Buchanan v. Martin Marietta Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 July 1985 |
| Citation | 494 A.2d 677 |
| Parties | 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3442 Murdock A. BUCHANAN v. MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Dunlap & O'Brien, Mark Dunlap (orally), Portland, for plaintiff.
Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, Graydon G. Stevens (orally), Portland, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, VIOLETTE, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.
The defendant, Martin Marietta Corporation, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, Murdock A. Buchanan, after a jury verdict in Superior Court, Cumberland County, finding that the parties had entered into an employment contract that was breached by the defendant's termination of the plaintiff's employment. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The plaintiff was initially hired as a cement sales representative by the defendant's predecessor in 1960. In 1969, because of a corporate reorganization the plaintiff was assigned to a position as terminal manager. The defendant assured him this was a temporary arrangement, and he would soon be reassigned as a salesman. After four years as a terminal manager, the plaintiff voluntarily left the defendant's employ and began working as a cement salesman for one of its competitors.
After approximately seventeen months of highly successful sales effort in this employment, in the summer of 1974, representatives of the defendant approached the plaintiff to discuss the defendant's reemployment of the plaintiff. Several meetings were held, culminating in a meeting on August 9, 1974, when the plaintiff met with Frank Anderson, the president of the defendant's eastern cement division, and three other corporate officials. It was at this meeting that the plaintiff accepted the defendant's offer to return to work. On July 31, 1978, the defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment.
The plaintiff initiated this action in August 1979, seeking recovery from the defendant for wrongful termination in breach of an employment contract, age discrimination, and retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court reserved ruling on the defendant's motions for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case and at the close of all the evidence and submitted the case to the jury. The jury rejected the plaintiff's claims of age discrimination and retaliatory discharge. By special verdict, however, the jury found that the plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a binding contract whereby the defendant became obligated to employ the plaintiff until his retirement. Also finding that the defendant breached this obligation by terminating the plaintiff's employment, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages. The trial court denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict and ordered judgment to be entered for the plaintiff. The defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, was also denied. The defendant appeals, contending, as it did before the trial court, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the plaintiff and defendant had entered into an employment contract not terminable at the will of the defendant. 1
When reviewing the denial of motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we determine whether the verdict can be sustained by any reasonable view of the evidence, including all justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered. Cyr v. Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376, 1379-80 (Me.1983).
In Maine, it has long been the rule that a contract of employment for an in-definite term is terminable at the will of either party. Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hospital, 379 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1977); Merrill v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 78 Me. 97, 100, 2 A. 847, 848 (1886). 2 In the instant case, however, plaintiff has alleged and the jury found that he and the defendant entered into a contract for a definite term, viz, until his retirement date in 1991.
The defendant does not dispute that Frank Anderson was authorized by the defendant to hire the plaintiff....
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