Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1896
• Citation: 43 P. 931,13 Wash. 692
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: BRYANT v. STETSON & POST MILL CO. ET AL.

43 P. 931

13 Wash. 692

BRYANT v. STETSON & POST MILL CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 14, 1896

Appeal from superior court, Whatcom county; John R. Winn, Judge.

Action by Fannie E. Bryant against the Stetson & Post Mill Company and others. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Fairchild & Rawson and Stratton, Lewis & Gilman, for appellant.

Kerr & McCord and John Wiley, for respondents.

HOYT C.J.

The superior court sustained a demurrer to the complaint of appellant, and, she electing to stand thereon, judgment of dismissal was rendered. The appellant claims that the following allegations of fact were contained in the complaint: That the real property in controversy was community property; that it was sold on a judgment against W J. Bryant, husband of appellant; that the sheriff's deed under this sale was made before the right of redemption had expired; that at the time of the sale said W. J. Bryant had property in King county sufficient to satisfy the judgment that plaintiff was ignorant of the judgment and proceedings thereunder until too late to object thereto except in the way she is now objecting; and that she was ready and willing to pay the judgment, and redeem the property, if permitted so to do. Upon this claim was based her contention that the complaint stated a cause of action against the defendants. It cannot be gathered from the complaint alone as to whether or not the sheriff's deed was prematurely made. The only fact stated in the complaint upon that subject is to the effect that the deed was made within six months after the confirmation of the sale. It is nowhere alleged how long after the sale itself, nor is there any sufficient allegation as to any offer to redeem within the time provided by statute after the confirmation of sale. By the act of 1886 (Laws 1885-86, p. 116) it was provided that the right to redeem shall date from the day of sale, and, if it repealed the section upon the same subject in the Code of 1881, so that the date of confirmation was no longer material in determining the time in which property could be redeemed, there was no fact stated in the complaint tending to show that at the date the deed was made the time for redemption had not expired. And even if the section in the Code of 1881 was in force, there were no facts alleged from which it sufficiently appeared that plaintiff had been deprived of her right to redeem the property. There was no attempt to allege any other fact which tended to show that the proceedings in obtaining the judgment and making sale of the property in question under an execution issued thereon were not in all respects regular. Hence, if the judgment was such that the property in question was liable to be sold for its satisfaction, the title of the defendants thereunder was superior to any claim of the plaintiff. It appeared from the complaint that the property when sold was that of the community composed of plaintiff and her husband. It follows that the defendants who hold under the sale have a good title if the claim upon which the judgment was rendered was one that could...