Bryan v. Pinney

• Decision Date: 13 February 1889
• Docket Number: Civil 242
• Citation: 20 P. 311,3 Ariz. 27
• Parties: T.J. BRYAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. D. H. PINNEY et al., Defendants and Appellees [*]
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

20 P. 311

3 Ariz. 27

T.J. BRYAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. D. H. PINNEY et al., Defendants and Appellees ^[*]

Civil No. 242

Supreme Court of Arizona

February 13, 1889

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Maricopa. William W Porter, Judge.

Affirmed.

Cameron H. King, and Goodrich, Smith & Street, for Appellant.

The only point to be considered in this court is the question of laches. We submit that the statute of limitations applies with equal force under our statutes to actions at law and suits in equity. Mere delay or laches in bringing suit for land short of the period prescribed by the statute of limitations will not defeat plaintiff's action. Angell on Limitations, pp. 24, 25; Wood on Limitation, p. 115, sec. 58; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168; Rogers v Brown, 61 Mo. 187-191; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal 267, 10 P. 674; Lord v. Morris, 18 Cal. 486, 489; Gratton v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 34; Hancock v. Plummer, 66 Cal. 338, 5 P. 514; Piller v. S. P. R. R., 52 Cal. 44; Williams v. Conger, 49 Tex. 602; Hardy v. Hardin, 4 Saw. 548, Fed. Cas. No. 6060; White v. Sheldon, 4 Nev. 288; United States Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 56; Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 193, 32 Am. Dec. 208.

Baker & Campbell, Clark Churchill, and D. H. Pinney, for Appellees.

As to the statute of limitations, it is contended by appellant that the statute applies with equal force to actions at law and suits in equity. This is so in many cases. There are three classes of cases in regard to the bar of time: First, those in which equity is bound to apply the statute of limitations,--i. e. in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction at law and in equity. 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 1520; Hall v. Russell, 3 Saw. 575, Fed. Cas. No. 5943. Second, those in which it merely acts in analogy to those statutes and not in obedience to them. (See the examples in Story, supra, and cases cited by appellant. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168, is notably of this class.) Third, those in which the court is neither bound nor acts upon the principle of analogy to them, but proceeds on doctrines peculiar to and inherent in itself.

"But a defense peculiar to courts of equity is founded upon the mere lapse of time and the staleness of the claim in cases where no statute of limitations directly govern the case." 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 1520. To the latter class is usually assigned (1) those cases in which the public convenience requires there shall be a speedy end of strife, (2) others in which some of the principal parties in transactions sought to be reviewed are dead and their vouchers lost, (3) others in which the court could not be certain, from lapse of time, that relief apparently proper would certainly be just, and (4) others where the disturbance of purchasers or transactions acquiesced in for a greater or less time would prejudice the vested rights of third persons. Etting v. Marx, 4 F. 673.

It is evident that this case belongs to the class where a court of equity assumes the untrammeled prerogative of deciding, independent of any statute of limitations, whether the complainant has used such diligence in exhibiting his demand as the nature of the particular case required. Etting v. Marx, 4 F. 673; Wood on Limitation, secs. 58, 59. And this doctrine has been steadily adhered to in a great variety of cases. Harwood v. Cincinnati R. R. Co., 17 Wall. 78-81; Twin Lock Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 594; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87-96; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178-185; Sullivan v. Portland and Kennebeck R. R. Co., 94 U.S. 806-812; Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 235; Smith v. Thompson, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 112, 54 Am. Dec. 126, and notes; In re Lord, 78 N.Y. 111; 2 Perry on Trusts, sec. 870; Story's Equity Pleadings, 813; McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. 14-20.

"Any irregularity in a sale which renders it voidable will be deemed to be waived if it is not taken advantage of within a reasonable time and before innocent parties acquire rights." 2 Jones on Mortgages, sec. 1674; Hamilton v. Lubukee, 51 Ill. 415, 99 Am. Dec. 562; Rigney v. Small, 60 Ill. 416.

It is suggestive to note the increase of the value of this property during the inaction of the complainant (about four years), from $ 6,801.25 (the price at a judicial sale) and $ 125,000, at the time of filing this suit.

Porter, J. Wright, C. J., and Barnes, J., concur.

OPINION

The facts are stated in the opinion.

PORTER, J.

The bill in this case sets forth that plaintiff is a resident of Maricopa County; that some of defendants reside in same county, and others in places outside the territory; that one Jonathan M. Bryan, on or about the twentieth day of August 1883, died intestate, and at his death was the owner, seised and possessed, of several tracts of land described in the bill, all situated in the county of Maricopa; that on or about the twenty-fourth day of September, 1883 letters of administration upon the estate of Jonathan M. Bryan, deceased, were issued by the probate court of Maricopa County to M. W. Kales, defendant herein; that during the life-time of Bryan he executed to Kales certain promissory notes, for the security of the payment of which he also executed and delivered to Kales a mortgage on all the real estate described in the bill; that said Kales, without presentation for allowance of his debts in the probate court, commenced an action in the district court of the second judicial district for Maricopa County in his own proper person and name, and in his individual capacity, against himself in his representative capacity as administrator, and made answer to the complaint in such representative capacity. Whereupon, on the ninth day of October, 1883, a judgment of foreclosure was made and entered, and on the eighth day of November, 1883, the district court made an order of sale of said premises; that in pursuance thereof sales were made of the different parcels of the land, the defendant Robert Garside being the purchaser of one piece, M. W. Kales of two other separate pieces, and defendant William Gilson of another portion; that after the sales, and before the making of any deeds by the sheriff, Kales sold one quarter section to J. T. Simms, and the certificate of purchase was set over to Simms; that Kales, before the making of any deed, assigned to defendant D. H. Pinney block 98 of the city of Phoenix, it being a part purchased by Kales at sheriff's sale; that on June 16, 1884, the sheriff executed and delivered to Garside a deed of the part he bought, and that Garside, on May 27, 1887, sold the same to defendant J. De Barth Shorb; that on June 10, 1884, the sheriff executed and delivered a deed to Simms, as assignee of the certificate of purchase from Kales, the parcel of land so purchased by him; that defendant Simms, on February 28, 1887, sold the same to defendant George T. Brassius, who subdivided the same into blocks and lots, with streets running through said property, which is now known and designated as "Central Place"; that Brassius sold a lot therein to John W. Jeffries on May 3, 1887, and on May 5, 1887, sold another lot to defendant Henry W. Ryder; that on June 19, 1884, the sheriff executed a deed to defendant William Gilson for the part purchased by him, who on April 6, 1886, sold the same to defendant Cordelia L. Beckett; that on the 16th day of June, 1884, the sheriff executed a deed to D. H. Pinney, who on the 10th day of September, 1886, sold a portion thereof to defendant the Bank of Napa, Cal., and that said Pinney, on November 18, 1886, conveyed another part of said block to defendant F. Q. Story, who thereafter sold the same to defendant M. H. Sherman, who is now in possession of the same. The bill further states that, at the time of the death of said Jonathan M. Bryan, Vina Bryan was the wife of Bryan, and did survive him without issue, and said Bryan left no descendants; that all of the property was community property, and that she thus acquired title to the property, and so held the same, until the twenty-ninth day of June, 1887, when she conveyed the same to plaintiff, Thomas J. Bryan, for a good and valuable consideration. The bill alleges that the price bid and paid for each respective piece of property was an inferior price, and less than each was worth in open market; that of all the facts so alleged the defendants, and each of them,...