Buchholz v. Buchholz

• Decision Date: 10 November 2022
• Docket Number: 20220113
• Citation: 982 N.W.2d 275
• Parties: Jonathan Lee BUCHHOLZ, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Kristin Angela Overboe BUCHHOLZ, Defendant and Appellant
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

982 N.W.2d 275

Jonathan Lee BUCHHOLZ, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Kristin Angela Overboe BUCHHOLZ, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20220113

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Filed November 10, 2022

Rehearing Denied December 7, 2022

Lynn Slaathaug Moen, Mayville, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Kristin A. Overboe, Fargo, ND, self-represented, defendant and appellant.

Crothers, Justice.

I

[¶1] Kristin Overboe appeals from a divorce judgment, an order striking a declaration, an order denying a motion to amend the findings of fact, and an order striking additional filings and granting a protection order. We affirm the divorce judgment but remand for the district court to specify in the order for judgment whether either or both of the parties shall be permitted to marry, and if so, when. We affirm the court's order denying Overboe's motion to amend findings of fact but vacate the April 25, 2022 order granting Jonathan Buchholz's motion to strike and granting a protection order. We also grant Buchholz's motion for attorney's fees and award double costs.

II

[¶2] On November 17, 2020, Jonathan Buchholz filed a divorce from Kristin Overboe. On December 17 and 29, 2021, the district court conducted a two-day trial. On February 16, 2022, the court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and a final judgment granting the divorce and distributing all marital property. On January 19, 2022 and February 11, 2022, additional hearings were held to clarify and modify the court's findings. The latter hearings were held in response to filings by both parties, including the following:

• A January 18, 2022 motion from Overboe for reconsideration regarding accounting for and distribution of amounts received for crop sales.

• A February 3, 2022 letter from Buchholz requesting clarification of valuation findings of the marital estate.

• A February 11, 2022, declaration from Overboe claiming Buchholz's February 3, 2022 letter did not comply with the "basic tenements of due process," that there were several issues with the court's decisions regarding property and valuations, a family trip Buchholz took, among numerous other issues that had already been addressed or were irrelevant.

[¶3] On February 15, 2022, Buchholz filed a motion to strike Overboe's February 11, 2022 declaration. Buchholz's motion was granted on February 23, 2022. On February 16, 2022, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment granting the divorce and distributing the marital property. On February 25, 2022, Overboe filed a motion to modify the findings of fact. On March 16, 2022, the court denied Overboe's motion. On April 6, 2022, Buchholz moved to have the court find Overboe's March 31, 2022 discovery requests duplicative, enter a protection order against Overboe, and strike from the record a number of Overboe's filings.

[¶4] On April 18, 2022, Overboe filed a notice of appeal from the divorce judgment, the findings of fact, a letter from Buchholz requesting clarification on marital property valuations, the order striking Overboe's February 11, 2022 declaration, the order striking Overboe's February 17, 2022 declaration and accompanying exhibits, and the order dismissing Overboe's February 25, 2022 motion to amend findings. On April 25, 2022, the district court granted Buchholz's April 6, 2022 motion to strike Overboe's filings and granted a protection order. On May 16, 2022, Overboe filed a notice of appeal from the order granting Buchholz leave to deposit funds and the order striking additional filings and granting a protection order.

III

[¶5] Overboe argues the judgment is invalid because the district court did not grant a divorce to both parties and because the judgment did not address remarriage as required by N.D.C.C. § 14-05-02. Overboe also argues the district court clearly erred in valuing and distributing the marital estate.

A

[¶6] Overboe argues the judgment is not valid because the district court did not grant a divorce to both parties. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-01, a marriage can be dissolved by death of one of the parties or by a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. A divorce judgment can be granted for many reasons, including irreconcilable differences. N.D.C.C. § 14-05-03.

[¶7] On February 16, 2022, the district court entered a divorce judgment based on irreconcilable differences. Overboe argues the judgment did not grant a divorce to both parties. In Lessard v. Johnson , Overboe made a similar argument on behalf of a client and this Court rejected it as "nonsensical and frivolous." 2022 ND 32, ¶ 10, 970 N.W.2d 160. There, we concluded Overboe's argument was "flagrantly groundless, devoid of merit and demonstrates persistence in the course of litigation evidencing bad faith." Id. For the reasons stated in Lessard , we again reject the argument as frivolous.

