Bryant v. State

• Decision Date: 05 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. SC94902.,SC94902.
• Parties: Byron BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

785 So.2d 422

Byron BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC94902.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 5, 2001.

Michael Dubiner and Mark Wilensky of Dubiner & Wilensky, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Byron Bryant.¹ We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment and sentence.

Byron Bryant was charged with first-degree murder for the December 16, 1991, killing of Leonard Andre, which occurred during the course of an armed robbery of Andre's Market in Delray Beach, Florida. Bryant was also charged with the armed robbery with a firearm as a result of this incident.

The evidence presented at trial revealed the following facts: On December 16, 1991, at approximately 8 p.m., Andre took the receipts of the day to the back of his store. Shortly thereafter, two men came into the store, one going to the back and one staying in the front. At gunpoint, one of the men ordered Andre's wife to open the cash register and demanded money, whereupon she took money from the cash register and gave it to one of the intruders. She then heard gunshots in the back of the store, and the men ran out. She found her husband in the back of the store lying on the floor with blood all around him. The autopsy determined that Andre had been shot three times at close range.

Police developed Bryant as a suspect only after several of his acquaintances contacted the police about his involvement in the murder. Subsequently, Bryant gave police a taped statement in which he admitted to killing Andre during a robbery attempt. In his statement to police, Bryant explained that he was with three other men on the night of the incident and was advised by one of them about the location of Andre's Market and that there was money in the store. Bryant went into the store and walked towards the back as though he were looking for the back room and asked for the bathroom; when Andre turned his back, Bryant pulled out his gun. Andre began to struggle and wrestle with Bryant over the gun, until Bryant got control of the gun and shot Andre. When Andre continued to fight, Bryant shot him again. After shooting Andre the third time, Bryant ran out of the store and left the scene. Bryant admitted in his statement that he shot Andre three times with a .357 magnum and admitted that he had a ski mask in his possession. Bryant told the detective that although he did not wear the ski mask, he dropped it when he ran from the store. During the investigation, a ski mask was found in the alleyway near the market.

After returning home from the scene at Andre's Market, Bryant asked his girlfriend to dispose of the gun he had used in the incident. He further admitted that the gun that was recovered from him at the time of his arrest was the same gun that one of his accomplices used during the incident at Andre's Market. At trial, however, Bryant denied any involvement in the robbery or killing, claiming his statement given to police was the result of police coercion.

A jury found Bryant guilty as charged. After Bryant waived his right to a jury for sentencing, the trial judge imposed the death penalty for the first-degree murder of Leonard Andre and life in prison for the armed robbery. The court found three aggravating circumstances applied to Bryant: he previously had been convicted of a capital or violent felony; the murder was committed during a robbery; and the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. See § 921.141(5)(b), (d)-(e), Fla. Stat. (1999). The court found no statutory mitigating circumstances and only one nonstatutory mitigator, remorse, but gave it very little weight. The court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and sentenced Bryant to death by electrocution for the first-degree murder and life imprisonment for the armed robbery.

Bryant raises seven issues on appeal, claiming the trial court erred in the following: (1) determining that Bryant was competent to stand trial; (2) requiring Bryant to be held in visible restraints before the jury; (3) failing to properly evaluate the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of Bryant's lack of education; (4) failing to evaluate the nonstatutory mitigator that Bryant lacked a positive role model; (5) failing to exercise its discretion in evaluating the nonstatutory mitigating factor of Bryant's neurological impairment; (6) finding the death sentence proportionate in this case; and (7) ruling that electrocution is not cruel and unusual punishment.

Guilt Phase

First, Bryant claims the trial court erred in finding Bryant competent to stand trial. "In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial court must decide whether the defendant `has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Hardy v. State, 716 So.2d 761, 763-64 (Fla.1998) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)); see also § 916.12(1), Fla. Stat. (1993); Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.211(a)(1). "The reports of experts are `merely advisory to the [trial court], which itself retains the responsibility of the decision.'" Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla.1995) (quoting Muhammad v. State, 494 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1986)). "In situations where there is conflicting expert testimony regarding the defendant's competency, it is the trial court's responsibility to consider all the evidence relevant to competency and resolve the factual dispute." Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764 (citing Hunter, 660 So.2d at 247, and Watts v. State, 593 So.2d 198, 202 (Fla.1992)). "The trial court's competency decision will be upheld absent a showing of abuse of discretion." Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764 (citing Hunter, 660 So.2d at 247, and Watts, 593 So.2d at 202.)

After considering the evidence and observing Bryant's behavior in court, the trial court found Bryant competent to stand trial.² Although there were conflicting opinions from the experts on the issue of competency, it was in the sound discretion of the trial court to resolve the dispute.³ Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Bryant competent to stand trial. See Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764 (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in finding defendant competent where there was conflicting expert testimony regarding the defendant's competency); see also Hunter, 660 So.2d at 247 (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in finding defendant competent where there was evidence to support that resolution); Turner v. State, 645 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.1994) (holding "[a]lthough there was conflicting evidence during the pretrial competency proceedings, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding Turner competent to stand trial"). Moreover, the lay and expert testimony presented support the trial court's resolution.

Second, Bryant argues the trial court erred in requiring Bryant to be tried while wearing restraints. As a general rule, a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to appear before the jury free from physical restraints, such as shackles or leg and waist restraints. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). This Court has recognized that restraining a defendant with shackles in view of the jury adversely impacts an accused's presumption of innocence. See Diaz v. State, 513 So.2d 1045, 1047 (Fla.1987); Elledge v. State, 408 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.1981). However, a criminal defendant's right to be free of physical restraints is not absolute: "[U]nder some circumstances, shackling `is necessary for the safe, reasonable and orderly progress of trial.'" United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1225 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.1976)). "Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, `outweigh[ ] a defendant's right to stand before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.'" Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F.2d 1409, 1413 (11th Cir.1984)). Indeed, this Court has held that shackling is a permissible tool to be exercised in the sound discretion of the trial judge when circumstances involving the security and safety of the proceeding warrant it. See Derrick v. State, 581 So.2d 31, 35 (Fla.1991); Correll v. Dugger, 558 So.2d 422 (Fla.1990); Stewart v. State, 549 So.2d 171 (Fla.1989). "Shackles may be necessary to prevent the defendant from disrupting the trial ... and to protect the physical well-being of the jury, lawyers, judge, and other trial participants." Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.1983). Prior to trial, the court ordered that Bryant be restrained, based principally upon Bryant's actions after his first trial where, upon hearing the verdict, he threw a chair in the direction of the prosecutor and jury, struggled with bailiffs, and shouted profanities while having to be forcibly restrained. The court offered Bryant the opportunity to wear an electronic belt which could be concealed underneath Bryant's clothing, in lieu of visible leg and waist restraints. Although Bryant objected to wearing any kind of restraints, he did initially agree to wear the electronic belt. On the day of the trial, however, Bryant refused to wear the electronic belt and requested not to be present if he was to be restrained. After a brief absence from the courtroom, Bryant requested that he be allowed back into the trial and, although he...