Bryan v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 30 September 1857
• Parties: J. J. BRYAN v. W. P. HUNT.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

36 Tenn. 543

J. J. BRYAN

v.W. P. HUNT.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September Term, 1857.

FROM SULLIVAN.

This is an action of assumpsit from the circuit court of Sullivan county. At the July term, 1857, before Judge Patterson, there was verdict and a judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed in error.

Maynard, L. C. Haynes, and Deaderick, for the plaintiff; Thomas A. R. Nelson and J. B. Heiskell for the defendant.

McKinney, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

On the 22d of November, 1854, an agreement in writing, not under seal, was entered into between the parties, whereby Hunt--whose residence was at Spurgeon's Mill, on the Holston river, in Sullivan county--agreed to deliver to Bryan at Chattanooga, on the Tennessee river--the place of residence of the latter--“five to six hundred barrels of flour,” at a stipulated price; “one hundred or more barrels to be delivered on the first tide, and the balance to be delivered as soon as convenient between now and the 1st of June.”

Part of the flour was delivered within the time stipulated; and for the failure to deliver the remainder before “the 1st of June,” the present action was brought.

The defence is placed upon the ground that the delivery of the remainder of the flour was prevented by reason of the want of a sufficient tide in the Holston river.

The proof shows that immediately after the contract was completed and the written instrument signed by the parties, Hunt asked Bryan, “if there was no tide, would he expect him to deliver the flour.” To which Bryan replied, “he did not expect him to deliver it if there was no tide.”

The question for our consideration is in regard to the admissibility and effect of this evidence, which, though objected to by the plaintiff, was allowed to go to the jury, who rendered a verdict for the defendant.

It is a well-settled rule of the common law, independently of the statute of frauds, that where a contract has been reduced to writing, and is complete in its terms and free from ambiguity, verbal evidence is not allowed to be given of what passed between the parties, either before the written instrument was made or during the time it was in a state of preparation, so as to add to or subtract from, or in any manner to vary or qualify the written contract. The written instrument must be considered as containing the true agreement between the parties, and as furnishing the best evidence of their final intentionsand acts. And this rule,...