B

[¶8] Overboe argues the divorce is invalid because it did not state as required by law whether, and if so when, the parties could marry. Section 14-05-02, N.D.C.C., provides:

"The effect of a judgment decreeing a divorce is to restore the parties to the state of unmarried persons, but neither party to a divorce may marry except in accordance with the decree of the court granting the divorce. It is the duty of the court granting a divorce to specify in the order for judgment whether either or both of the parties shall be permitted to marry, and if so, when. The court shall have jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce at any time so as to permit one or both of the parties to marry, if the court deems it right."

(Emphasis added.)

[¶9] We interpret statutes according to their plain terms. See N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 (words understood in their ordinary sense); 1-02-03 (words and phrases construed according to the context and rules of grammar). Here, the plain language in N.D.C.C. § 14-05-02 prohibits remarriage "except in accordance with the decree of the court granting the divorce." Id. The statute also imposes a "duty" on the court to direct "whether either or both of the parties shall be permitted to marry, and if so, when." Id. This section requires that the district court affirmatively address remarriage in every divorce judgment. Id. Therefore, although the divorce is valid, we remand for the district court to address remarriage as required by N.D.C.C. § 14-05-02.

C

[¶10] Overboe argues the district court erred in establishing a valuation date for marital property, in valuing marital property, and distributing marital property.

[¶11] During a divorce proceeding the district court must value the marital estate and equitably divide the property. Schultz v. Schultz , 2018 ND 259, ¶ 24, 920 N.W.2d 483. Before determining the value of the marital estate and distributing property, the court must determine a valuation date. N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). This action was commenced in 2020 when N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1) specified that the valuation date for marital property is a date mutually agreed upon, if parties cannot agree the valuation date is the date of service of the summons and complaint or the date on which the parties separated, whichever comes first. Here, the district court used November 17, 2020, which was the date on the summons. In fact, the summons and complaint were served on Overboe on November 18, 2020. Overboe did not object to the date, and referred to it in the Joint 8.3 Property Listing and during cross-examination of Buchholz.

[¶12] The district court erred by using November 17, 2020 instead of using November 18, 2020 as the valuation date. However, under applicable law the district court did not err in using the summons date as the valuation date. Overboe makes no argument that she was prejudiced by the one day difference, or that it affected her substantial rights. We conclude the one day difference in valuation dates was harmless. N.D.R.Civ.P. 61 ("At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.").

[¶13] After establishing a valuation date, the district court must value the marital estate. "All property held by either party, whether held jointly or individually, is considered marital property[.]" Tuhy v. Tuhy, 2018 ND 53, ¶ 10, 907 N.W.2d 351. A court must determine the total value of the marital estate before making an equitable division of property. Ulsaker v. White, 2006 ND 133, ¶ 13, 717 N.W.2d 567. Valuations of marital property are findings of fact and will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Berdahl v. Berdahl , 2022 ND 136, ¶ 9, 977 N.W.2d 294. "A court's valuations of marital property are not clearly erroneous if they are within range of the evidence presented." Id. "A choice between two permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous if the district court's findings are based on either physical or documentary evidence, or inferences from other facts, or on credibility determinations." Lee v. Lee , 2019 ND 142, ¶ 6, 927 N.W.2d 104. "The value a district court places on marital property depends on the evidence presented by the parties." Id.

[¶14] Overboe argues the district court made multiple errors in its valuation of the marital property. As we more fully explain below, after our review of the record we conclude the district court's findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law, evidence exists to support them, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

[¶15] Overboe argues the district court erred by finding Buchholz brought $1.2 million worth of property into their marriage. Buchholz and Overboe hired an appraiser for the land. Based on the appraisal, the court found: tract 1 was worth $720,628, and tract 2 was worth $483,749, totaling $1,204,377. These tracts of land were purchased before the parties were married and Overboe's name is not on these deeds. Overboe contends the court did not consider the debt on the land brought into the marriage, but fails to point to evidence supporting the claim. See ...