Brunson v. Gainey

• Decision Date: 12 December 1956
• Docket Number: No. 522,522
• Citation: 95 S.E.2d 514,245 N.C. 152
• Parties: Otis C. BRUNSON, Administrator of Bobby Ray Brunson, Minor Child, Deceased, v. Harold Hartwell GAINEY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 514

95 S.E.2d 514

245 N.C. 152

Otis C. BRUNSON, Administrator of Bobby Ray Brunson, Minor Child, Deceased, v. Harold Hartwell GAINEY.

No. 522

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 12, 1956.

Bryan & Bryan, Dunn, for plaintiff appellant.

Young, Lamm & Taylor, Lillington, for defendant appellee.

RODMAN, Justice.

Plaintiff, by assignments of error 9, 11, 14, and 15, presents for consideration the accuracy of the charge, as related to the defense asserted by defendant, that he was confronted by a sudden emergency.

Plaintiff testified: 'that the defendant passed by the deceased's house about three or four times a day, and sometimes more than that; that the defendant passed the deceased's house every single day; that the home of the deceased had a small front yard; that the children of the witness, including the deceased, played in the yard and in the edge of the ditch in front of the house, because the yard was very small; that the witness had four children at that time; that they played in the yard and in the edge of the road every day; that they were playing in the yard and the edge of the road many times when the defendant passed in front of the house * * *.'

No person testified that he witnessed the accident. Plaintiff relied largely upon the testimony of Highway Patrolman Williams, who investigated the occurrence. He described the physical conditions as he found them and related statements made to him by defendant. Defendant did not offer any evidence.

It appears from Mr. Williams' description that the home is on the south side of the road, which is approximately 14 feet wide. At some places the road is sand and gravel with a very hard surface, and in other places it is sandy with just one wheel rut down the center of the road. In front of the house the road was sandy with a onecar path. The depth of the sand in the road ranged from three to seven inches. The road lay in an east-west direction. It was straight for 350 yards approaching plaintiff's house from an easterly direction. From the edge of plaintiff's house to the edge of the road is 12 feet. From the edge of plaintiff's steps to the edge of the road is seven feet. Just north of the center of the road was a patch of blood that covered 'a right large area.' Defendant told the witness the blood spot marked the point where he struck the child. Defendant's car was in the highway, 43 feet west of the blood spot. There were skid marks from the blood spot to a point 138 feet east of the blood. There is an embankment on each side of the road. There were trees, bushes, and weeds growing on the embankments. The embankment on the north side of the road is about three feet high. On the north side of the road and about 57 feet east of the house is a mail box.

Because of the bushes and trees, one traveling in a westerly direction would not see the porch of plaintiff's residence when he was more than 45 feet east of the mail box. From a point where the skid marks started to the front wheels of defendant's car was 181 feet. Defendant told witness 'that he was traveling from east to west, and passed the house at approximately 40 miles per hour and that the first thing the defendant knew there was a child in the road in front of him and that he applied his brakes; and that the defendant told the witness that he did not know whether the child was sitting or walking.'

In another part of his testimony the witness stated he was 'told by the defendant that when the defendant first saw the child the child was in the middle of the road, that he applied his brakes, that he did not know whether the child was sitting or walking at the time he was struck; that the defendant said he was driving about 40 miles per hour at the time.'

When defendant pointed out the skid marks to witness, he asked defendant 'why it was so long to the skid marks east of the car and that the defendant answered that he was traveling about 40 miles per hour when he saw the child, and that he attempted to stop before striking the child * * *.'

In answer to defendant's contention that the jury should not find that the child came to his death by the negligence of defendant for that defendant was confronted with a sudden emergency, plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury: 'The doctrine of sudden emergency is unavailing to one who, by his own negligence, placed himself in such a position of emergency.'

Plaintiff also requested the court to charge the jury: 'The duty of due care on the part of the driver does not just begin when the victim, infant or adult, is actually observed in a perilous position, but as soon as the victim should have been foreseen by the driver by his keeping a proper lookout, prior to the injury or death.'

The court declined to give either of the requests of plaintiff, and this refusal is made the basis of assignments of error 14 and 15.

The court charged on this phase of the case as follows: 'Now, I would like to charge you thus as to the defendant's contention with reference to sudden emergency. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that it would be incumbent upon you as jurors, to determine whether or not a sudden emergency or peril did in fact exist at the time and place of the accident, and if you do find that an emergency did exist at that time (I charge you that one who is required to act in an emergency is not held by law to the wisest choice of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of ordinary care and prudence similarly situated would have made, because it is well understood that a person in the presence of an emergency is not usually held to the same deliberation and circumspect care as in ordinary circumstances where no emergency exists. The standard of conduct required in an emergency, as elsewhere, is that of a prudent man).'

Plaintiff excepted to the portion of the charge in parentheses and assigns that portion as prejudicial error. Again, on the question of sudden emergency, the court charged: "when a person is confronted with a sudden emergency he is not held by law to the same degree of care as under ordinary circumstances, but only the degree of care...