the property. Plaintiffs allege that less trucks arrived at the project that day because the police were ordered to divert them at the intersection of PR-3 and PR-187, the road that led to the project.
That same day, May 9, 1997, Plaintiffs wrote and delivered a letter to co-Defendant Toledo, the Police Superintendent, regarding the problem, specifically pointing out the dangerous atmosphere that prevailed in and around the project, and asking the Superintendent for help in protecting the rights of those at the project. Said letter went unanswered and was to no avail; the picketing continued that day and on May 12, 1997, and the project remained paralyzed.
The Commonwealth court held a hearing on May 12, 1997. During said hearing, Secretary Pagán apparently requested a meeting in chambers, where he allegedly informed that court that he could try to resolve the explosive situation. The Commonwealth Court then issued a ten (10) day temporary restraining order to see if the situation could be resolved amicably. At the end of the first ten (10) days, no change had occurred, and therefore that Court extended the order by an additional ten (10) days. After no further change in the situation was reported, the Commonwealth court then issued a preliminary injunction that enjoined further sand removal for sixty (60) days. It further ordered an environmental evaluation to be carried out to determine ecological and other damages, and held a hearing to consider these issues.
On July 2, 1997, the Estates filed a Third-Party Complaint against the DNRE, alleging that the Secretary of said administrative agency had intervened and acted improperly in the case, had prevented the Police Department from carrying out their duties, and had thus aided and abetted the illegal actions carried out against the Estates.
In August 1997, after a lengthy hearing on the merits, the Commonwealth court concluded that no irreparable harm had been proven by the Municipality of Loíza, and that its claim for damages to the environment was not supported by any scientific or specific evidence. Consequently, it denied the motion for injunctive relief and dismissed the Municipality's complaint. The Municipality appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgment issued by the trial court. The Municipality then appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, who on December 16, 1999, granted certiorari.
At the administrative level, concurrent procedures regarding the sand removal controversy commenced in March 1997, when the DNRE, at the behest of the Municipality and its citizens, ordered hearings be held...
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