Bryant v. Capra

• Decision Date: 30 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-CV-10198 (KMK),18-CV-10198 (KMK)
• Parties: THOMAS BRYANT, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL CAPRA, Superintendent; MS. HICKSON, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

THOMAS BRYANT, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL CAPRA, Superintendent; MS. HICKSON, Defendants.

No. 18-CV-10198 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 30, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Thomas Bryant

Ossining, NY

Pro Se Plaintiff

Jonathan James Wilson, Esq.

Maria Barous Hartofilis, Esq.

New York State Office of the Attorney General

New York, NY

Counsel for Defendants

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:

Thomas Bryant ("Plaintiff"), currently an inmate at Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing"), brings this pro se Action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1, et seq., against Michael Capra ("Capra") and Ms. Hickson ("Hickson") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights when they purportedly mandated that Plaintiff must tie back his dreadlocks in order to participate in recreational activities in the prison yard. (See Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") (Dkt. No. 33-1).) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (the "Motion") the SAC. (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 35).) For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's SAC and the exhibits attached therein and are assumed true for purposes of resolving the instant Motion.¹

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Sing Sing. (SAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff claims not to believe in God and not to "participate in the practices of religion that propagate this ideology." (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also alleges to have floor-length dreadlocks that he has been growing for approximately 25 years. (Id. ¶ 13.)

On July 13, 2018, while Plaintiff was playing basketball at Sing Sing, Hickson approached him and told him that he could not "have his hair up with nothing securing it unless it was with a religious hair covering." (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff interpreted this to mean that he needed to take his hair "out of the wrapped style (atop his head) he had it in without a religious covering on it." (Id.) Plaintiff claims that this was inconsistent with a directive issued by the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), Directive 4914,because, according to Plaintiff, nothing in that directive obligates Plaintiff to bind his dreadlocks with a religious hair covering. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that because he was unable to secure his dreadlocks without using "religious means," he "ha[d] no opportunity to protect his hair . . . while being active in the yard," resulting in his hair being exposed to "filth, dirt, sweat, blood; being stepped on, or being tangled up with people" during recreational activity. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) According to Plaintiff, he has not been to the yard since receiving Hickson's instructions, as he is allegedly unable to both exercise his "non-religious" beliefs by not wearing religious protective gear and to physically participate in recreational activity without damaging his dreads. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance regarding Hickson's instruction, which was denied by the Inmate Grievance Review Committee ("IGRC"). (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff then appealed that grievance to Capra, the Superintendent of Sing Sing, who "[a]ccepted in part" Plaintiff's grievance. (SAC Ex. B ("Grievances") 17 (Dkt. No. 33-1).)² Capra's decision recites the facts underlying Plaintiff's grievance and states, "In accordance with directive #4914 . . . inmates wearing below shoulder length dreadlocks must tie them back in a ponytail with[ a] barrette, rubber band, or other fastening device approved by the Superintendent. Grievant advised it is in his best interest to speak to an area supervisor who is in the best position to address immediate concerns." (Id.) Plaintiff claims he appealed Capra's decision, but never received a ruling from the final decisionmaker in the inmate grievance process, the Central Office Review Committee ("CORC"). (SAC ¶ 23.)

According to Plaintiff, he has a history of behavioral issues and illnesses, such as anti-social personality disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and "impulsivity." (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that engaging in recreation and physical exercise is an important way for him to develop better social skills, focus on work, and avoid engaging in behavioral outbursts. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.) Plaintiff claims that Hickson and Capra's decisions have prevented him from engaging in the regular recreational activity he used to enjoy, resulting in deteriorating muscle and joint health, as well as depression, anxiety, "impulsivity," and suicidal or other harmful thoughts. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff claims violations of his First and Eigth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of his rights under RLUIPA. (Id. ¶¶ 30-34.) Plaintiff seeks both damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 8-9.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this Action on April 23, 2018 by filing a Complaint in the Northern District of New York. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 12, 2018. (See Am. Compl.) Pursuant to a Decision & Order issued by a court in the Northern District on October 25, 2018, Plaintiff's claims as to Defendants were severed and transferred to this District. (See Decision & Order 17 (Dkt. No. 13).)

Following transfer of the relevant claims to this District, on November 8, 2018, the Court issued an Order of Service. (Dkt. No. 16.) Defendants initially filed a Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint on April 4, 2019, (see Dkt. No. 30), pursuant to a briefing schedule set by the Court, (see Dkt. No. 27). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a request to amend the Amended Complaint and the SAC. (See Leave to Amend; SAC.) The Court ordered Defendants torespond to the SAC. (Dkt. No. 34.) Defendants responded on May 6, 2019 by filing the instant Motion. (See Not. of Mot.; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. ("Defs.' Mem.") (Dkt. No. 36).) Plaintiff filed opposition papers on May 14, 2019. (See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. ("Pl.'s Mem.") (Dkt. No. 39).) Defendants filed a Reply on June 3, 2019. (See Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. ("Defs.' Reply Mem.") (Dkt. No. 43).) Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply on June 18, 2019. (See Pl.'s Reply Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. ("Pl.'s Reply Mem.") (Dkt. No. 45).)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff need allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his or her] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be acontext-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). Further, "[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court . . . draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the "complaint[] must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). However, "the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them." (italics and quotation marks omitted)).

Generally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents...