Buchanan v. Hope Fed. Credit Union

• Decision Date: 21 February 2023
• Docket Number: 2021-CA-00218-COA
• Parties: CALVIN BUCHANAN APPELLANT v. HOPE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION APPELLEE
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

CALVIN BUCHANAN APPELLANT v. HOPE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION APPELLEE

No. 2021-CA-00218-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi

February 21, 2023

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/28/2021.

RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEVE S. RATCLIFF III.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: LARRY STAMPS ANITA M. STAMPS.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER HANSER MEREDITH.

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH J.

¶1. Calvin Buchanan appeals from the Rankin County Circuit Court's order denying Buchanan's motion to transfer venue of Hope Federal Credit Union's (HFCU) action seeking confirmation of an arbitration award to the Hinds County Circuit Court, First Judicial District. Buchanan argues the circuit court erred by declaring Rankin County a proper venue and by denying Hinds County as the proper venue. Finding credible evidence to support HFCU's choice of venue in Rankin County, we affirm the order denying the transfer of venue.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. This case derives from proceedings to confirm an arbitration award. The arbitrator granted monetary relief to HFCU and adjudged Buchanan liable to HFCU for payment. HFCU is a federally chartered credit union registered to do business in the State of Mississippi with its principal place of business located within the City of Jackson in the portion of the city contained in Rankin County, Mississippi.^[1] Taylor Brown LLC is a Tennessee limited liability company engaged in business operations in Tennessee.

¶3. On March 8, 2012, HFCU extended a commercial loan ("loan") to Taylor Brown for the purpose of financing a pharmacy. The loan is evidenced by a loan agreement and a promissory note executed by Taylor Brown, a continuing and unconditional guaranty executed by Buchanan ("Guaranty"), and a continuing and unconditional guaranty executed by Ivory Taylor^[2] (collectively, "loan documents"). Each of these loan documents is dated March 8, 2012.^[3] Taylor Brown subsequently defaulted on its loan payments at some point before September 20, 2017.^[4] ¶4. On July 18, 2019, HFCU filed a demand for arbitration against Buchanan and Ivory with the American Arbitration Association.^[5] HFCU's demand for arbitration claimed that the terms of the Guaranty entitled HFCU to payment from Buchanan for the loan indebtedness owed by Taylor Brown. On January 31, 2020, the arbitrator conducted a final hearing for the arbitration proceedings, during which both HFCU and Buchanan were represented. On March 31, 2020, the arbitrator issued his final award and rendered judgment in favor of HFCU and against Buchanan. HFCU then filed this action with the Rankin County Circuit Court on April 14, 2020, seeking confirmation of the arbitration award and entry of final judgment against Buchanan.

¶5. On July 22, 2020, service of HFCU's complaint was accepted and made on Buchanan by the Lafayette County Sheriff's Office. Buchanan filed his motion to transfer venue to the Hinds County Circuit Court, First Judicial District, on August 21, 2020. HFCU then filed its response on August 28, 2020, and opposed transferring venue of the action to Hinds County. On November 6, 2020, HFCU filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law against Buchanan. HFCU proceeded to set a hearing for November 24, 2020, on Buchanan's motion that Taylor Brown defaulted at some point between March 8, 2012, and September 20, 2017. The date of the default is unknown, but the precise date of the default is not pertinent to the matters on appeal, nor are the details of Taylor Brown's default within the record before this Court. to transfer venue and HFCU's motion to confirm the arbitration award, but the hearing was subsequently changed to November 25, 2020.

¶6. On November 23, 2020, Buchanan filed his reply to HFCU's response opposing the transfer of venue, and on November 24, 2020, Buchanan filed a motion to stay the hearing on HFCU's motion for judgment as a matter of law until after the hearing on venue. The next morning, on November 25, 2020, the day the hearing was scheduled to occur, Buchanan's counsel requested a continuance of the hearing.

¶7. Rather than postpone the hearing, the parties reached an agreement to have the circuit court rule on the motions based on the parties' briefs. But the parties' agreement was contingent on a request from HFCU for the court to consider the fact that arbitration occurred in Madison County, not Hinds County as previously alleged by Buchanan, and a request from Buchanan to consider an additional case reference. Neither Buchanan or HFCU objected to the requests made.

