Buchanan v. Tilden

• Decision Date: 24 January 1899
• Citation: 52 N.E. 724,158 N.Y. 109
• Parties: BUCHANAN v. TILDEN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

158 N.Y. 109

52 N.E. 724

BUCHANAN

v.TILDEN.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 24, 1899.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by Adelaide E. T. Buchanan against George H. Tilden. From an order of the appellate division (39 N. Y. Supp. 228) reversing a judgment for plaintiff, she appeals. Reversed.

Louis S. Phillips, for appellant.

Delos McCurdy, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

At the close of plaintiff's case both parties moved for a directed verdict, and neither asked to go to jury on any question. The trial judge thereupon directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The appellate division, with a divided court, reversed the judgment in plaintiff's favor entered upon the verdict, and ordered a new trial. The plaintiff has appealed from that order, stipulating for judgment absolute in case of affirmance, and presents for our determination a single question of law arising upon undisputed facts. Before stating that question, reference will be made to the material facts:

The plaintiff is the adopted daughter of Moses Y. Tilden, a brother of the late Samuel J. Tilden. The defendant is an heir at law and next of kin of Samuel J. Tilden. On the 20th day of October, 1886, the defendant began an action against the executors of the estate of Samuel J. Tilden and others, praying judgment that the thirty-fifth article of Mr. Tilden's will be adjudged void, and that the property therein mentioned be declared undisposed of by any provision thereof. The defendant, being without means to prosecute this action, applied to Robert D. Buchanan, the husband of the plaintiff, for assistance in raising the funds necessary to carry on the litigation. Buchanan expressed his willingness to aid defendant, if certain arrangements were made, and said that his uncle, Robert G. Dun, might be willing to advance the money required. The defendant expressed himself as willing ‘to do anything in the world to raise the money,-to make any arrangement that was reasonable,’-and said to Buchanan that, if the contest was successful, Mrs. Buchanan ‘should come in, share alike, with the rest of them.’ It was evidently within the contemplation of the parties that, if this action of the defendant was successful, the result would be that, as to a very large part of his estate, Mr. Tilden died intestate, and that, while the plaintiff, as an adopted child of Moses Y. Tilden, and not of Samuel J. Tilden's blood, might take no part thereof, yet there were the strongest moral and family reasons why she should be regarded as an heir at law and next of kin. Buchanan induced Dun to make certain necessary advances, to the extent of $5,000, and Dun consented to do so solely on the ground that plaintiff was to share the fruits of a successful contest, he being unacquainted with the defendant. This portion of the money was advanced by Dun about the time defendant began his action, and he was then presented to Dun, and repeated to him the promise, in regard to plaintiff sharing alike with the rest of the heirs, that he had made to her husband.

In February, 1887, the defendant asked Buchanan if he could raise more money. Buchanan testified that, in response to this application, ‘I told him that I thought, before any more money was talked about, that the arrangement that had been talked about had better be whipped into line, * * * and he said they were all perfectly willing to share and share alike in that matter. I said, ‘That does not satisfy me; that is not what I want; I want some positive agreement.’ After considerable further talk, he said that his brothers and sisters were scattered; that he could not get it into shape just then, but that he had to have some more money, and had no have it right away, and, in order to get the moeny, and have it right away, he, on his own personal behalf, having nothing to do with his brothers or sisters in any sense, would obligate himself to pay personally fifty thousand dollars.' Thereupon defendant and Buchanan went to the office of counsel, where the following letter was drawn up, signed by defendant, and delivered by Buchanan to Dun: ‘New York, February 19th, 1887. Robert G. Dun, Esq., No. 314 B'way, N. Y. City-My Dear Sir: It is understood between Mr. R. D. Buchanan and myself that, in the event of the success of the proceedings now pending, or any which may be taken, to practically set aside the thirty-fifth section of the will of my late uncle, Samuel J. Tilden, in view of the assistance, looking to that end, which has been and may be rendered by Mr. Buchanan, as well as by yourself, that I will, and hereby do, become responsible for the payment to Mrs. Adelaide E. Buchanan, or her order, of the sum of fifty thousand dollars. It is further understood between us that, while I am not strictly authorized to speak in behalf of my brothers and sisters in that respect, from what has already transpired between me and them, in the event of such success, they will be disposed to act generously with Mrs. Buchanan in the premises. Yours, very resp'y, George H. Tilden.’

