Bubolz v. Dane County

• Decision Date: 21 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-0819,89-0819
• Citation: 464 N.W.2d 67,159 Wis.2d 284
• Parties: Dan BUBOLZ, Margaret Bubolz, Dale Myers, Marilyn Myers, Henry Weiss, Olga Weiss, Felix Wildgruber, Virginia Wildgruber, Lester Gilbertson, Sylvia Gilbertson, John Waldman, and Lila Waldman, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, v. DANE COUNTY, Defendant-Cross Respondent, Thomas Junck, and Linda Junck, Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 67

464 N.W.2d 67

159 Wis.2d 284

Dan BUBOLZ, Margaret Bubolz, Dale Myers, Marilyn Myers,

Henry Weiss, Olga Weiss, Felix Wildgruber, Virginia

Wildgruber, Lester Gilbertson, Sylvia Gilbertson, John

Waldman, and Lila Waldman, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, v. DANE COUNTY, Defendant-Cross Respondent, Thomas Junck, and Linda Junck, Defendants-Appellants-Cross

Respondents.

No. 89-0819.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs April 9, 1990.

Opinion Released Nov. 21, 1990.

Opinion Filed Nov. 21, 1990.

Donald B. Bruns of the Bruns Law Office, on the briefs, Madison, for defendants-appellants-cross respondents.

Irwin Kass of Tomlinson, Gillman, Travers & Gregg, S.C., on the brief, Madison, for plaintiffs-respondents-cross appellants.

Before GARTZKE, P.J., and DYKMAN and SUNDBY, JJ.

DYKMAN, Judge.

Thomas and Linda Junck appeal from a trial court judgment declaring that the Juncks' commercial use of their lot violates a restrictive covenant in their deed and enjoining the Juncks from using the lot for commercial purposes. On cross-appeal, twelve members of "Horseshoe Bend" (plaintiffs), the Juncks' subdivision, contend the trial court erred in determining that: (1) the scope of the permanent injunction is sufficiently broad; (2) the town of Verona and Dane County's rezoning of the Juncks' lot to LC-1 is not illegal spot zoning; (3) the Juncks' activity is not a nuisance (4) the Juncks' claim is not frivolous pursuant to sec. 814.025, Stats. ¹

Both parties also request costs and fees for frivolous appeals pursuant to sec. (Rule) 809.25(3), Stats. We affirm the trial court in all respects and deny both parties costs and fees for frivolous appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves a subdivision known as "Horseshoe Bend" in rural Dane county. The property was previously owned by Marilyn and Dale Myers and subdivided by them in the mid-1960's. The Myers retained one lot in Horseshoe Bend and conveyed nine lots to eight separate parties. Of the eight deeds of conveyances, at least three ² contained restrictive covenants. One of the three conveyances with a restrictive covenant was to Patrick and Corrine Keyes, who later conveyed the property to the Juncks.

The restrictive covenant in the Juncks' deed provides:

Not more than one (1) single family residence shall be constructed on said premises at a cost of not less than $20,000.00. No basement, tent, shack, or trailer shall be used for a residence, temporarily or permanently. Any construction shall be completed within one (1) year from the date of commencement.

Prior to 1986, all of the lots in the Horseshoe Bend were zoned either R-1 (residential) or RH-1 (rural homes). In 1986, the Juncks applied to the town of Verona and to Dane county for a zoning change to LC-1 (limited commercial). Although the rezoning was opposed by a majority of the property owners in Horseshoe Bend, the measure was passed.

Plaintiffs brought suit to enforce the restrictive covenant and prevent the Juncks' commercial use of their lot. At trial, evidence was presented establishing that, since 1977, the Juncks had operated an electrical contracting business, T.J. Electric, from their lot. In addition, the Juncks stored business equipment and vehicles on their lot. ³ The Juncks conceded that this use violated their previous R-1 zoning classification.

The trial court determined that the Juncks' use of the lot violated their restrictive covenant. Accordingly, the trial court issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the Juncks from continuing to store business equipment on their property.

II. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT

The Juncks argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Horseshoe Bend was established as part of a general plan by the former owners to create a rural neighborhood and that the Juncks' use of the lot violated the restrictive covenant in their deed.

The existence of a general development plan or scheme is a question of fact determined by examining the intent of the original owners in platting the development, the conditions of the platting, and all surrounding circumstances. LaValle v. Kulkay, 277 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Minn.1979). On appeal, we will not upset a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Sec. 805.17(2), Stats. The correct construction of the restrictive covenant, however, is a question of law which we review independently. See Joyce v. Conway, 7 Wis.2d 247, 249, 96 N.W.2d 530, 532 (1959).

