Buchanan v. Cassell, 34712

• Decision Date: 19 February 1959
• Docket Number: No. 34712,34712
• Citation: 335 P.2d 600,53 Wn.2d 611
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Clayton BUCHANAN and Hanna Buchanan, his wife, Appellants, v. Charles E. CASSELL and Laurel E. Cassell, his wife, and The State of Washington, Respondents.

Page 611

53 Wn.2d 611

335 P.2d 600

Clayton BUCHANAN and Hanna Buchanan, his wife, Appellants, v. Charles E. CASSELL and Laurel E. Cassell, his wife, and The

State of Washington, Respondents.

No. 34712.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Feb. 19, 1959.

D. W. Moore, Clarkston, Thomas W. Feeney, Lewiston, Idaho, of counsel, for appellants.

S. Dean Arnold, Clarkston, for respondents.

HUNTER, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Clayton and Hanna Buchanan, brought this action to quiet title to real property under the ten-year adverse possession statute. All of the land in question at one time belonged to the Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Company. Plaintiffs are the owners of a certain tract of land which lies between state highway No. 3 and the west bank of the Snake river. The tract of land in controversy extends along the east boundary of the plaintiffs' tract and runs easterly to the high-water mark of the west bank of the Snake river, this strip being unplatted property. The plaintiffs seek to tack their possession, which is less than ten years, to that of their predecessors, the Woodrings, in order to come within the statute, (RCW 4.16.020).

W. A. Woodring and Gertrude L. Woodring, his wife, contracted for the purchase of lots 2 and 3, block 'O' of Vineland, from the Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Company. The deed they received described the property as platted property, with the exception of a fraction of lot 3 which had been previously conveyed to one Jeoffrey Woodring, and the exception of certain right-of-ways for railroad and highway purposes. W. A. Woodring was the only grantee named in the deed they received. The Woodrings moved onto the property about 1919. They developed the tract by building a home and barn, constructing boundary fences running east and west from the highway on the west to the Snake river on the east. The Woodrings used the disputed area for farming, including the planting of potatoes, grain and corn. They also used the area for pasturing stock and utilized the barn for use of th stock and later built a boathouse on the disputed area. The Woodrings were in possession for a period of thirty-two years. To all appearances they treated all the property to the edge of the river as their own.

Shortly before his death, on June 13, 1951, W. A. Woodring made a conveyance of the land to his wife, Gertrude, by a quitclaim deed which he signed with an 'X.' The property conveyed was identical to that contained in his deed from the Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Company, except that his deed described the property by metes and bounds. The description begins at the southeast corner of lot 3, then by the direction in degrees and the distance in feet it circumscribes the property back to the point of beginning. There are no visible monuments mentioned in the deed to which the description refers. The easterly line of the metes and bounds description coincides with the government surveyed meander line, although the surveyed meander line is not mentioned as such in the metes and bounds description. The land in dispute, as heretofore designated, runs from this surveyed meander line to the high-water mark of the Snake river. Thereafter, on October 28, 1952, Gertrude Woodring sold all of the property to the plaintiffs. The description in her deed of conveyance, which she testified she thought included the disputed strip, was the same as contained in the quitclaim deed from her husband.

The defendants, Charles and Laurel Cassell, claim title to the property by virtue of a quitclaim deed they received from the successor in interest to the Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Company. Exhibits admitted by stipulation showed that the defendants have title deducible of record. The disputed area is not assessed to anyone for tax purposes, nor have any taxes been paid by anyone. The state of Washington was joined to foreclose any right it may have had for inheritance tax due from the estate of W. A. Woodring. However, the state did not appear.

At the close of plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved for a dismissal of plaintiffs' action with prejudice. The court granted this motion and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment accordingly, quieting title in the defendants. Plaintiffs have appealed.

Appellants have assigned error (1) to the court's granting respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice, at the close of the appellants' case, and (2) to the entry of the following portion of the trial court's finding of fact No. 1:

'* * * that Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest did not claim or intend to hold said lands adversely and that Plaintiffs' possession if adverse did not commence until October 28, 1952.'

The appellants contend that the possession of their predecessors, the Woodrings, was adverse to the title of the true owner, and therefore the appellants, being in privity with the Woodrings, have a right to tack their possession to that of their predecessors, to meet the requirements of the ten-year adverse possession statute.

This state follows the rule that a purchaser may tack the adverse use of its predecessor in interest to that of his own where the land was intended to be included in the deed between them, but was mistakenly omitted from the description. In Faubion v. Elder, 1956, 49 Wash.2d 300, 301 P.2d 153, 157, we said:

'As to point (3), it is apparent that appellant and his predecessors...