¶8. The circuit court rendered a decision on November 25, 2020, and informed the parties by electronic communication that the motion to transfer venue was denied and that the motion to confirm the arbitration award was granted. On January 28, 2021, the circuit court entered an order denying a transfer of venue and entered a final judgment confirming the arbitration award against Buchanan and in favor of HFCU. Buchanan filed his notice of appeal on February 26, 2021.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9. "Circuit courts' rulings on motions for change of venue are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Taylor Constr. Co. Inc. v. Superior Mat Co. Inc., 298 So.3d 956, 958 (¶5) (Miss. 2020). The circuit court is required to "give the plaintiff the benefit of reasonable doubt with respect to venue selection, and this Court must do the same on appeal." Williamson v. Edmonds, 880 So.2d 310, 315 (¶13) (Miss. 2004). We "will not disturb a trial court's ruling regarding venue 'unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion or that the discretion has not been justly and properly exercised under the circumstances of the case.'" Am. Fam. Life Assur. of Columbus v. Ellison, 4 So.3d 1049, 1051 (¶8) (Miss. 2009) (quoting Hedgepeth v. Johnson, 975 So.2d 235, 237 (¶7) (Miss. 2008)).

DISCUSSION

¶10. Buchanan claims that the Rankin County Circuit Court was not a proper venue for HFCU's action seeking to confirm the arbitration award, and he alleges that Hinds County was the proper court instead.^[6] Buchanan's venue argument is based on three grounds: he does not reside in Rankin County; arbitration was not conducted in Rankin County; and the failure to make payments on the loan did not occur in Rankin County. Conversely, HFCU contends that Rankin County is a proper venue because the failure to cure the loan default occurred at HFCU's principal place of business located in Rankin County.

¶11. By definition, venue is "[t]he proper or a possible place for a lawsuit to proceed[.]" Black's Law Dictionary at 1870 (11th ed. 2019). Venue "refers to the place where an action is to be heard[.]" State v. Walgreen Co., 250 So.3d 465, 474 (¶27) (Miss. 2018).^[7] "The determination for proper venue is governed by statute." Jones County. v. Est. of Bright ex rel. Bright, 351 So.3d 458, 460 (¶7) (Miss. 2022); see also Weeks Inc. v. Lewis, 335 So.3d 1049, 1052 (¶13) (Miss. 2022) ("The permissible venues for a plaintiff to select from are controlled by statute."). Our supreme court has explained, "It is well established that the plaintiff is entitled to choose between any of the permissible venue options where credible evidence or factual basis supports the venue selected." Snyder v. Logan, 905 So.2d 531, 534 (¶16) (Miss. 2005). In other words, the plaintiff's "choice must be sustained unless in the end there is no credible evidence supporting the factual basis for the claim of venue." Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So.2d 382, 386 (¶6) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Flight Line Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So.2d 1149, 1155 (Miss. 1992)); see also Herman Grant Co. v. Washington, 214 So.3d 266, 271 (¶14) (Miss. 2017) ("It is the plaintiff's prerogative to decide where, among permissible venues, to sue the defendant.").

¶12. Mississippi law includes a section of statutes that cover arbitration proceedings and delineate the rules that apply to arbitration.^[8] Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-15-21 (Rev. 2019) governs the confirmation of arbitration awards and states the following:

Upon presentation of the articles of submission and the award to the court designated in the submission or the court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the award, the court shall, upon motion, confirm the award, unless the same be vacated or modified, or a decision thereon be postponed, as hereinafter provided.

(Emphasis added). Section 11-15-21 instructs the parties as to where it is permissible for an award to be confirmed. By its terms, the statute directs parties to present the award for confirmation (1) to the court specifically named in the demand that submitted the claim to arbitration or (2) to the court with subject matter jurisdiction of the arbitrated claim. Thus, an action for confirmation cannot be deemed to have been brought in an "improper venue" when the action has been filed in a court that conforms to section 11-15-21.

¶13. This statute provides guidance in determining whether the Rankin County Circuit Court was a permissible forum for HFCU's action on the arbitration award. Here, Rankin County Circuit Court could be deemed a permissible venue under the statute if the articles of submission designated Rankin County Circuit Court as the court for post-arbitration proceedings. A review of the record shows that the parties did not designate a specific court anywhere in the demand for arbitration or the documents attached to the submission. In the alternative, the Rankin County Circuit Court could be a permissible venue if the court had subject matter jurisdiction over HFCU's claim against Buchanan.

¶14. "Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the...