Buchannon v. State
Decision Date | 30 September 1994 |
Citation | 652 So.2d 799 |
Parties | Willie Albert BUCHANNON v. STATE. CR 93-1250. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Corinne T. Hurst, Auburn, for appellant.
Willie Albert Buchannon, pro se.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Stephen Dodd, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Willie Albert Buchannon, was convicted of robbery in the first degree and was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. He raises two issues on appeal.
The appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for first degree robbery because, he says, the State failed to prove that he "[t]hreaten[ed] the imminent use of force ... with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property." Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-8-43(a)(2).
Wal-Mart discount store security officer Albert Dorn testified that he saw the appellant remove two cartons of cigarettes from a shelf, place them in a styrofoam cooler, and leave the store without paying for any merchandise. Dorn followed the appellant into the parking lot of the Wal-Mart store and asked him to stop, but the appellant, holding the cooler, ran across the street. According to Dorn, "[t]he cooler started busting ... and the merchandise started to fall out onto the pavement." R. 45. When Dorn stopped to pick up the merchandise, Kevin Smith, another Wal-Mart employee, joined in the chase of the appellant. Dorn and Smith pursued the appellant across several streets and the parking lots of shopping centers, occasionally losing and then regaining sight of him, to "the back of a housing area", where the appellant "pulled out a straight edge razor" and "told [Dorn] to get back." R. 47-48.
Opelika police officers eventually apprehended the appellant, who was lying in some bushes in a nearby wooded area. There were several items of merchandise bearing Wal-Mart price tags on the ground near him.
Section 13A-8-41, Ala.Code 1975, which defines robbery in the first degree, provides, in pertinent part:
Section 13A-8-43, which must be violated in order to constitute robbery in the first degree, provides:
Section 13A-8-40(b), Ala.Code 1975, states: " 'In the course of committing a theft' embraces acts which occur in an attempt to commit or the commission of theft, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission."
The commentary to the robbery statutes explains:
Ala.Code 1975, §§ 13A-8-40 through 13A-8-44 Commentary at 531.
The appellant contends that the State's evidence proved, at most, that he threatened force "to resist apprehension later" rather than to effect an immediate escape. He argues that the threat was not made to "retain possession" of the stolen property because, he says, there was no evidence that when he threatened force he still had possession of any Wal-Mart merchandise. He insists that, for all Dorn and Smith knew, he had dropped all of the stolen merchandise before he made the threat.
These arguments overlook the evidence presented by the State that when the appellant was apprehended merchandise bearing Wal-Mart price tags was found on the ground near him. The reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence is that the appellant threatened Dorn and Smith "to retain possession" of other merchandise, which he had not dropped.
Furthermore, it is immaterial whether Dorn and Smith thought the appellant had abandoned the stolen property. The relevant inquiry focuses on the appellant's intent. One is guilty of robbery if he uses or threatens the use of force "with intent to compel acquiescence to ... escaping with the property." Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-8-43(a)(2). See Gordon v. State, 552 So.2d 901, 904 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) ( ). Compare Casher v. State, 469 So.2d 679, 680 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), and Harris v. State, 451 So.2d 406, 410 (Ala.Cr.App.1984) ( ).
The appellant also argues that because the threat occurred so far from the scene of the theft and after several instances in which his pursuers lost sight of him, it cannot be deemed to have been made in "immediate flight" from the theft. In support of his argument, the appellant cites Laney v. State, 417 So.2d 624 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), McFarland v. State, 581 So.2d 1249 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), and Gordon v. State, 552 So.2d 901 (Ala.Cr.App.1989).
In Laney, the shoplifter's threat and apprehension occurred only "thirty feet from the front door of the store." 417 So.2d at 624. That case, however, is not authority for the proposition that, for a threat to be considered to have been made in "immediate flight" from a shoplifting, the threat must be made within the confines of the store's parking lot or any other arbitrary boundary.
We acknowledge that, in McFarland, this Court noted that the accused, who had shoplifted a screwdriver from a Sears department store, was "constantly under surveillance" by Sears employees until the time of his apprehension, 581 So.2d at 1253, and that in Gordon, we noted that "[a]t no time did the store personnel ... lose sight of the [accused] from the time of the theft until the time the [accused] produced a deadly weapon," 552 So.2d at 904. However, we do not interpret those cases to establish the rule that a shoplifter's flight is not "immediate" if his pursuers momentarily lose sight of him during a chase.
We hold that as long as the flight, pursuit, and eventual apprehension of the accused are part of a continuous series of events directly precipitated by the accused's theft, then the accused's acts occur in "immediate flight after the ... commission" of the theft. Compare Ex parte Campbell, 574 So.2d 713 (Ala.1990) ( ).
The appellant argues that a statement he made to Opelika Police Investigator Casey Fox was inadmissible and should have been suppressed because, he says, it was made in response to interrogation after he had invoked his right to counsel.
Investigator Fox testified that when he informed the appellant of the rights guaranteed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the appellant stated that he wanted a lawyer. After the appellant made that request, Fox did not question him. Instead, the appellant asked Fox, "[W]hat, what robbery--what was constituting the robbery?" R. 111-12. Fox replied "that one of the witnesses had said [the appellant] had a knife." R. 112. Investigator Fox did not ask the appellant any questions, but listened as the appellant
The investigator testified that he never "ask[ed] [the appellant] any questions or...
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Eggers v. State
...and what punishment he could be facing for that charge, the accused initiated the conversation with the police); Buchannon v. State, 652 So.2d 799, 801 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (by asking police officer "`[W]hat, what robbery — what was constituting the robbery?'" after he had invoked his right ......
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...subjective "hope" on the part of the police that he will do so, is not the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Buchannon v. State, 652 So.2d 799, 802 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), quoting Gilchrist v. State, 585 So.2d 165, 175 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). Moreover, the question did not necessarily call fo......
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Eggers v. Alabama, 2:13-cv-1460-LSC
...and what punishment he could be facing for that charge, the accused initiated the conversation with the police); Buchannon v. State, 652 So. 2d 799, 801 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (by asking police officer "'[W]hat, what robbery—what was constituting the robbery?'" after he had invoked his righ......
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State v. Martinez
...no Arizona cases addressing this precise issue, some other jurisdictions have dealt with similar issues. See Buchannon v. State, 652 So. 2d 799, 800-01 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (rejecting argument that shoplifter apprehended with stolen merchandise only used force against pursuing store emplo......