Bryant v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 23 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 1462-12-4 |
| Parties | STANLEY WESLEY BRYANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Humphreys and Kelsey
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Stanley Wesley Bryant ("Bryant") appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual battery in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3 by way of a guilty plea in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County ("trial court"). On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred (1) in failing to account for Bryant's mental condition and finding him competent to stand trial,1 (2) in determining thatBryant's plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, (3) when it found Bryant guilty based on a proffer of facts that does not assert facts supporting all the elements of the alleged crime, (4) by failing to grant his motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction or in the alternative to withdraw his plea, and (5) in imposing an improper condition of probation and suspended sentence that forbids Bryant from entering the "neighborhood" of the victim by crossing certain streets and by forbidding his residing at his parents' home.
I. Analysis
Prior to addressing the merits of any of Bryant's claims, we must address the Commonwealth's contention that Rule 5A:18 precludes a majority of the claims from appellate review. We find that Bryant's failure to object to the trial court's finding of competency and ultimate acceptance of Bryant's guilty plea prior to sentencing waives any objection he may have to those two aspects of the proceedings below.
Rule 5A:18 states that "[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice." (Emphasis added). "This Court has said 'the primary function of Rule 5A:18 is to alert the trial judge to possible error so that the judge may consider the issue intelligently and take any corrective actions necessary to avoid unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials.'" Neal v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 416, 422, 425 S.E.2d 521, 525 (1992) (quoting Martin v.Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 530, 414 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1992)). Thus, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 750, 607 S.E.2d 738, 742, adopted upon reh'g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005). To the extent Bryant raises constitutional issues, we note that "Rule 5A:18 applies to bar even constitutional claims." Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998).
The record before us reveals that Bryant never raised any issue in the trial court related to his competency to stand trial, whether his plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, nor to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's proffer of facts supporting the guilty plea at the time of the trial. It was not until after the trial court completed sentencing that Bryant attempted to raise these issues in his post-sentencing motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction or in the alternative to withdraw his plea.2 Therefore, we find that Bryant did not properly preserve these assignments of error and that they are precluded from appellate review under Rule 5A:18. We now turn to the remaining assignments of error.
Bryant alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction because the proffer of facts failed to establish that jurisdiction was proper due to the absence in the Commonwealth's proffer of evidence of where the incidents took place and the ages of the victim and defendant at the time of the alleged crimes. This argument is without merit.
Bryant's first argument is that "[i]n order to establish jurisdiction in the circuit court of Loudoun County, the Commonwealth had to prove that the alleged acts took place withinLoudoun County." Bryant cites to Keesee v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 174, 217 S.E.2d 808 (1975), and Harding v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 543, 110 S.E. 378 (1922), in support of his argument. However, Bryant's argument confuses venue with jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court explained:
Venue and jurisdiction, though sometimes confounded, are, accurately speaking, separate and distinct matters. Jurisdiction is authority to hear and determine a cause, or "it may be defined to be the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in the given case." It is, like venue, regulated by statute or organic law. Venue is merely the place of trial, and the purpose of statutes prescribing venue is to give defendants the privilege of being sued only in the place or places prescribed by the statutes. "But it is a privilege which may be waived . . . ."
Texaco, Inc. v. Runyon, 207 Va. 367, 370, 150 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1966).
Based on the record before us, it is clear that the trial court did not err in denying Bryant's motion with respect to this argument. The trial court clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case. See Code § 17.1-513. Furthermore, to the extent that Bryant's motion contested whether the trial court was the proper venue, Bryant waived any issues with regard to venue being proper in Loudoun County. Code § 19.2-244 requires that "[e]xcept as to motions for a change of venue, all other questions of venue must be raised . . . before the finding of guilty in cases tried by the court without a jury." (Emphasis added). As Bryant filed his motion after the verdict of the trial court, the issue was waived.
Bryant also contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction because the Commonwealth's proffer of facts failed to establish that he was over the age of eighteen at the time of the offense and therefore jurisdiction lay exclusively with a juvenile and domestic relations district court under Code § 16.1-241. However, Bryant's argument is misplaced for two reasons.
First, Bryant relies on Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 222 S.E.2d 790 (1976), and Smyth v. Morrison, 200 Va. 728, 107 S.E.2d 430 (1959), in arguing that when evidence is presented to a trial court following a guilty plea, the court has a duty to review the evidence and hear arguments of counsel to make a determination of guilt based on the proffered evidence. However, this is in direct contrast to the actual holding of Kibert. In Kibert, the Supreme Court explained that "a 'plea of guilty, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equivalent of a conviction of the offense to which it is directed.'" Kibert, 216 Va. at 664, 222 S.E.2d at 793 (quoting Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 296, 46 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1948)). Thus, " " Id. Therefore, Id. (emphasis in original). Based on this holding, it is clear that by virtue of Bryant's guilty plea, the trial court may have considered the proffer of evidence; however, it was not necessary to establish proof of the elements of the crime.
Second, the issue of Bryant's age at the time of the offense is a factual issue that Bryant admitted as true when he pled guilty to the indictment. This is similar to the situation in Jones v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 142, 590 S.E.2d 572 (2004). In that case, the defendant was indicted for distributing cocaine, and he entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense. Id. at 144-45, 590 S.E.2d at 573-74. However, the proffered evidence did not establish that the offense took place in Virginia. Id. at 145, 590 S.E.2d at 574. Nevertheless, the circuit court found him guilty of the offense, and the defendant appealed. Id. This Court held that, although theproffered facts did not establish that the crime took place in Virginia, the indictment alleged that the offense took place in the city of Petersburg, Virginia. Since a no contest plea admits all the facts pleaded in the indictment as true, the defendant's plea of nolo contendere was sufficient standing alone to establish the circuit court's jurisdiction. Id. at 148, 590 S.E.2d at 575.
Likewise, in this case, the indictment states that "on or about June 1, 2009 to on or about September 1, 2009, in the County of Loudoun, [Bryant] did feloniously and unlawfully commit aggravated sexual battery on the complaining witness, to wit: A.P., who was less than thirteen years of age, in violation of Section § 18.2-67.3 of the Code of Virginia." The indictment also alleges that Bryant was born on July 10, 1990. Thus, his guilty plea admitted that, for the period during which the offenses occurred, Bryant was over the age of eighteen. Therefore, Bryant factually conceded the trial court's jurisdiction over this offense, and we find that the trial court did not err in denying Bryant's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Bryant also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. "'[W]hether or not an accused should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty for...
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