Bruno v. United States
Decision Date | 15 September 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 15992.,15992. |
Citation | 259 F.2d 8 |
Parties | Joe BRUNO, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Jerome L. Goldberg, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Thomas R. Sheridan, Lloyd F. Dunn, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before DENMAN, FEE and HAMLIN, Circuit Judges.
Bruno appeals from the verdict in a jury trial case convicting him of four unlawful sales and facilitating the sales of narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 for which he was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. He contends (a) that the Court erroneously refused certain instructions; (b) that the statutory presumption of knowledge of importation by possessing narcotics is not valid in the case; and (c) that he was entrapped into making the sales by the Government's agents.
The facts are not in dispute. On four separate occasions during October and November, 1957, one Velasquez, a deputy sheriff of Los Angeles County, posing as a narcotics peddler, sought and obtained heroin from the appellant. On each occasion Velasquez received the heroin directly from the appellant and paid the appellant in cash. The sole testimony regarding these transactions was that of Velasquez and of several Government agents who had observed the negotiations from a distance. Appellant neither testified himself nor offered any evidence in his own behalf.
The ground of the District Court's refusal of the requested instruction is that they were not submitted at "the opening of the trial", the Court so interpreting Rule 14 of that Court, West's Ann.Code, requiring them to be "presented to the court in duplicate as soon as possible after the opening of the trial." Emphasis added. They were not presented until some time prior to the testimony of the final witness. We think the Court erred in its refusal. The situation is now controlled by F.R.Crim. P. 30, 18 U.S.C.A., permitting parties to file requests for instructions "at the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs." Emphasis added.
We think that Bruno reasonably delayed in submitting his requested instructions until he could know, from the Government's case-in-chief, whether his theory of defense would have some support in the evidence. In any event F.R. Crim.P. 52(b) requires our consideration of Bruno's contention that it was plain error to refuse to consider the instructions.1
The requested instructions are:
However, the instruction itself is not warranted by the evidence. Bruno contends that he was the mere selling agent for somebody else and hence he himself did not "sell" the drugs, relying on Adams v. United States, 5 Cir., 220 F.2d 297 and United States v. Moses, 3 Cir., 220 F.2d 166, in neither of which was considered the facilitating of a sale under 21 U.S.C.A. § 174.
The evidence shows that Bruno received some of the drugs from another person but there is no evidence that he received them as agent and not as a purchaser who then sold them as owner. That it was the latter is supported by the facts that Bruno on two occasions reduced the sale price of the narcotics on his own authority and on another occasion indicated to Velasquez the quality of the drugs which would be available the following week.
In any event Bruno facilitated the sale of the drugs. In Pon Wing Quong v. United States, 9 Cir., 111 F.2d 751, 756 in upholding the conviction of Quong we decided that the word "facilitates" of 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 "in any manner facilitates a sale" has This definition is accepted and followed in the Tenth Circuit in United States v. One 1950 Chevrolet 4-Door Sedan, 215 F.2d 482, 484. Cf. Black's Law Dictionary 4 Ed. p. 705.
This view is supported by the fact that 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 punishes anyone who (a) "buys, sells" or "in any manner facilitates the * * * sale." The uncontradicted evidence that Bruno delivered to Velasquez the heroin and received the payments therefor, shows facilitation of the sales. There is no error in denying the giving of the instructions.
Bruno moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the statutory presumption of 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 is inapplicable in his case. The presumption reads:
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury."
The motion was made at the close of the Government's case and the Government contends that the motion could not be considered by the District Court because not renewed at the close of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. Johnson
...We note that the district court also treated the government's untimely requests in the same manner.30 Wilkins cites Bruno v. United States, 259 F.2d 8 (9th Cir.1958), in support of his argument that Rule 30 nullifies the local provision. In Bruno, the court did indeed conclude that the fede......
-
Lewis v. United States
...912 (5th Cir. 1959) (alternative ground); United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955). To the contrary is Bruno v. United States, 259 F.2d 8, 10 (9th Cir. 1958) (alternative grounds): "The uncontradicted evidence that Bruno delivered to Undercover Agent Velasquez the heroin and rece......
-
Chavez v. United States
...would follow them. We think that they are not applicable here. Cf. Vasquez v. United States, 9 Cir., 1961, 290 F.2d 897; Bruno v. United States, 9 Cir. 1958, 259 F.2d 8; Lewis v. United States, 337 F.2d 541, at ...
-
United States v. Contrades, Cr. No. 11556.
...185 F.Supp. 82. 17 7 Cir., 1956, 229 F.2d 216. 18 9 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 721. 19 1832, 6 Pet. 445, 31 U.S. 445, 8 L.Ed. 458. 20 9 Cir., 1958, 259 F.2d 8. 21 1921, 255 U.S. 138, 41 S.Ct. 260, 65 L.Ed. 22 9 Cir., 1940, 111 F.2d 751, 756. ...