Bryant v. Bryant
| Decision Date | 16 March 1927 |
| Docket Number | 84. |
| Citation | 137 S.E. 188 |
| Parties | 193 N.C. 372, 51 A.L.R. 1100 v. BRYANT. BRYANT et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Harnett County; Cranmer, Judge.
Action by Wiley Bryant and others against Wash Bryant. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals. Modified, and as modified, affirmed.
Appeal by defendant from a final judgment signed by Cranmer, J., in Johnston county, in an action pending in the county of Harnett. The parties consented that the judge should find the facts upon the pleadings and the admissions of the parties and render a final judgment in the cause out of term and outside the county in which the action was pending. The facts are as follows:
(1) The plaintiffs are the children of the defendant, Wash Bryant and his late wife. Ida Bryant, who died on the 12th day of January, 1920.
(2) On the 14th day of February, 1913, W. W. Scott and wife conveyed to Wash Bryant and wife, Ida Bryant, 113 acres of land located in Harnett county, N. C., by deed which has been duly registered in Book 177, p. 506, which deed and the said record thereof are made a part of this finding of fact for full description of the land so conveyed and under said deed. The land was held by said husband and wife as tenants by entireties up to the date of the death of said Ida Bryant.
(3) The said Ida Bryant was feloniously murdered and slain on the 12th day of January, 1920, by her husband, Wash Bryant defendant herein, and her death on the 12th day of January 1920, was the result of her felonious murder by her said husband.
(4) Said Wash Bryant was convicted of the murder of his wife at the September term, 1923, of Harnett superior court, being convicted of murder in the second degree, and is now serving a term in the state prison on account of same.
(5) At the time of the death of said Ida Bryant she was in good health, was younger than her husband, was free from dissipation, while her husband was addicted to the use of strong drink, and under the mortuary table she had a longer expectancy of life than her husband.
(6) The defendant, Wash Bryant, at the institution of this action and the granting of the temporary restraining order herein, had employed an auction company, and was offering said tract of land for sale, claiming to be seized thereof in fee simple.
Upon these facts it was adjudged that the defendant holds the legal title to the land conveyed to him and his wife in trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs, his heirs at law, and that they are the equitable owners, and entitled to the actual possession thereof freed and discharged from the claims of the defendant; that the defendant convey the land to the plaintiffs, and, upon failure to do so, that the judgment should be registered in the office of the register of deeds of Harnett county, and should operate as such conveyance; and that the defendant account to the plaintiffs for the rents and profits received by him. The cause was retained for a statement of the account. The defendant, assigning error, excepted and appealed. Modified and affirmed.
Equity compels wrongdoer who has acquired res by homicide to hold it as a constructive trustee of person wronged or his representatives, though homicide may not have been committed expressly to acquire title.
H. L. Godwin, of Dunn, for appellant.
Clawson L. Williams, of Sanford, and Clifford & Townsend and Young & Young, all of Dunn, for appellees.
The deed executed by W. W. Scott and his wife on February 14, 1913, conveyed to the defendant and his wife an estate by entireties. When the defendant put his wife to death, to what extent did his felonious act affect his interests in the land? This is the question proposed for solution.
A review of the cases involving the legal effect of felonious homicide upon the title claimed by the slayer to the property of the deceased discloses three lines of argument: (1) The legal title does not pass to the murderer as heir or devisee; (2) the legal title passes to the murderer, and may be retained by him in spite of his crime; (3) the legal title passes to the murderer, but equity will treat him as a constructive trustee of the title because of the unconscionable mode of its acquisition, and compel him to convey it to the heirs of the deceased, exclusive of the murderer. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 311.
The first of these positions was maintained in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 819, and in Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb.
61, 47 N.W. 700, 10 L. R. A. 810, 28 Am. St. Rep. 500. In the Riggs Case the facts were that Francis B. Palmer made his will in which he gave small legacies to his two daughters, the plaintiffs in the action, and the remainder to his grandson, the defendant, subject to the support of his mother, with a gift over to the two daughters, subject to the support of the mother, in case the grandson should die under age, unmarried, and without issue. The grandson, 16 years of age, lived with the testator as a member of his family, and, to prevent a revocation of the will, took the life of the testator by means of poison. The court held that the legal title did not pass to the defendant; that by reason of his crime he was deprived of any interest in the devise; and that he should be enjoined from using any part of the estate left him by the testator. The holding that no legal title passed, and that the defendant had no interest in the devise, was criticized; and a few years afterwards, in Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N.Y. 149, 42 N.E. 540, the Court of Appeals said that Riggs v. Palmer must not be interpreted as holding that the will was revoked; that, instead of being revoked and made in-operative by reason of the crime, the devise took effect, and transferred the legal title, the relief to which the plaintiffs were entitled being equitable and injunctive. In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the court declared that the devisee should not retain and enjoy his ill-acquired title.
In Shellenberger v. Ransom, supra, the question was whether Leander Shellenberger, who willfully took the life of his daughter for the purpose of getting her property, acquired title to her estate; the facts being that she died intestate, and that except for his crime he would have taken her estate by inheritance. The court, following Riggs v. Palmer, supra, said that Leander Shellenberger took no estate from his daughter, and that her title passed to her brother. Upon a rehearing this decision was reversed, and it was held that the title to the daughter's estate vested in the criminal by operation of law, and was dependent upon no condition, not even his acceptance. Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935, 25 L. R. A. 564. Referring to these two cases, it has been said:
Ames, supra, 312, note.
Among the cases which sustain the position that the legal title vests in the murderer and may be retained by him despite his crime are Shellenberger v. Ransom, supra, decided on the rehearing; Deem v. Millikin, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 357, 3 O. C. D. 491; and In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637, 29 L. R. A. 145, 50 Am. St. Rep. 765. In the case last cited it was shown that James Carpenter was murdered by his son so that the son might get immediate possession of the father's estate under the statute of distributions.
After the commission of the crime, the son and the widow, who had become an accessory after the fact, conveyed their interest in the property to the attorney who defended them in the prosecution for murder. The collateral heirs of the decedent contended that neither the mother nor the son under these circumstances had a beneficial interest in the estate.
The Supreme Court, disallowing the claim of the collateral heirs, arrived at its conclusion upon the following reasoning:
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