Brunswick v. Statewide Grievance
Citation | 931 A.2d 319,103 Conn.App. 601 |
Decision Date | 04 September 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 27629.,27629. |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Parties | Max F. BRUNSWICK v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE. |
Roger J. Frechette, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Cathy A. Dowd, assistant bar counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
FLYNN, C.J., and McLACHLAN and Gruendel, Js.
Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires in relevant part that attorneys in our state "shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. . . ."1 The defendant, the statewide grievance committee, reprimanded the plaintiff attorney, Max F. Brunswick, for violating that rule in the course of his representation of a client in an arbitration proceeding. Pursuant to Practice Book § 2-38, the plaintiff filed a petition for judicial review with the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff now challenges the propriety of that determination. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The record discloses the following facts. The plaintiff is an attorney licensed to practice law in Connecticut who represented a client in an arbitration proceeding. On January 11, 2002, an award adverse to the plaintiff's client entered.2 On January 15, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award that alleged, inter alia, that the arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, undue means or evident partiality on the part of the arbitrators.3 The court, Hon. Anthony V. DeMayo, judge trial referee, held a hearing on the motion to vacate on February 4 and 6, 2002, at the conclusion of which it denied the motion and issued sanctions against the plaintiff and his client for making allegations without reasonable cause.4 The court thereafter referred the matter to the defendant to investigate a possible violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.5
On December 2, 2003, the New Haven judicial district grievance panel filed a decision in which it found probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had violated rules 8.4(3), 3.3(a) and 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A three person reviewing committee subsequently conducted a hearing on the matter. In its decision, the committee found the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
The reviewing committee found by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff violated rule 3.1 in two ways. It stated: The reviewing committee further found that
Upon the plaintiff's request for review, the defendant affirmed the decision of the reviewing committee. The defendant concurred with the reviewing committee's findings that the plaintiff's allegation relating to fraud, corruption or undue influence and his allegation of evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators constituted violations of rule 3.1. With regard to the first allegation, the defendant stated: The defendant therefore concluded that the plaintiff's violations of rule 3.1 warranted a reprimand.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 2-38, the plaintiff filed a petition for judicial review with the Superior Court. In its March 22, 2006 memorandum of decision, the court found substantial evidence to support the findings of the review committee and the conclusion that the plaintiff violated rule 3.1. It therefore dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. From that judgment, the plaintiff now appeals to this court.
Before considering the plaintiff's particular claims, we address the standard of review applicable to such grievance appeals. The plaintiff argues that the proper standard by which to evaluate the defendant's finding that he violated rule 3.1 is the clearly erroneous standard. Conversely, the defendant maintains that the applicable standard is the substantial evidence test.6 A review of the case law reveals a degree of confusion as to the appropriate standard, therefore warranting closer examination.7
Attorney disciplinary proceedings are "for the purpose of preserving the courts from the official ministration of persons unfit to practise in them." Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288, 2 S.Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed. 552 (1883). As our Supreme Court explained nearly one century ago, In re Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 450, 91 A. 274 (1914).
In Connecticut, our judges possess the "inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar." Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 523, 461 A.2d 938 (1983). They "can and ought to be [held responsible] for the fitness of those who enjoy the privileges of the legal profession under their authority and sanction." In re Peck, supra, 88 Conn. at 451, 91 A. 274. Accordingly, in exercising that responsibility, our judges (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 215 Conn. 517, 526, 576 A.2d 532 (1990). Likewise, it is the Superior Court's inherent supervisory authority over attorney conduct that vests in it jurisdiction to review an order of the defendant. Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 232, 578 A.2d 1075 (1990).
Attorney grievance proceedings are governed by the General Statutes and the rules of practice. See General Statutes § 51-90 et seq.; Practice Book § 2-29 et seq. Those provisions provide methods of procedure that complement, but do not confine, a court's inherent power to discipline its officers. Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 216 Conn. at 233, 578 A.2d 1075; In re Peck, supra, 88 Conn. at 457, 91 A. 274.
Adopted by the judges of this state, our rules of practice expressly consider the standard of review appropriate to an appeal from the decision of the defendant. They nevertheless provide little clarity to the clouded question before us. Practice Book § 2-38(f) provides: ...
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