Bryant v. Cadle

• Decision Date: 07 February 1910
• Citation: 106 P. 687,18 Wyo. 64
• Parties: BRYANT v. CADLE.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

106 P. 687

18 Wyo. 64

BRYANT v. CADLE.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

February 7, 1910

On rehearing. Denied, but judgment modified.

For former opinion, see 104 P. 23.

POTTER, C. J.

A petition for rehearing was filed in this cause by the defendant in error. The plaintiff in error filed a motion to modify the order remanding the cause for new trial, by either rendering judgment for the plaintiff in error or directing the district court to do so. Both the petition for rehearing and motion to modify were heard upon briefs and oral argument. No new point is raised by the petition for reheating, but it is claimed that this court erred in the conclusions stated in the former opinion. Upon further consideration we perceive no reason for changing those conclusions. The facts of the case and the grounds for the decision are so fully stated in the former opinion that we deem it unnecessary to enlarge materially upon what was then said. 104 P. 23. Counsel for defendant in error have called our attention to some authorities not cited in their original brief, but we think they are not in point upon the facts in this case.

In addition to the facts stated in the previous opinion, showing the character of the possession and claim of Mrs Scrutchfield prior to her sale and conveyance of the property in controversy, we may add that in 1891 the property was assessed for taxation to, and the taxes paid by, Grinnell, as receiver, and from 1893 to 1896, both inclusive, it was assessed to, and the taxes paid by, Mrs. Scrutchfield. She sold and conveyed the property in 1897. We think it impossible to escape the conclusion that Mrs Scrutchfield's possession prior to the time that she sold and conveyed the property was hostile to the legal title of Scrutchfield and under a claim of right. The question is not material whether the language employed in the orders vesting the property in her was sufficient to divest the legal title of Scrutchfield, and hence it is unnecessary to enter into a consideration of the meaning of the word “control,” as found in the several orders of the court. During the period of Mrs Scrutchfield's possession she held it under the court's order for the sole benefit of herself and children; and the divorce decree continuing the receiver in charge of the property for the use and benefit of herself and children, and the later order granting her full, unqualified and absolute control for the sole benefit...