Bruno v. U.S. Renal Care, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-04617-FLA (MRWx) |
| Parties | MICHAEL BRUNO, Plaintiff, v. U.S. RENAL CARE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT 13] AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. 20]
Before the court are two motions: (1) Plaintiff Michael Bruno's (“Bruno” or “Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (Dkt. 13 “MTR”); and (2) Defendant U.S. Renal Care Inc.'s (“U.S. Renal Care” or “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 20, “MTD”). Both Motions are opposed. Dkt. 19 (Opposition to MTR, “MTR Opp.”); Dkt. 23 (Opposition to MTD, “MTD Opp.”). In August 2021, the court found these matters appropriate for resolution without oral argument and vacated the hearing dates. Dkts. 24, 26; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. / / / For the reasons stated herein, the court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and GRANTS in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff filed this putative employment class action on March 3, 2021, in Los Angeles Superior Court. Dkt. No. 1-1. The Complaint alleged eleven causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code, California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (the Unfair Competition Law, “UCL”), and 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). Id. On June 4, 2021, Defendant removed the action to this court, alleging both (1) federal question jurisdiction in light of the FCRA claim, and (2) jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). Dkt. 1.
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 24, 2021, alleging nine causes of action for violations of: (1) California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (unpaid overtime); (2) California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a) (); (3) California Labor Code § 226.7 (); (4) California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 (unpaid minimum wages); (5) California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 (); (6) California Labor Code § 226(a) (non-compliant wage statements); (7) California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (unreimbursed business expenses); (8) the UCL; and (9) the FCRA. Dkt. 11 (“FAC”).
According to the FAC, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a Dialysis Technician from approximately March to November 2020. FAC ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiff was an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff seeks to represent two classes: a proposed “Wage Class” consisting of “[a]ll current and former hourly-paid or nonexempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants within the State of California at any time during the period from March 3, 2017 to final judgment and who reside in California” and a proposed “FCRA Class” consisting of “[a]ll of Defendants' current and former employees and prospective applicants for employment in the United States who applied for a job with Defendants on whom a background check was performed at any time during the period from March 3, 2016 to final judgment.” Id. ¶ 13.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to federal court only where the district court would have original jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” In assessing whether removal from state court was proper, the court looks to the pleadings at the time of removal rather than any amendment to the pleadings post-removal. See Broadway Grill, Inc. v. Visa Inc., 856 F.3d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017) (“the circuits have unanimously and repeatedly held that whether remand is proper must be ascertained on the basis of the pleadings at the time of removal”).
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand argues Defendant fails to show that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million as required for CAFA jurisdiction. MTR 1; MTR Br. 3-4. Plaintiff, however, does not address the court's federal question jurisdiction, which arises from the fact that the Complaint alleged a cause of action under a federal statute, the FCRA.[1] See generally MTR. Thus, the court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Smith v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 2:11-cv-02108-KJM (EFB), 2012 WL 202055, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) (); Rogers v. Smith Volkswagen, LTD, No. 2:19-cv-02567-AB, 2020 WL 1676400, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2020) ().
On Reply, Plaintiff argues that his FCRA claim is insufficient to support removal because federal question jurisdiction permits but does not require removal. Dkt. 21 (“MTR Reply”) at 13. Plaintiff, however, does not cite any legal authority for the proposition that a defendant may not remove an action in which the plaintiff has asserted a federal claim, and argues only that the removal statute must be strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. See id. While it is true that federal question jurisdiction does not mandate removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 vests the right of removal exclusively with the defendant. See Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2007). As Defendant has chosen to exercise that right here, Plaintiff's argument fails.[2] The court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in this action, as all claims relate to Plaintiff's employment with Defendant and “form part of the same case or controversy” as the FCRA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. At this time, the court will not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Having found the court has original jurisdiction over the FCRA claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, the court need not assess whether the court also has jurisdiction under CAFA.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of claims asserted in a complaint. Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). A district court properly dismisses a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts “to state a cognizable legal theory.” Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 824 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2016).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (internal citations omitted). When evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “must accept all well-pleaded material facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Caltex, 824 F.3d at 1159. Legal conclusions, however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Defendant moves to dismiss the first and fourth through eighth causes of action of the FAC. MTD 1. First, Defendant argues Plaintiff's first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action fail to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (“Rule 8”) and are deficient because they use “open-ended, catch all phrases” such as “including, but not limited to” and “inter alia,” which Defendant maintains does not give fair notice of all of the grounds for his claims. MTD Br. 1, 4-8. Defendant notes, for example, that Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for failure to pay minimum wage alleges: “Defendants' failure to pay minimum wages included, inter alia, Defendants' effective payment of zero dollars per hour for hours Plaintiff and the other class members worked off-the-clock performing work duties, such as tasks related to providing medical care for patients, cleaning medical equipment and the work area, and communicating with supervisors about work-related issues.” MTD Br. 5 (citing FAC ¶¶ 34, 81) (emphasis in MTD). Thus, according to Defendant, “Plaintiff apparently has not disclosed all of the grounds on which he intends to seek classwide relief for minimum wage violations.” Id.
Upon review of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, the court finds the allegations sufficient to satisfy Rule 8. Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The FAC pleads sufficient facts to meet that standard. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th...
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