Clay v. United States

Decision Date04 March 2003
Docket NumberNo. 01-1500.,01-1500.
Citation537 U.S. 522
PartiesCLAY v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Petitioner Clay was convicted of arson and a drug offense in Federal District Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, and that court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998. Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he could have done so expired 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment and 69 days after issuance of its mandate. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. Such motions are subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." § 2255, ¶ 6(1). Relying on Circuit precedent, the District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for § 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals' mandate. Because Clay filed his § 2255 motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held: For the purpose of starting the clock on § 2255's one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction. Pp. 527-532.

(a) Finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning in the postconviction relief context: Finality attaches in that setting when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. See, e. g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390. Because the Court presumes "that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court's precedents," United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495, the Court's unvarying understanding of finality for collateral review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of "becomes final" in § 2255. Pp. 527-528.

(b) Supporting the Seventh Circuit's judgment, the Court's invited amicus curiae urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differences between § 2255 and § 2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal habeas corpus by state prisoners. Where § 2255, ¶ 6(1), refers simply to "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final," § 2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." When "Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23. Invoking the maxim recited in Russello, amicus asserts that "becomes final" in § 2255, ¶ 6(1), cannot mean the same thing as "became final" in § 2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus maintains, would render superfluous the words "by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review" — words found only in the latter provision. If § 2255, ¶ 6(1), explicitly incorporated the first of § 2244(d)(1)(A)'s finality formulations, one might indeed question the soundness of interpreting § 2255 implicitly to incorporate § 2244(d)(1)(A)'s second trigger as well. As written, however, § 2255 leaves "becomes final" undefined. Russello hardly warrants a decision that would hold the § 2255 petitioner to a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by § 2244(d)(1)(A). An unqualified term, Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a pinpointed one. Moreover, one can readily comprehend why Congress might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of "final" in § 2244(d)(1)(A) but not in § 2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to "became final" might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by reference to state-law rules. Those rules may differ from the general federal rule and vary from State to State. The qualifying words in § 2244(d)(1)(A) make it clear that finality is to be determined by reference to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no comparable risk of varying rules to guard against. Pp. 528-531.

(c) Section 2263—which prescribes a limitation period for certain habeas petitions filed by death-sentenced state prisoners—does not alter the Court's reading of § 2255. First, amicus' reliance on § 2263 encounters essentially the same problem as does his reliance on § 2244(d)(1)(A): Section 2255, ¶ 6(1), refers to neither of the two events that § 2263(a) identifies as possible starting points for the limitation period — "affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review" and "the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Thus, reasoning by negative implication from § 2263 does not justify the conclusion that § 2255, ¶ 6(1)'s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than the other. Second, § 2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to "affirmance of the conviction and sentence," while § 2255, ¶ 6(1), ties the limitation period to the date when "the judgment of conviction becomes final." "The Russello presumption . . . grows weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection." Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 435-436. Pp. 531-532.

30 Fed. Appx. 607, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

Thomas C. Goldstein, by appointment of the Court, 537 U. S. 808, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Amy Howe.

Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

David W. DeBruin, by invitation of the Court, 536 U. S. 974, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief was Elaine J. Goldenberg.

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 is subject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." § 2255, ¶ 6(1). This case concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court, does the judgment become "final" for post-conviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a petition for certiorari expires?

In accord with this Court's consistent understanding of finality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of starting the clock on § 2255's one-year limitation period, we hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction.

I

In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On November 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. That court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 40(a)(1) and 41(b) (when no petition for rehearing is filed, a court of appeals' mandate issues 21 days after entry of judgment). Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he could have petitioned for certiorari expired on February 22, 1999, 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment, see this Court's Rule 13(1), and 69 days after the issuance of the appellate court's mandate.

On February 22, 2000—one year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired—Clay filed a motion in the District Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Congress has prescribed "[a] 1-year period of limitation" for such motions "run[ning] from the latest of" four specified dates. § 2255, ¶ 6. Of the four dates, the only one relevant in this case, as in the generality of cases, is the first: "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." § 2255, ¶ 6(1).

Relying on Gendron v. United States, 154 F. 3d 672, 674 (CA7 1998) (per curiam), the District Court stated that "when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek certiorari . . . , the conviction becomes `final' on the date the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal." App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because Clay filed his § 2255 motion more than one year after that date, the court denied the motion as time barred.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That court declined Clay's "invitation to reconsider our holding in Gendron," although it acknowledged that Gendron's "construction of section 2255 represents the minority view." 30 Fed. Appx. 607, 609 (2002). "Bowing to stare decisis," the court expressed "reluctan[ce] to overrule [its own] recently-reaffirmed precedent without...

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