It will be observed that this letter, while charging defendant in a fixed sum, leaves open the general adjustment between plaintiff and defendant's brothers and sisters. After receiving this written declaration of the defendant, Dun continued his advances, until they aggregated over $20,000. A long contest followed in the courts. Defendant succeeded in his action, and he and others became entitled to a very large sum of money that the late Samuel J. Tilden supposed he had dedicated to public uses under the thirty-fifth article of his will. Dun testified that the defendant had repaid his advances; that they were collected through his attorney, but he thought an action was brought against him. Defendant paid plaintiff $8,150, on account of the $50,000, under the letter of February 19, 1887. As nothing more was paid, and plaintiff received no recognition from the heirs at law and next of kin of Mr. Tilden, she brought this action to recover the balance of the $50,000 and interest.

One of the learned judges of the appellate division thus states the question of law presented in this case: ‘Can a wife enforce payment in her own name, where the husband renders valuables services, and stipulates with the person to whom the same are rendered that compensation therefor shall be made, not to him, but to her?’ In answering this question in the negative, the main positions of the court below may be briefly stated: While admitting that there is a distinct class of cases where promises have been made to a father, or other near relative, for the benefit of a child, or other dependent relative, in which the person for whose benefit the promise was made has been permitted to maintain an action for the breach of it, and further admitting, for argument's sake, that the duty and obligation of the husband to the wife is, as a consideration, quite equal to the duty and obligation of the father to the child, yet the fact still remains, in the case at bar, that this is not a contract looking towards the discharge of the obligation which the husband owed to support the wife, and must, therefore, be supported, if at all, upon the mere relation of husband and wife. The learned court then states that it has found no authority for holding that a promise made to the husband by a third person for the benefit of his wife, which was not intended to provide for her support, or to discharge the husband's duty in that regard, could be enforced by the wife. It is also intimated that there is no disposition to extend the principle of some of the cases relating to father and child to any other relationship. As to this latter suggestion, we do not think it will be seriously questioned, on principle, that the relation of husband and wife is fully equal to that of parent and child as a consideration to support a promise.

Before discussing ths appeal in the light of the authorities, we have to say that, in our judgment, the learned appellate division have failed to give due weight to certain controlling features of this case. In the first place, the question formulated by the court below does not contain what we regard as one of the most important points disclosed by the evidence, to wit, the large equitable interest the plaintiff had in this scheme to attack the will, under the provisions of the agreement made to carry it out. This is not the case, simply, of a husband rendering valuable services to a third party upon the latter's promise to pay the compensation, not to him, but to his wife. While this case embraces that feature, it involves the further element of the wife's joint interest in the scheme to attack the will. It may fairly be inferred, from this record, that the defendant was powerless to conduct the action attacking the will unless some one furnished him the funds. This assistance was rendered by Buchanan and Dun, upon the express agreement and understanding that the plaintiff should receive, in case of success, $50,000 from defendant as part of her share of the estate, and generous treatment from his brothers and sisters. Plaintiff, in equity and good conscience, as an adopted child of Moses Y. Tilden, was entitled to come in and share with the other heirs and next of kin the large fund that had been freed from the provisions of the will. When this equitable right or interest is coupled with the relation of husband and wife, we have presented a situation that affords ample consideration for the contract sued upon,-a situation that distinguishes this case from any of the cases where the party suing upon a promise rests exclusively upon a debt or duty owed him by the promisee.

Another general feature of this case, to which we think the court below has failed to give due prominence, is the extent of the legal and moral obligation resting upon a husband to support and provide for his wife. A brief quotation from one of the opinions below will made...