Bryant v. American Surety Company

• Citation: 69 Minn. 30
• Decision Date: 21 June 1897
• Docket Number: Nos. 10,495 - (163).,s. 10,495 - (163).
• Parties: MELVILLE E. BRYANT v. AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY OF NEW YORK.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

69 Minn. 30

MELVILLE E. BRYANT v. AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY OF NEW YORK.¹

Nos. 10,495 - (163).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 21, 1897.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Elliott, J., overruling its demurrer to the complaint. Reversed.

Edgerton, Wickwire & Rice, for appellant.

Pierce & Austin, for respondent.

START, C. J.

This is an action for malicious prosecution, and the defendant appeals from an order overruling its demurrer. The sole question on this appeal is whether an action for malicious prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations in six or two years.

The following actions must be brought within six years: "An action for criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not arising on obligation, and not hereinafter enumerated." G. S. 1894, § 5136, subd. 5. And the following actions must be brought within two years: "An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury." G. S. 1894, § 5138, subd. 1, as amended by Laws 1895, c. 30. The words we have italicized were added by the amendment. Before this change was made, it is certain that an action for malicious prosecution was included in section 5136, and the limitation was six years. It is also clear that the purpose of the amendment was to place in the two-years class provided for by section 5138 certain actions sounding in tort, which were not originally included therein. Is an action for malicious prosecution one of them? We answer the question in the affirmative.

This amendment was construed in the case of Brown v. Village, 67 Minn. 146, 69 N. W. 710, wherein it was held that the amendment did not apply to actions for personal injuries arising from the negligent omission to do an act, but that it was limited to and included a class of wrongs of a similar nature to those mentioned in section 5138 before it was amended. Now, an action for a malicious prosecution involving a criminal charge is akin to an action for slander or libel, for it is a most potent means of injuring a man's reputation. Such a prosecution is a formal and public declaration, with the apparent sanction of the officers of the law, that the person against whom the charge is made is a criminal, and guilty of the particular crime charged. Bishop, Noncont. Law, § 222; Cooley, Torts, 225.

The plaintiff, however, claims that, to bring within the amendment any particular action for a tort, it must not only be akin to those specifically mentioned in the section before it was amended, but that it must also be a tort resulting in personal injury. It must be conceded that such is the case. But it does not follow from this concession that his further claim is correct, which is to the effect that the words "personal injury" are to be construed as if the amendment read, "or other tort resulting in bodily injury."

If we read this section 5138 as...