Bryant v. State

• Decision Date: 24 January 1925
• Citation: 89 Fla. 26,103 So. 170
• Parties: BRYANT v. STATE.[*]
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

103 So. 170

89 Fla. 26

BRYANT v. STATE.^[*]

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

January 24, 1925

Rehearing Denied Feb. 28, 1925.

Error to Circuit Court, De Soto County; George W. Whitehurst Judge.

Walker Bryant was convicted of burning insured property with intent to injure the insurer, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In burning insured property with intent to injure insurer element of intent relates to overt act of burning. In the crime of burning a building or other property, which at the time is insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to injure the insurer, the element of intent relates to the overt act of burning, and not to the act of insuring the property burned.

Indictment for statutory offense following substantially language of statute is generally sufficient. Generally, an indictment for a statutory offense, which follows substantially the language of the statute, will be held sufficient to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Conviction not reversed for technical errors as to admissibility of evidence or charges, if evidence of guilt is ample, and accused is denied no fundamental rights. Where the evidence of guilt is ample, and the accused is denied no fundamental rights, a judgment of conviction will not be reversed because of technical errors in rulings on the admissibility of evidence or charges given or refused.

COUNSEL

W. D. Bell, of Arcadia, for plaintiff in error.

Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., and Marvin C. McIntosh, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.

OPINION

WEST J.

The count of the indictment upon which there was a conviction charges that the defendant----

'Walker Bryant, on the 24th day of October, A. D. 1922, at and in the county of De Soto aforesaid, did then and there willfully, maliciously, and feloniously set fire to and burn a certain building there situate, to wit, a building the property of W. T. Gould, alias W. T. Gould, Jr., which said building was then and there insured against loss or damage by fire, in and with the St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, a corporation, and the New Jersey Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, with intent then and there to injure and defraud the said St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, a corporation, and the said New Jersey Fire Insurance Company, a corporation.'

Upon a trial a verdict of guilty as charged was returned, and defendant was adjudged guilty by the court. Writ of error was taken from this court.

There was a motion to quash the indictment, which was denied. This ruling constitutes one of the assignments of error.

The 'intent to injure the insurer' is an essential element of the crime. The overt act is the burning, not the insuring, of the property, which, coupled with intent to injure the insurer, constitutes the crime. Latham v. State (Fla.) 102 So. 551, opinion filed November 8, 1924.

In the brief and in the oral argument in this court on behalf of plaintiff in error, it is urged that the indictment alleges that the property was insured with intent to injure the insurer, whereas the crime denounced by the statute is burning with intent to injure the insurer; that the indictment therefore charges no offense, and the ruling denying the motion to quash was erroneous. It is true that between the allegations of the act of burning, and of the intent prompting the act, the building burned is described and the fact of its having been insured against loss or damage by fire is alleged, but the language employed and the form is which the allegations of essential elements are expressed, are not such as to render the indictment criticizable on the ground that it leaves uncertain the question of whether the intent to injure relates to the insuring or to the burning. The statute provides that 'whoever burns a building or any goods, wares, merchandise or other chattels, which are at the time insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to injure the insurer,' shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalty imposed. Section 5111, Rev. Gen. Stats. There has, it seems, been no difficulty in construing the statute to mean that...