Bryant v. Reedy

Citation200 S.E. 896,214 N.C. 748
Decision Date01 February 1939
Docket Number693.
PartiesBRYANT v. REEDY.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Appeal from Superior Court, Robeson County; Marshall T. Spears Judge.

Action for slander by Mrs. Agnes Bryant against Mrs. Howard Reedy. Judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

No error.

In slander action, there was no error in portion of charge relating to issues concerning whether defendant spoke words in substance as alleged and concerning compensatory and punitive damages to be allowed. Code 1935, § 2432.

In slander action, the recollection of evidence was for jury and not for the court or attorneys. Code 1935, § 2432.

This is an action for slander brought by plaintiff against defendant and prayer for actual and punitive damages. The plaintiff alleges, and the evidence is to the effect, that she is an innocent and virtuous woman and is a lady of good character.

The evidence, in substance, is to the effect that at the time this action was instituted, June 23, 1936, she was working for George Kheiralla who operates a grocery store in the Town of Rowland, and that she has worked for him for several years. Many witnesses offered by the plaintiff showed that her general reputation was good. The plaintiff offered as a witness, J. H. Carper, who testified that he had been a Rural Policeman in Robeson County for about fourteen years, a Police Officer in the Town of Rowland, and at the time he testified, was an assistant Tax Collector in Robeson County that on or about the 15th of March, 1936, he was called to the home of the defendant and she told him, in substance, that the plaintiff, Mrs. Bryant, was the cause of all the trouble between George Kheiralla and his wife, and that "he was keeping her there as his woman, and his wife was not satisfied and she was breaking up their home."

J. B. Bullock, who at the time was Chief of Police in the Town of Rowland, testified substantially to the same thing that J. H. Carper testified to.

Mrs. C. B. Carper, who lives in the Town of Rowland, testified that she had known Mrs. Bryant and Mrs. Reedy for a number of years, and that about April 15, 1936, she had a conversation with Mrs. Reedy and Mrs. Reedy told her that she had seen Mrs. Bryant up there a good many times and that Mrs. Bryant had run Mrs. Kheiralla away from home and that George Kheiralla was keeping Mrs. Bryant there as his wife, "and that she was nothing but an old prostitute woman for George Kheiralla", "* * * She told me this a good many times and that she did not want any such woman as that living next to her."

G. T. Cox testified that he was sixty-two years of age, had known both the plaintiff and defendant since 1920. Sometime early in May he was passing Mrs. Reedy's home and had a conversation with her in regard to Mrs. Bryant, and that she told him that, "If you will get that prostitute woman out of this store, why everything will be settled. Get rid of Agnes Bryant and everything will quiet off and be all right."

I. Blum testified that he runs a business in the Town of Rowland and is acquainted with the plaintiff and the defendant, and that on or about the latter part of April or first of May, 1936, Mrs. Reedy came to his store and talked with him about Mrs. Bryant. "She said something about Mrs. Bryant ought to be feathered and tarred, that she was living with George Kheiralla, breaking up their home and living with him as man and wife."

Mrs. Bryant, the plaintiff, testified that since the above statements were made about and concerning her, that she had been humiliated and damaged. She has stopped going to Church, her name has been taken off the church circle, that numbers of people in the Town of Rowland and community whom she formerly considered her friends, now refuse to speak to her. That she was very much embarrassed to walk the streets or go in a crowd of people because she feels that she has been slandered and ridiculed, and feels very much humiliated. She testified that she was working at the same place, because she knew she could not get a job at any other place.

The defendant denied that she had ever made any statements intending to slander Mrs. Bryant and denied what plaintiff's witnesses testified to. In her answer she says, in part: "That if plaintiff has sustained any injury or damage to her reputation or standing in the community, which is denied, then such injury and damage was sustained prior to the institution of this action, and prior to the alleged utterance of the defamatory remarks contained in the complaint which were attributed to the defendant. * * * This defendant specifically denies that she has at any time spoken of and concerning the plaintiff any slanderous, derogatory, false, untruthful or defamatory words; but that any statements made by this defendant with respect to the said plaintiff which the said plaintiff might have construed to amount to a charge of incontinency, were not made with any malicious, wilful or wanton intent, but were made in good faith, and upon reputable and reliable information and were the truth, and this defendant pleads and relies upon the truth thereof in justification of said statements."

