Bryant v. Rucker
Decision Date | 16 March 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 44667,Nos. 1,2,3,44667,s. 1 |
Citation | 173 S.E.2d 875,121 Ga.App. 395 |
Parties | Peggy BRYANT v. Eugene RUCKER et al |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Paul C. Myers, Atlanta, for appellant.
Nall, Miller, Cadenhead & Dennis, Doughlas Dennis, Baxter L. Davis, Atlanta, for appellees.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff had brought her children to play at the home of defendants, who were family friends. This was not her first visit to their house. The carport was wet from water which the children had splashed out of a small swimming pool. One child had already slipped there the same day, but defendants did not warn plaintiff of the wet condition or the previous fall. Plaintiff slipped.
The law of Georgia and the decisions of this court hold that a social guest in a defendant's private home is a bare licensee. Stanton v. Grubb, 114 Ga.App. 350, 151 S.E.2d 237; Laurens v. Rush, 116 Ga.App. 65, 156 S.E.2d 482; Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga.App. 150, 182 S.E. 625.
"If plaintiff is a social guest in defendant's home, the great weight of Anglo-American authority classifies him as a bare licensee, even though he was expressly invited. (Ann. 25 ALR2d 598.) This classification is often invoked to deny the host's liability for harm caused by a concealed danger that he did not know of, but which would have been discoverable by inspection. * * * Such a limitation of duty probably conforms to people's reasonable expectations in the ordinary host-guest situation. If the host is the kind of person who does not inspect and maintain his property on his own account, the guest scarcely expects an exception to be made on the occasion of his visit. In this country, moreover, where most social contact is among people who are on a similar economic footing, the host is usually in no better position than the guest to absorb or distribute the loss.' 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1477, § 27.11. 2 Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d 175, § 330.' Laurens v. Rush, 116 Ga.App. 65, 66-67, 156 S.E.2d 482, 483-484.
The factual situation of the Stanton case is nearly identical to this case. In Stanton the water was tracked into the basement by other guests coming from the defendant's swimming pool. In this case the water was splashed in the yard outside the house by children.
This court has held, even as to a business invitee, that a business proprietor cannot reasonably be expected to prevent the presence of some water on a normal floor during a period of time when it is continually raining. Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga.App. 170(2)(c), 138 S.E.2d 77; Card v. Chichester's Baconsfield Pharmacy, 111 Ga.App. 358, 141 S.E.2d 790; Angel v. Varsity, Inc., 113 Ga.App. 507, 148 S.E.2d 451. If a business proprietor is not required to be continually mopping up rainwater inside his store to protect a business invitee, it ought to follow that an owner of a private home is not required to be continually mopping up water around his swimming pool outside his house to protect a social guest.
This is not a case of hidden peril, pitfall or mantrap. Crosby v. Savannah Electric & Power Co., 114 Ga.App. 193, 198, 150 S.E.2d 563.
Judgment affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Quillian and Judge Evans join in this dissent.
The majority has failed to concern itself with rules applicable to motions for summary judgment by a party defendant on whom the burden of proof does not lie upon the trial of the case but on whom it does lie when such defendant makes a motion for summary judgment, and this is such a case; and has also failed to call attention to, and has failed to consider, pertinent and controlling evidence such as, for example, that the defendant husband had placed a sharp metal object next to a puddle of water which created a slippery condition on the floor and his daughter had very recently slipped in this same puddle of water, all of which he knew as well as his wife. For these reasons, I do not deem it amiss that the complete pleadings and all of the material evidence be included in this opinion.
Mrs. Peggy Bryant brought an action against Eugene R. Rucker and Florence Rucker alleging: The answer admitted paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of plaintiff's action but denied all other paragraphs of the petition material to this case.
The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment based upon the pleadings and the deposition of the...
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