Bryan v. Summit Travel, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 984 S.W.2d 185
• Parties: Denise K. BRYAN, Appellant, v. SUMMIT TRAVEL, INC., Respondent. 55567.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 185

984 S.W.2d 185

Denise K. BRYAN, Appellant, v. SUMMIT TRAVEL, INC., Respondent.

No. WD 55567.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

Dec. 15, 1998.

Bruce R. Bartlett, St. Louis, MO for appellant.

Roland P. Walker, Columbia, MO for respondent.

Before RIEDERER, P.J., LOWENSTEIN and ULRICH, JJ.

RIEDERER, J.

Denise K. Bryan appeals from the denial of her worker's compensation claim by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. Because we find that Bryan filed her claim after the statute of limitations had expired, we affirm the ruling of the Commission.

Affirmed.

Facts

On December 4, 1990, Appellant, a travel agent for her then employer, the Respondent, was driving from Columbia, Missouri, to Marshall, Missouri, to deliver airline tickets on Respondent's behalf. While en route, Appellant's vehicle collided with a cow on the highway. As a result of the collision, Appellant sustained, among other things, a severe head injury and memory loss. She was comatose for eleven days. After the accident, Appellant was unable to recollect independently the purpose of her travel on December 4, 1990, and the record is unclear as to when, if ever, Appellant later remembered that detail. Appellant was hospitalized and incurred significant medical costs which were paid, in part, by Medicaid and her husband's insurance provider, but never by Respondent or its insurer.

Due to the severity of injuries she sustained in the collision, Appellant was rendered unable to continue working in any meaningful capacity and, in fact, never returned to the employ of Respondent. On June 3, 1991, Appellant's husband was appointed as Appellant's legal guardian. At the time of his appointment, the guardian was, apparently, unaware that Appellant had been on her way to deliver tickets for Respondent at the time of the accident, and the record is unclear as to precisely when he was apprised of that fact.

On April 24, 1995, Appellant filed a Claim for Compensation with the Division of Worker's Compensation which was heard by Administrative Law Judge R. Michael Mason. At the hearing before Judge Mason, the parties stipulated that: (1) medical bills incurred from the injury were paid by Medicaid and other health insurance; (2) since the date of the injury, there had not been any two-year period during which medical bills resulting therefrom were not paid; and (3) Respondent had not paid any compensation to or on behalf of Appellant on account of said injury. On August 5, 1997, Judge Mason issued Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law denying Appellant's claim for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations as set forth in § 287.430. ¹ In response, on August 19, 1997, Appellant filed an Application for Review with the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. On February 26, 1998, the Commission issued a Final Award Denying Compensation. This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

In an appellate review of an administrative decision, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the agency's decision. Missouri Dept. of Corrections v. Cheeney, 926 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Mo.App.1996). The decision will be upheld unless it exceeds agency authority; it is not based upon substantial and competent evidence on the record as a whole; it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; it involves an abuse of discretion; or it is otherwise unlawful. Id. However, where the decision of an administrative agency involves the interpretation or application of law we independently review the matter as a question of law. Missouri Ethics Commission v. Thomas, 956 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Mo.App.1997). We give no deference to the agency's conclusions of law. Rather, we exercise our own independent judgment. Id.

I.

In her first point on appeal, Appellant claims that the Commission erred in finding that the statute of limitations for filing her worker's compensation claim had expired prior to its filing. Specifically, Appellant contends that because medical bill payments were periodically made on her account by Medicaid and another insurance provider, the statutory period for filing a claim was tolled at least until the time that the last such payment was made. Section 287.430.1 provides in pertinent part:

No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefor is filed ... within two years after the date of injury or death, or the last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death, except that if the report of the injury or the death is not filed by the employer as required by section 287.380, the claim for compensation may be filed within three years after the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death.

§ 287.430.1 (emphasis added).

Thus, the question is whether the payments made to cover Appellant's medical costs were made "under this chapter." Section 287.430 was amended in 1980 to supplant a previous version of the statute which had provided that the statutory period for filing a claim was "subject to being tolled by any payment made on account of the injury." Blair v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 593 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Mo.App.1980); Skinner v. Dawson Metal Products, 575 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Mo.App.1978) (emphasis added). The 1980 amendment's deletion of the words "any payment made on account of the injury" and addition of the words "under this chapter" evidences the legislature's desire to toll the statutory period, not merely when payments of any kind are made on an injured employee's behalf generally, but rather only when such payments are specifically made pursuant to Chapter 287, the Worker's Compensation Law.

In the instant case, neither Appellant's employer (Respondent) nor anyone else on its behalf ever instituted payment of Appellant's medical expenses under the mandate of Chapter 287 or any other reason. Instead, the payments that were made on account of Appellant's injury were by Medicaid and Appellant's spouse's insurer, neither of which were furnished under Chapter 287. Appellant cites to the Court's opinion in Brown v. Ozark Christian Schools of Neosho in asserting that the statutory language "under this section" has no import. 847 S.W.2d 888 (Mo.App.1993). However, Neosho is distinguishable from the present case. In Neosho, the injured claimant's employer paid the employee's medical expenses for supposedly gratuitous reasons. Thus, the payments were made by a party having an obligation "under this chapter," and thus the payments were made "under this chapter." By contrast, in the present...