Buchanan v. City of Kenosha
| Decision Date | 20 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-C-0207.,99-C-0207. |
| Citation | 90 F.Supp.2d 1008 |
| Parties | Lonnie BUCHANAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF KENOSHA and Kenneth Kopesky, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Frederick L. Zievers, Kenosha, WI, for plaintiff.
Kevin P. Reak, Gregg Gunta, Joseph McCarthy, Milwaukee, WI, for defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lonnie Buchanan brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendant Kenneth Kopesky, a City of Kenosha police detective, violated his constitutional rights by failing to comply with lawful extradition procedures when he transported plaintiff from Waukegan, Illinois to Kenosha, Wisconsin in connection with a homicide investigation. Defendant Kopesky now moves for summary judgment.1
On November 16, 1998, four men entered a home in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and one of them shot and killed the homeowner. Two of the men were subsequently arrested and described the shooter as a black male with a disabled left arm who was known to them only as "Hard Times." On February 25, 1999, defendant Kopesky, based on information provided to him, determined that plaintiff was the shooter and obtained a warrant for his arrest. On the same day, police in Waukegan, Illinois, acting on information from Kopesky, arrested plaintiff in Waukegan. Plaintiff did not have a disabled arm and was not known as "Hard Times."
Defendant and Kenosha Detective Les Meredith went to the Waukegan Police Station where plaintiff was held. Waukegan police advised plaintiff of the charges against him and read him his Miranda rights, which plaintiff waived. Defendant asked plaintiff to make a statement and plaintiff said he was innocent. Plaintiff states that defendant told him he could clear up the problem by coming back to Kenosha and making a statement. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff further says defendant told him that after he gave his statement defendant would return plaintiff to the Waukegan Police Station, where plaintiff left his car. (Id. ¶ 7.) According to plaintiff, defendant then conferred with Waukegan and Lake County law enforcement authorities and appeared to be discussing plaintiff's "exhibition rights," which plaintiff later discovered were his "extradition rights." (Id. ¶ 8.)
Waukegan police officer Ward testifies that defendant and Meredith told him and Waukegan Police Lieutenant House, the officer in charge, that they wanted to take plaintiff straight to Kenosha from the Waukegan Police Station. (Ward Dep. at 28.) Ward says Lieutenant House told defendant and Meredith that removing plaintiff without following extradition procedures "wasn't a good idea," and that House would have to talk with the State's Attorney's Office "before anything like that happened." (Id. at 30.) Ward states that the Kenosha detectives replied that removing plaintiff would not be a problem as long as he signed a waiver, and that they do that kind of thing all the time. (Id. at 31.) Ward also says he did not see plaintiff sign a waiver of extradition but that he heard people in his office being told that such a waiver had been signed. (Id.) Ward indicates that he began preparing paperwork for the extradition, known as a "fugitive from justice ticket," but that he, Lieutenant House and the other Waukegan officers learned that plaintiff was no longer in the building. (Id. at 33-34.) Ward states that neither he nor Lieutenant House gave the Kenosha officers permission to remove plaintiff from the Waukegan Police Station. (Id. at 35.)
According to plaintiff, after the discussion between defendant and the Lake County authorities several of the Lake County authorities left his presence, at which time defendant shackled and handcuffed him and transported him to Kenosha. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 9.) Defendant states that he and Detective Meredith asked plaintiff in the presence of two Waukegan detectives whether he would accompany them to Kenosha and that plaintiff agreed. (Def.'s Aff. ¶ 9.) It is undisputed that prior to transporting plaintiff to Kenosha neither defendant nor any other officer advised plaintiff of his extradition rights. (See Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 16 (undisputed).) Plaintiff states that after defendant took him to Kenosha he asked plaintiff to sign a statement that he returned to Wisconsin voluntarily. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff states that he signed the statement but realized that defendant was not going to return him to Illinois as allegedly promised. (Id. ¶ 14.) The statement plaintiff signed makes no mention of extradition rights or of an agreement by plaintiff to waive such rights. (Def.'s Aff.Ex. D.)
Plaintiff was held in the Kenosha jail for seventeen days, then was released without being charged.
Summary judgment is required "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The mere existence of some factual dispute does not defeat a summary judgment motion; "the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis deleted). For a dispute to be genuine, the evidence must be such that a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. For the fact to be material, it must relate to a disputed matter that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Id.
Although summary judgment is a useful tool for isolating and terminating factually unsupported claims, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), courts should act with caution in granting summary judgment, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When the evidence presented shows a dispute over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, summary judgment must be denied. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once this burden is met, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and designate specific facts to support each element of the cause of action, showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Neither party may rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, or upon conclusory statements in affidavits, Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir.1989). Both parties must produce documentary evidence to support their contentions. Whetstine v. Gates Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir.1990).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, it is "not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record—only those inferences that are reasonable." Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991).
The law in the Seventh Circuit governing § 1983 claims based on deprivation of extradition rights was established in two decisions arising out of a single case, McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1979) ("McBride I"), and McBride v. Soos, 679 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.1982) ("McBride II"). There, the plaintiff was in custody in Missouri, but was wanted by the State of Indiana. After being transported to Indiana he brought a § 1983 action against the Indiana agents for allegedly removing him from Missouri without complying with extradition procedures.
In McBride I the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether the defendant deprived the plaintiff of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and federal law as required by § 1983. See McBride I, 594 F.2d at 611-12. The court held in the affirmative, stating:
The obligation imposed on states to extradite fugitives from justice within its borders to the state from which he has fled upon proper demand from that state is rooted in the Constitution. Art. 4, § 2, cl. 2. This constitutional provision is implemented by federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182. Before an individual can be extradited, the governor of the asylum state must determine: (1) whether the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime; and (2) whether the person demanded is a fugitive from justice from the state making the demand.
McBride I, 594 F.2d at 612 (footnotes omitted). The court went on to point out that:
These safeguards serve to protect the rights of the alleged fugitive. As this court has stated:
The statute is one involving the substantial rights of citizens, and its essential elements must be strictly followed ... Only by faithfully following the provisions of the statute may a person be lawfully deprived of his liberty and extradited from an asylum state to another state, there to be tried for the commission of a crime. The alleged fugitive has a right not to be imprisoned or dealt with by the states in disregard of those safeguards provided by the Constitution and statutes of the United States.
United States v. Meyering, [75 F.2d 716,] 717 [(7th Cir.1935)] ([c]itations omitted). Failure to comply with procedural safeguards prior to extradition can be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding.
In addition to procedural protections embodied in the Constitution and the federal statute, the laws of Missouri and Indiana also provide safeguards for alleged fugitives. Under Indiana law, Soos and Haney, as agents of the demanding state, were required to follow certain procedures in obtaining a warrant from the Indiana governor. Finally, under Missouri law, plaint...
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