O'Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 November 1966 |
| Docket Number | INC,MASSEY-FERGUSO |
| Citation | 413 S.W.2d 891 |
| Parties | G. T. O'BRYAN Appellant, v., Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Thacker & Kramer, Bratcher, Rummage, Beard & Flaherty, Owensboro, for appellant.
Humphreys, Jones & Short, Owensboro, for appellee.
DAVIS, Commissioner.
After G. T. O'Bryan had obtained a verdict of $50,000 against Massey-Ferguson, Inc., the trial court set the verdict aside and entered judgment n.o.v. dismissing O'Bryan's claim. CR 50.02. Upon this appeal O'Bryan urges that the judgment n.o.v. be set aside and that judgment in his favor be directed pursuant to the jury's verdict. O'Bryan's claim against Massey-Ferguson was based on alleged breach of 'promises, representations and commitments made to the appellant in consideration of, and to induce, his signing up as a retail dealer' for Massey-Ferguson, to employ appellant's explanation of the case.
It appears that appellant has been a retail dealer for Massey-Ferguson, and its predecessor companies, since 1950. His business establishment is located in Owensboro. There have been several written contracts evidencing the dealership agreement; they have been in substantially the same terms. The contract that was current during the period pertinent to this litigation was deted November 10, 1960, the date it was executed by O'Bryan, and December 15, 1960, the date it was executed in behalf of Massey-Ferguson, by an officer of the company.
Our view of the case makes it necessary to examine two portions of the written agreement in detail. After an introductory paragraph in which the principal place of business of appellant is described as 1035 West Fourth Street, Owensboro, Kentucky, the contract continues in part as follows:
'1. SELLING RIGHTS OF COMPANY PRODUCTS
b. In consideration of the faithful performance by Dealer of the undertaking set forth herein, Dealer is hereby granted the right to purchase Company Products for the effective period of this agreement. The trade area tributary to Dealer's principal place of business shall be considered the area in which Dealer is primarily responsible for development of the maximum volume of potential sales of Company Products. This area is not exclusive to Dealer and Company reserves the unrestricted right to sell Company Products to anyone, anywhere.'
Another significant portion of the written agreement states:
'4. GENERAL CONDITIONS:
b. Dealer acknowledges that no representations or statements have been made to him which would modify or tend to modify any of the provisions of this agreement in any way. All prior agreements and oral or collateral agreements heretofore or hereafter made and purporting to modify the provisions of this agreement shall have no force or effect. No representative of Company has authority to waive any provisions or to modify or to change the terms of this agreement excepting only by a supplemental written agreement executed by duly authorized Officer of Company and by Dealer.'
Without a detailed recitation of the evidence, we think it fairly states appellant's contention to say that he adduced evidence (and for this purpose we will assume its verity) showing that he had always been assured by the several branch managers that his dealer-territory included Daviess, McLean, Hancock and Ohio Counties. These branch managers assured appellant that the company would not establish a dealership in any of the four counties without giving appellant the 'first refusal' of such a dealership. These assurances to appellant were renewed in early 1960 (prior to the signing of the pertinent written contract) when Mike Gary assumed the branch manager's duties.
In 1962, without any prior notice to appellant, a dealership for Massey-Ferguson products was established at Sacramento in McLean County. Published advertisements relating to the new dealership proclaimed that it had been established by Massey-Ferguson and that the new firm was...
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Gajewski v. Bratcher
...v. Lanier, 116 Ga.App. 471, 157 S.E.2d 796 (1967); Williams v. Williams, 251 Iowa 260, 100 N.W.2d 185 (1959); O'Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.1966); Burrowes Corporation v. Read, 151 Me. 92, 116 A.2d 127 (1955); Sherman v. Koufman, 349 Mass. 606, 211 N.E.2d 220 (1965); ......
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Burchett v. Com., 2000-SC-0179-DG.
...as applied to evidence means that the evidence tends to establish or disprove an issue in litigation." O'Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Ky.1967), and on an earlier occasion that evidence is relevant when it "tends to make the proposition at issue either more or less pr......
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Elmore v. Com.
...S.W.2d 739, 740 (Ky.1954). If it is not ambiguous, a contract will be enforced strictly according to its terms. O'Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Ky.1966); Frear, 103 S.W.3d at 106. A court will interpret those terms "by assigning language its ordinary meaning and witho......
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R.B.S. v. K.M.S.
...v. Lanier, 116 Ga.App. 471, 157 S.E.2d 796 (1967); Williams v. Williams, 251 Iowa 260, 100 N.W.2d 185 (1959); O'Bryan v. Massey–Ferguson, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.1966); Burrowes Corporation v. Read, 151 Me. 92, 116 A.2d 127 (1955); Sherman v. Koufman, 349 Mass. 606, 211 N.E.2d 220 (1965); ......