Many witnesses testified that the general reputation of defendant was good.

All the witnesses communicated the remarks made to them to Mrs. Bryant before the institution of the present suit.

The issues submitted to the jury and their answers thereto were as follows:

"1. Did the defendant speak of and concerning the plaintiff the words in substance, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.

2. What compensatory damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant? Answer: $1,000.00.

3. What punitive damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant? Answer: $750.00."

Judgment was rendered by the Court below on the verdict. The defendant made numerous exceptions and assignments of error and appealed to the Supreme Court. The material ones and necessary facts will be set forth in the opinion.

F. L. Adams, of Rowland, and F. Ertel Carlyle, H. A. McKinnon, and F. D. Hackett, all of Lumberton, for appellant.

W. E. Lynch, of Rowland, and W. S. Britt and J. C. King, both of Lumberton, for appellee.

CLARKSON Justice.

At the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the conclusion of all the evidence, the defendant made motions in the Court below for judgment as in case of nonsuit. C.S. § 567. The Court below overruled these motions and in this we can see no error. We think the evidence plenary to be submitted to the jury.

The questions presented by defendant: "1. Did the Court commit error in the admission of evidence, particularly with reference to: (a) the slanderous words alleged to have been spoken by the defendant; (b) the evidence as to the effect of the alleged slanderous words upon the plaintiff mentally and as to her humiliation and embarrassment?" We think not.

N.C. Code, 1935 (Michie), § 2432, is as follows: "Whereas doubts have arisen whether actions of slander can be maintained against persons who may attempt, in a wanton and malicious manner, to destroy the reputation of innocent and unprotected women, whose very existence in society depends upon the unsullied purity of their character, therefore any words written or spoken of a woman, which may amount to a charge of incontinency, shall be actionable."

Section 4230 is as follows: "If any person shall attempt, in a wanton and malicious manner, to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman by words, written or spoken, which amount to a charge of incontinency, every person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

"Incontinency means want of restraint in regard to sexual indulgence, and imports, according to our statute, definitive, illicit, sexual intercourse." Lucas v. Nichols, 52 N.C. 32, 35.

There is nothing more truthful than what is written in Proverbs (part verse 8, chapter 18), "The words of a talebearer are as wounds." We think that the damage shall include injury to the feelings, mental suffering endured in consequence and the humiliation and embarrassment which is a consequence of the wrong done.

The second question presented by defendant: "Did the court commit error in refusing to permit the defendant to offer evidence in mitigation of damages?" We think not under the facts and circumstances of this case.

N.C.Code, supra, Section 542, in part, is as follows: "The defendant may in his answer allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages; and whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances."

A plea of justification or of mitigation is a prerequisite to the allowance of evidence of the truth of the charge.

Without it such evidence is incompetent. Upchurch v. Robertson, 127 N.C. 127, 128, 37 S.E. 157; Dickerson v. Dail, 159 N.C. 541, 75 S.E. 803; Burris v. Bush, 170 N.C. 394, 87 S.E. 97. When the defendant pleads the general issue, he may not introduce evidence in justification or mitigation. Upchurch v. Robertson, supra; Elmore v. R. Co., 189 N.C. 658, 673, 127 S.E. 710.

It will be noted that defendant denied the allegations of plaintiff as to the slander charges in toto. No issue was submitted or tendered by defendant that she relied on the plea of the truth of the matter charged by plaintiff as defamatory. Defendant offered to introduce in evidence paper writing identified by the plaintiff and which purports to be an acknowledgement of payment of judgment rendered in the action of Mrs. Agnes Bryant against Mrs. Mary Kheiralla, which was excluded. Exception and assignment of error was made by defendant. We do not think it can be sustained. If competent the exclusion was...

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