Bryan v. Community State Bank of Bloomington, 41835

• Decision Date: 28 November 1969
• Docket Number: No. 41835,41835
• Citation: 285 Minn. 226,172 N.W.2d 771
• Parties: Gerald L. BRYAN, et al., Applicants, Respondents, v. COMMUNITY STATE BANK OF BLOOMINGTON, Objector, Relator.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 771

172 N.W.2d 771

285 Minn. 226

Gerald L. BRYAN, et al., Applicants, Respondents, v. COMMUNITY STATE BANK OF BLOOMINGTON, Objector, Relator.

No. 41835.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 28, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Minn.St. 45.07, which provides that the supreme court may review an order denying a bank charter by certiorari, is not an exclusive method of review. Section 15.0424, subd. 1, of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for judicial review of a final decision in a contested case coming from any administrative agency, with certain exceptions, also states that 'nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law * * *.' Therefore, applicants for a bank charter proceeded properly in appealing to the district court from an order of the Department of Commerce denying their application and were not confined to certiorari under § 45.07.

2. Minn.St. 15.0422 requires more than a mere conclusion that there is or is not a reasonable public demand in order to deny or grant a bank charter. It is necessary for the Department of Commerce to indicate the reasons behind its decision or to make specific findings of fact to support it.

3. Minn.St. 15.0425 permits a reviewing court to affirm or remand an agency decision, or reverse or modify it, 'if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions' are made upon unlawful procedure or are unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. Thus, an administrative board should state with clarity and completeness the facts and conclusions essential to its decision so that a reviewing court can determine from the record whether the facts furnished justifiable reason for its action.

4. Substantial evidence of a reasonable public demand adduced at the additional hearings amply supports the final action taken by the Department of Commerce.

Diessner, Wurst, Bundlie, Carroll & Crouch, Minneapolis, for relator.

Larkin, Hoffman, Daly, Lindgren & Danielson, Minneapolis, for respondents.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

This case comes before the supreme court upon a writ of certiorari to review an order issued by the Department of Commerce dated November 26, 1968, granting an application for a bank charter.

On February 11, 1966, applicants filed their application requesting a certificate of authority to transact a banking business at the intersection of France Avenue and Old Shakopee Road in Bloomington, Minnesota. Hearings commencing April 7, 1966, were held from time to time until July 27, 1966. On August 2, 1966, the Department of Commerce entered an order denying the application on the grounds that the applicants failed to demonstrate a reasonable public demand for the bank in the proposed location and that the probable volume of business in the location would be insufficient to insure and maintain the solvency of the applicant bank and the solvency of the existing banks in the locality. Such order was made pursuant to Minn.St. 45.07. ¹

Applicants sought review of the order of August 2, 1966, in Hennepin County District Court pursuant to § 15.0424 ² of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because of a lack of substantial evidence to support the department's conclusions the district court remanded the case for further proceedings and authorized the Department of Commerce to receive additional evidence and testimony. The court in its memorandum stated that it would seem either that the department did not accept some of applicants' evidence, that it found the evidence it did accept insufficient to establish a reasonable public demand, or that it considered evidence which was not made available to the court. In any event, the court did not know or was unable to determine the basis of the department's decision. The remanding order therefore required the Department of Commerce to make specific findings of fact supporting its conclusions, such findings to specify the appropriate geographical area to be considered and cover the 12 points outlined by this court in In re Application of Jackson, 277 Minn. 293, 152 N.W.2d 472.

The department thereafter held hearings during which new evidence was taken. It then made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the application for the bank charter, reversing its prior decision.

Community State Bank of Bloomington filed the petition for certiorari. It should be noted that the Department of Commerce and said objector had appealed from the district court's order but such appeal was dismissed on the ground that they failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

This appeal presents the following issues: (1) Is it proper to appeal to district court to review an order of the Department of Commerce denying an application for a certificate of authority to transact a banking business? (2) Was it proper for the district court to authorize the taking of additional evidence and for the department to hear additional evidence arising subsequent to the first hearing? (3) Was the decision of the department granting the application supported by substantial evidence?

1. As to the first issue, Minn.St. 45.07 provides:

'* * * In case of the denial of the application, the department of commerce shall specify the grounds for the denial and the supreme court, upon petition of any person aggrieved, may review by certiorari any such order or determination of the department of commerce.'

Relator questions whether § 15.0424 of the Administrative Procedure Act was intended to create a dual method of judicial review. Section 15,0424, subd. 1, of that act provides for judicial review of a final decision in a contested case coming from any administrative agency, with certain exceptions. However, it also provides that 'nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law * * *.' Thus, review under the Administrative Procedure Act is optional, and traditional methods, such as certiorari under § 45.07, are still available. ³ In the instant case, therefore, applicants proceeded properly in appealing to the district court.

2. In resolving the second issue, we find it necessary to dispose of relator's contention that the district court exceeded its scope of review by requiring the commerce department to produce more detailed findings in accordance with each of the 12 points outlined in the Jackson case.

We must first point out that relator is not on sound ground in raising an alleged district court error on a review by certiorari of an administrative agency's decision. Relator had a right of appeal from the district court decision, but such right was apparently wasted due to procedural errors. It should not now have another chance for that appeal. Nevertheless, since the issue has been raised, we will deal with it briefly.

The district court based its remand upon the following language in In re Application of Jackson, Supra, which required 12 detailed findings on the matter of reasonable public demand (277 Minn. 295, 152 N.W.2d 474):

'* * * Thus, in determining whether a 'reasonable public demand' is established in any case, it is required that these words be given a meaning which will promote the legitimate interest of the community as a whole in having a sound banking structure, reasonably competitive and fully adequate for the needs of the community. In making this determination, the following factors are among those that should be considered: (1) Number of banks already serving the area in which the proposed bank would locate; (2) size of area; (3) population of area; (4) wealth of residents of area; (5) commercial and industrial development of area; (6) potential growth of area; (7) adequacy of the services being provided by existing banks compared to the needs of residents and the services to be offered by proposed bank; (8) capability of existing banks to handle potential growth of the area; (9) convenience of the location of existing banks to residents of the area as compared to convenience of the proposed bank; (10) size of banks in area; (11) dates when the banks in the area were established; and (12) the number of persons in area who desire to use the proposed bank and the amount of business they would generate.'

Relator's contention that the above 12 factors need not be spelled out in the commission's findings is based on language in § 15.0422 requiring all agency decisions to be accompanied by a statement of reasons 'consist(ing) of a Concise statement of the conclusions upon each contested issue of fact necessary to the decision.' (Italics supplied.) However, note 5 to the Jackson case interprets § 15.0422 as requiring more than a mere conclusion that there is no reasonable public demand. It is necessary for the commission to indicate the reasons behind its decision or to make specific findings of fact to support it.

3. The district court also had statutory support for its review and subsequent remanding order. Minn.St. 15.0425 permits a reviewing court to affirm or remand the agency decision, or reverse or modify it--

'* * * if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are:

'(c) Made...