Brushaber v. Stegemann

• Decision Date: 12 January 1871
• Citation: 22 Mich. 266
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Henry Brushaber and John Brushaber v. John Stegemann

22 Mich. 266

Henry Brushaber and John Brushaber v. John Stegemann

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 12, 1871

Heard January 11, 1871

Error to Wayne circuit.

This was an action brought by John Stegemann in the circuit court for the county of Wayne, against Henry Brushaber and John Brushaber for false imprisonment. The declaration contained the usual count for an assault and battery. The defendants pleaded the general issue. On the trial the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for two hundred dollars, and the judgment entered on a verdict is brought into this court by writ of error; the questions for review arising upon the rulings and charge of the court.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

O Kirchner, for plaintiffs in error.

Brown & Chambers, for defendant in error.

OPINION

Campbell Ch. J.

Stegemann sued the Brushabers for assault and false imprisonment without reasonable or probable cause. The false imprisonment complained of was that they had compelled him to go with them to the police office, under pretense of charging him with a felonious assault on his wife, who was their sister.

Henry Brushaber, having taken the stand and testified on his own behalf, was asked, on cross-examination, a series of questions referring to his opposition to his sister's marriage; his sale to Stegemann, before the marriage, of property afterwards conveyed by Stegemann to his wife, and a subsequent conveyance by her to the brothers, and it is alleged as error that the court allowed these questions to be put to him and admitted the answers. They had a manifest bearing on the relations between witness and Stegemann, and were admissible as to his credibility as a witness, without reference to his liability as defendant. We think they were also proper on the merits, as having some bearing on the animus of the parties.

An exception is taken to a charge of the court defining what might amount to an imprisonment. The portion of the charge complained of is so vaguely pointed out, that it is questionable whether the exception is sufficient in form. But as the objection seems to point at so much of the charge as held that an imprisonment might exist without actual manual arrest of the person, we shall refer to that point. The clause in question was this: "Now, a man may be imprisoned without being taken hold of by persons that imprison him. Suppose, for instance, an officer comes to one of you with a warrant, and says, 'I want you to go along with me,' and you go along without his taking hold of you--that would be an arrest. It is not necessary that he should lay his hands upon you. So, if a man comes to you and says, 'If you don't go with me I shall shoot you ' and if you go with him through fear, although he does not touch you, it would be an imprisonment. And if a man comes to you in any other way and uses words, or accompanies them with such an appearance that would lead you to be in fear of him, or make you comply with his...