United States v. One 1950 Chevrolet 4-Door Sedan
Decision Date | 20 August 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 4823.,4823. |
Citation | 215 F.2d 482 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. ONE 1950 CHEVROLET 4-DOOR SEDAN, Motor No. HAA 181614, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
A. Pratt Kesler, U. S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant.
Chris T. Praggastis, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, PICKETT, Circuit Judge, and SAVAGE, District Judge.
The United States seized and sought the forfeiture of a 1950 Chevrolet automobile under the provisions of 49 U.S. C.A. §§ 781 and 782, on the ground that it had been used in the transportation and sale of marihuana. This is an appeal from a judgment denying the forfeiture and directing the release of the automobile to the owner.
The evidence of the United States in support of the libel was limited to circumstances surrounding the use of the automobile in connection with the purchase of marihuana. The claimants offered no defense. A federal narcotics agent testified that on March 27, 1953, he went to Bingham Canyon, Utah, to meet Jose Ortega for the purpose of buying from him a quantity of bulk marihuana; that he met Ortega at a bar in Bingham Canyon where they discussed the sale of marihuana to the agent; and that upon leaving the bar, they used Ortega's automobile to travel to the place where the marihuana was to be obtained and delivered. The agent further testified that the distance to the place of delivery was between one-half mile and one mile; and that while they were traveling in the automobile, he agreed to purchase one package of marihuana for $15. When they arrived at what appeared to be a warehouse, Ortega left the car and went into the building. He returned shortly and delivered to the agent a can of marihuana for which the agent paid him $15. The parties then returned to the bar where they originally met. During the return trip, Ortega gave the agent his home telephone number and told him to call there concerning further purchases. Upon this evidence, the trial court held (1) that the automobile had not been used to transport, conceal, or possess narcotics, and (2) that the automobile had not been used to facilitate the sale of narcotics.
The pertinent provisions of 49 U.S. C.A. §§ 781 and 782 read:
49 U.S.C.A. § 784 provides that all provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of vessels and vehicles for violation of the customs laws shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred under the provisions of the chapter providing for the seizure of carriers transporting contraband articles.
The customs laws provide:
"In all suits or actions brought for the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle * * *, where the property is claimed by any person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant; * * *". 19 U.S.C.A. § 1615.
The courts have generally held that if the evidence is sufficient to show probable cause for belief that a vehicle was being used unlawfully and contrary to the foregoing statutes, a forfeiture of the vehicle should follow if the claimants have offered no proof. United States v. One 1949 Pontiac Sedan, 7 Cir., 194 F.2d 756, certiorari denied 343 U.S. 966, 72 S.Ct. 1061, 96 L.Ed. 1363; W. E. Dean & Co. v. United States, 5 Cir., 171 F.2d 468; United States v. Andrade, 9 Cir., 181 F.2d 42; United States v. Davidson, 1 Cir., 50 F.2d 517, certiorari denied 284 U.S. 660, 52 S.Ct. 36, 76 L. Ed. 559; United States v. Blackwood, 1 Cir., 47 F.2d 849, certiorari denied 284 U.S. 627, 52 S.Ct. 12, 76 L.Ed. 534. If the evidence is of such a character that it will support a reasonable belief that the statute has been violated, then probable cause has been shown. United States v. One 1949 Pontiac Sedan, supra, and the cases cited there.1
We doubt that the transportation of narcotics in a car while in the possession of a United States officer, which possession is in...
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