Bryant v. Brown

• Decision Date: 24 September 1928
• Docket Number: 27191
• Citation: 118 So. 184,151 Miss. 398
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: BRYANT et al. v. BROWN. [*]

118 So. 184

151 Miss. 398

BRYANT et al. v. BROWN. ^[*]

No. 27191

Supreme Court of Mississippi

September 24, 1928

Suggestion of Error Overruled Oct. 8, 1928.

(In Banc.)

1. INFANTS. Proceeding to commit minor for delinquency or violation of law involving moral turpitude is "civil" and not "criminal" proceeding jury trial is not required in proceeding to commit minor for delinquency or violation of law involving moral turpitude (Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 51697-5721).

Under sections 5697-5721, Hemingway's 1927 Code (chapter 111 Laws of 1916) and amendments thereto, a proceeding in the chancery court to commit a minor who has been guilty of a violation of the law involving moral turpitude, or who is a delinquent child developing vicious and criminal tendencies is a civil and not a criminal proceeding, and a jury trial is not required in such proceeding.

2 CONSTITUTIONAI. LAW. Infants. In proceedings to commit child for delinquency or violation of law involving moral turpitude, the child and its parents are entitled to a hearing and trial; hearing and trial accorded to child and parents on petition to commit minor in violation of law constitutes due process (Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 5687-5721).

Under the provisions of the said statutes mentioned in the preceding syllabus, the child and its parents are entitled to a hearing and a trial according to law, and such proceeding under the said act, in conformity to its provisions, constitute due process of law.

3. PRISONS. That child, after conviction of offense is committed to Industrial Training School does not constitute said institution a prison.

Under the criminal law, where a child is tried in the circuit court for a misdemeanor or felony involving moral turpitude, the trial proceeds as other criminal cases; and the fact that, after the said conviction the child is committed to the Industrial Training School, instead of to jail or the penitentiary, does not constitute said institution a prison.

4. INFANTS. Case for commitment of minor convicted of violation of law, transferred to chancery court, is tried according to procedure in such court.

Where a case is transferred from the circuit court to the chancery court for trial under this chapter of the act, the case, when it reaches the chancery court, is tried according to the procedure in such court, and the hearing is governed by the rules for the trial of civil cases.

5. INFANTS. Evidence of commission of crime is admissible in prodeeding to commit delinquent minor though proceeding is civil and not criminal prosecution for commission of the crime (Hemingway's Coder section 5702 (b).

Under clause (b) of section 5702, Hemingway's 1927 Code (chapter 195, Laws 1922), the proceeding is not for the purpose of trying the delinquent, immoral, or incorrigible child for a specific crime, but evidence of the commission of a specific crime is received and may be considered for the purpose of determining whether the child: is in fact immoral, delinquent, or incorrigible, and the proceedings under this statute are civil, and not criminal. It has no reference to enforcing the criminal law as such, but deals with the character of the child, and the environment in which it moves and lives as the subject-matter of inquiry, and is established as any other fact in a civil suit.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Parent and child. Primarily parents have right under the Fourteenth Amendment to custody and control of minor children, but state, on failure of parents to properly rear and educate child, may assert its power and apply curative to prevent injury to child and society (Const. Amend. 14).

Primarily, parents or those standing in loco parentis to minor children have the constitutional right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to the custody and control of such minor children, and may give them such education and training as in their judgment may seem best for the welfare of the child and for the good of society. But where the parents fail to perform their natural duty to so rear and educate the child as to make it useful, intelligent, and moral, but permit it to go unrestrained and become vicious in its habits and practices, and a menace to the rest of society, the state, as parens patriae of all children, may assert its power and apply the curative, so as to prevent injury to the child and to society by the wrongful and negligent conduct of the parents in failing to exercise the proper control and restraint over the child in its tendencies.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Infants. Constitutional provisions relating to involuntary servitude do not refer to legitimate authority for control and education of children; law relating to commitment of minors to industrial training school held constitutional (Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 5697-5721; Const. U.S. Amend. 13).

The provisions of the state and Federal Constitutions with reference to involuntary servitude do not have reference to legitimate authority for the control and education of children. A child may be subjected to restraints that may be necessary for the proper education and discipline that could not be applied to adults; and the said chapter 111, Laws of 1916, and amendments thereto chapter 132, Hemingway's 1927 Code), in so far as they are involved in this case, are valid and constitutional.

ANDERSON, J., dissenting.

HON. T. P. DALE, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Forrest county, HON. T. P. DALE, Chancellor.

Action by Mrs. Mary Brown against Howard Bryant and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ruth L. Waller and D. W. Draughn, for appellants.

Chapter 11 of the Laws of Mississippi 1916, are unconstitutional and are in strict violation of the personal rights and liberties of the child or children and the parents of the children, whom said law undertakes to confine and imprison in the Mississippi Industrial Training School at Columbia, said laws are contrary and in violation of both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Mississippi and statutory laws of said United States and of the state of Mississippi.

Chapter 11 of the Laws of 1916, and all of the amendments thereunder are illegal and unconstitutional because said laws passed pertaining to the Mississippi Industrial Training School are not sufficiently described in the caption or title at the beginning of the chapter of said laws, as provided by section 71 of the Constitution of the state of Mississippi.

It is unconstitutional in that it attempts to regulate or restrict or control the religious belief of the child in strict violation of the Constitution of the United States, article one of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The petition is unconstitutional in that it is attempting to deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law without the right of a trial by a jury of his peers.

The bill sets out charges of crime and undertakes to set forth records of convictions of offenses that were committed if committed at all at a period of more than twelve to twenty-four months, and that said offenses had previously been considered by the court, and passed upon by this court, and that said Howard Bryant had been discharged and given his freedom both from this court and from the courts which had jurisdiction of said offenses, that upon said offenses, if any, the defendant has been tried in a court of competent jurisdiction, and upon the facts presented, either convicted or acquitted, and that said charge now presented before this court is in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the state of Mississippi which guarantees that no person shall twice be placed in legal jeopardy for the same offense.

Rufus Creekmore, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

The constitutional objections which are raised by counsel in their brief seem to be the following: First, that the act violates section 71 of our state Constitution in that the title thereto is insufficient. Second, that it violates the first article of the Constitution of the United States in that it attempts to restrict and control the religious belief of those committed to the institution. Third, that it deprives the appellant of his liberty without due process of law. Fourth, that it deprives him of his right to a trial by a jury of his peers. These propositions will now be discussed in the order named.

Section 71 of the Constitution of the state of Mississippi provides: "Every bill introduced into the legislature shall have a title and the title ought to indicate clearly the subject-matter or matters of the proposed legislation." The title of Chapter 11 of the Laws of 1916 reads as follows: "An act to regulate the custody, control and care of delinquent children and to provide for the establishment and maintenance of the State Industrial Training School. "

Chapter 111, therefore, certainly has a title, and it surely indicates clearly the subject-matter of the proposed legislation. But even though it did not indicate clearly the subject-matter, still this of itself would not make the act unconstitutional and void. The law is well settled in this state that while it is mandatory that every bill shall have a title, yet that the title ought to indicate clearly the subject-matter is admonitory only, the sufficiency of the title being a matter for the legislature. State v. Phillips, 109 Miss. 22, 67 So. 651; Jackson v. State, 102 Miss. 663, 59 So. 871; Rosenstock v. Washington County, 112 Miss. 124, 72 So. 876; Lang v. Harrison County, 114 Miss. 341, 75 So. 125; Bryant v. Greenwood, 112 Miss. 718, 73 So. 728; Roseberry v. Northsworthy, 135 Miss. 845.

Counsel in their brief refer to no part of the statute...