Bryant v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | 3:15-cv-2158 |
| Parties | FREDDELL BRYANT, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Petitioner Freddell Bryant has filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (d/e 1). Bryant is serving three consecutive sentences of life imprisonment, having been convicted by a jury of using a firearm to murder three people during a drug-trafficking crime. He asks the Court to vacate his sentences.
On April 4, 2007, Bryant was indicted for conspiring to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine; possessing 500 or more grams of cocaine with intent to distribute; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug conspiracy; and possessing a firearm as a felon. See United States v. Bryant, Case No. 2:07-cr-20043, C.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007.
On March 24, 2009, Bryant signed a "cooperation and testimony" agreement with the Government and pleaded guilty to three of the offenses charged in the 2007 indictment. Pursuant to the agreement, Bryant promised to "provide complete and truthful testimony to any grand jury, trial jury, or judge in any proceeding in which [Bryant] may be called to testify." Cooperation Agreement, United States v. Bryant, 2:07-cr-20043, C.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2009 (Doc. 62 at 20-21) (emphasis removed). The agreement warned that Bryant's immunity from prosecution depended on his "complete compliance" with the cooperation agreement. Id. at 21.
Pursuant to the cooperation agreement, Bryant met with the Government in January and February 2010 and admitted that he had been involved in a triple homicide on March 25, 2007. At the January meeting, Bryant confessed to shooting and killing all three of the victims, but in February he changed his story and said that he himself had killed only one of the three victims.
On March 24, 2011, Bryant was called before a grand jury instate court in Vermilion County, Illinois, to testify about the triple homicide. Bryant refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The following month, in April 2011, Bryant was again called to testify, this time in front of a federal grand jury. But Bryant informed the Government that he did not intend to testify before the federal grand jury, either. On April 6, 2011, the district judge appointed an attorney, Jon Noll, to represent Bryant regarding his grand jury testimony.
After meeting with his attorney, Bryant reiterated his intention not to testify in front of the grand jury. The Government gave Bryant until May 3, 2011, to change his mind.
On May 3, 2011, Bryant appeared before the grand jury and, as promised, refused to testify. The Government then wrote Bryant's attorney a letter informing Bryant that, because he had willfully violated the 2009 cooperation agreement, the cooperation agreement was voided. May 4, 2011 letter, United States v. Bryant, 2:11-cr-20034, C.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2012 (Doc. 16-2). The Government told Bryant that it was now entitled to use Bryant's confession in support of a criminal prosecution against Bryant.
In July 2011 the Government charged Bryant with three counts of using a firearm to commit murder during a drug-trafficking crime. A jury convicted Bryant on all three counts, and the district judge sentenced Bryant to three consecutive life sentences.
Bryant appealed, arguing that the district judge erred in allowing the Government to use Bryant's 2010 confession against him. But the Seventh Circuit rejected Bryant's argument and affirmed the judgment and sentences.
18 U.S.C. § 2255 allows a person convicted of a federal crime to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. It is an extraordinary remedy, because a Section 2255 petitioner has already had "an opportunity for full process." Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007). Post-conviction relief under Section 2255 is therefore "appropriate only for an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).
Absent circumstances not present here, a Section 2255 motion must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). A judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003). The deadline for filing a petition for certiorari is 90 days after the Court of Appeals enters its judgment. S. Ct. R. 13(1). Here, the Seventh Circuit entered its judgment on April 17, 2014, and so Bryant's judgment became final on July 16, 2014—giving Bryant until July 16, 2015 to file his Section 2255 motion.
Bryant's motion did not reach this Court until July 28, 2015. But a prisoner's Section 2255 motion is considered "filed" for statute of limitations purposes when it is submitted to the proper prison authorities for filing. Jones v. Bertrand, 171 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, Bryant has declared under penalty of perjury that he gave his motion to the prison authorities on July 13, 2015. Because no evidence refutes this claim, the Court finds that Bryant timely filed his motion.
Bryant argues that the Court should vacate his sentences because his attorneys before and during his trial provided such ineffective assistance that Bryant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984) (). Under Strickland's familiar two-part test, Bryant must show both that his attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Vinyard v. United States, 804 F.3d 1218, 1225 (7th Cir. 2015).
To satisfy the deficiency prong, Bryant must show that his attorney's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. Scrutiny of an attorney's performance in the context of a Section 2255 motion is highly deferential, so as to "eliminate as much as possible the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. The Court "indulge[s] a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
To satisfy the prejudice prong, Bryant must "establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 1227 (internal quotation omitted).
Here, Bryant argues that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance in three ways. For the reasons below, the Court rejects Bryant's arguments.
Bryant first argues that his attorney Jon Noll provided ineffective assistance in connection with Bryant's grand jury testimony in 2011. The district court had appointed Noll to represent Bryant after the Government sought to have Bryant testify in front of a federal grand jury in 2011. Bryant says that after consulting with Noll he followed Noll's advice and refused to testify. Bryant says that the Government informed him that refusing to testify was a breach of his cooperation agreement, but that neither the Government nor Noll told Bryant that refusing to testify would result in Bryant's being charged with the three murders in federal court. Bryant says that he was told only that his refusal to testify "void[ed] the cooperation agreement in its entirety and release[d] the United States from any obligation underthe agreement," and that only upon being charged with the murders did "the reality of the breach of the agreement bec[o]me evident to Bryant" (d/e 1-1 at 15) (internal quotation omitted).
Bryant says that based on Noll's advice he believed that "all statements made by him [in 2010] were protected ... and could not be used against him nor could new charges be filed based on those statements" (d/e 1-1 at 15), and that he had no obligation to continue cooperating with the Government pursuant to the cooperation agreement after he was sentenced in his 2007 federal case on April 29, 2010. Had the "exact repercussions" been explained, Bryant says, he "would have never refused to testify" before the grand jury (d/e 1-1 at 15-16). Bryant says that Noll should have told him that not testifying could result in federal murder charges, but instead Noll told him only that "his testimony was protected by the terms of the plea agreements" (d/e 1-1 at 16).
Bryant argues that Noll's performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986) ().
But numerous documents contradict Bryant's account of what Noll told Bryant. On April 22, 2011, Noll wrote to Bryant and advised Bryant that refusing to testify could result in additional criminal charges relating to the 2007 triple murder:
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