A. GENERAL PLAN OR SCHEME

Even in the absence of privity, deed covenants are enforceable by purchasers of land in the same tract, where a common owner imposed restrictions on each parcel of property sold with a general plan or scheme in mind to enhance the value or attractiveness of the tract as a whole. Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis.2d 421, 425, 288 N.W.2d 815, 817-18 (1980). In Hall v. Church of the Open Bible, 4 Wis.2d 246, 89 N.W.2d 798 (1958), the court observed:

It is a well-established rule that a covenant restricting land to residential use, inserted by the proprietor in a conveyance of his lands, inures to the benefit of all the purchasers where it is inserted for the purpose of carrying out a general plan or scheme of development....

Id. at 248, 89 N.W.2d at 799. The question in each case is whether the common grantor placed the restrictive covenant in the deed "for the purpose of carrying out a general plan of development, which was to inure to the benefit of other grantees." Crowley, 94 Wis.2d at 425, 288 N.W.2d at 818.

At trial, a former co-owner, Dale Myers, testified that in conveying the lots in Horseshoe Bend, he had intended to create a "nice residential area." He stated that, as he had envisioned Horseshoe Bend, it would not be used commercially. Questioned why restrictive covenants were not placed in all of the conveyances, he stated that he placed them in conveyances only to parties he did not know well.

The trial court concluded Myers inserted the restrictive covenants pursuant to a general plan and, as such, their benefit inured to the other property owners in Horseshoe Bend. The court observed:

I find the evidence very convincing that it was the intent of Mr. Myers to preserve this as a rural residential area, his emphasis being on horses, the evidence of that by the very name that he chose for the street, Horseshoe Bend, by his own activities on the circle, and by the fact that a number of neighbors over the years have at various times kept horses in this rural setting.

We conclude the trial court's determination that a general plan existed is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to enforce the restrictive covenant.

B. CONSTRUCTION

The Juncks' restrictive covenant provides in part that "[n]ot more than one (1) single family residence shall be constructed on said premises at a cost of not less than $20,000.00." The Juncks contend that this clause only limits construction on the property, not its use. Thus, the Juncks maintain, they may operate an electrical business within the existing buildings. We disagree.

The term "residential," when used in a restrictive covenant, is in contradistinction to "business" or "commercial." Hunt v. Held, 90 Ohio St. 280, 107 N.E. 765, 766 (1914); Briggs v. Hendricks, 197 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex.Civ.App.1946). In Klapproth v. Grininger, 162 Minn. 488, 203 N.W. 418 (1925), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that:

While covenants imposing restrictions upon the use of property will not be enlarged by construction, they will be given the full force and effect intended by the parties who created them, and where the language used is clear and unambiguous it will be given its obvious meaning.

Id. 203 N.W. at 419 (citations omitted); see LaValle, 277 N.W.2d at 403. In Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Goodlove, 248 Mich. 625, 227 N.W. 772, 773 (1929), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that "[a] covenant restricting the erection of any building, except for dwelling house purposes, applies to the use as well as to the character of the building."

We agree with these decisions. It would be unreasonable not to construe the Juncks' restrictive covenant to cover use. Under the Juncks' interpretation, the Juncks would be free to operate any number of commercial enterprises on their lot so long as they did not construct non-residential buildings. They could, for example, maintain a used car lot or a driving range.

Such an interpretation would negate the general plan of the subdivision. As one court noted:

If, after a residence has been constructed on a lot with a restrictive covenant in the deed, the owner could thereafter use the building for a ... restaurant, beauty shop, antique shop, or numerous other uses to which, but for the prohibitions in a zoning ordinance, it would be suitable and available, the covenant would be of little value and the general plan of restriction, which would otherwise inure to the benefit of all purchasers, would be circumvented.

Strauss v. Ginzberg, 218 Minn. 57, 15 N.W.2d 130, 133 (1944) (emphasis added).

We conclude the Juncks' commercial use of the lot violated the restrictive covenant in their deed.

III. PERMANENT INJUNCTION

The Juncks contend that the trial court erred in imposing a permanent injunction. On cross-appeal, plaintiffs request that the scope of the permanent injunction be broadened. The permanent injunction prohibited the Juncks from:

[U]sing the property in question for anything other than primarily--single family residential purposes ... defendants Junck [are prohibited] from engaging in commercial activities, including operating their electrical contracting business ... on the premises, except insofar as those activities are incidental to their occupation of the premises as their single-family residence.

....

Defendants Junck are prohibited from using or storing any business-related supplies, inventory, equipment or vehicles in their existing home, garage, or existing 30' x 36' building or in any other...