Brunson v. Brunson

• Decision Date: 17 May 1912
• Citation: 74 S.E. 928,91 S.C. 411
• Parties: BRUNSON v. BRUNSON.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

74 S.E. 928

91 S.C. 411

BRUNSON v. BRUNSON.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 17, 1912

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Sumter County; H. F. Rice and John S. Wilson, Judges.

Action by Katie Brunson against G. W. Brunson. Application for an order staying proceedings against defendant for contempt for failing to obey an order requiring the payment of certain alimony pending an appeal from such order. Granted.

John H Clifton, of Sumter, for appellant. L. D. Jennings, of Sumter for respondent.

GARY C.J.

This is an application before me at chambers for an order staying proceedings in the above-stated case, pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. The main question argued before me was whether such order should be granted as there was not a separate appeal from the order of his honor, Judge H. F. Rice, adjudging the appellant guilty of contempt, in refusing to obey the order of his honor, Judge John S Wilson, requiring him to pay certain sums of money for alimony pendente lite.

In the case of State v. Nathans, 49 S.C. 199, 27 S.E. 52 the court points out the incidents of civil contempt proceedings as follows: "The judgment in a civil contempt proceeding is a judgment in a civil case, and, if the order to which the civil contempt proceedings attached as an incident is set aside for any cause, the proceedings in civil contempt fall with it. Pelzer, Rodgers & Co. v. Hughes, 27 S.C. 408 . This case is an illustration of the principle announced. The defendant therein was ordered to turn over certain choses in action to a receiver appointed by the court, and, on failing or refusing to do so, was ruled to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt. The rule was made absolute nisi. On appeal from this order, as well as the order appointing a receiver, this court held that the order appointing a receiver was erroneous because no case was made for the appointment of a receiver, and so set it aside; then very briefly the court said: 'This disposes also of the third question as to contempt.' That was a clear case of civil contempt. If the proceedings in the case at bar could be sustained as civil contempt proceedings, then, under the authority of Pelzer v. Hughes, supra, the order appealed from would have to be reversed, because the principal order to which it would attach as incident was not set aside."

If the order requiring the appellant to pay alimony pendente lite should be set...