Buchner v. Erie R. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1955
• Docket Number: No. A--74,A--74
• Citation: 111 A.2d 257,17 N.J. 283
• Parties: William L. BUCHNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation of New York, Defendant-Respondent, and Borough of Ridgefield, a municipal corporation of New Jersey, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 283

17 N.J. 283

111 A.2d 257

William L. BUCHNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation of New York,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

Borough of Ridgefield, a municipal corporation of New

Jersey, Defendant.

No. A--74.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Jan. 3, 1955.

Decided Jan. 24, 1955.

Richard F. Green, Elizabeth, argued the cause for appellant.

G. Addison Hobart, Newark, argued the cause for respondent (Minard, Cooper, Gaffey & Webb, Newark, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

In the evening of December 5, 1950 the plaintiff William L. Buchner boarded a train operated by the defendant Erie Railroad Company at Jersey City, destined for Ridgefield, New Jersey. The train arrived at the defendant's station in Ridgefield at 5:31 P.M., and plaintiff debarked, finding the station and the adjacent area 'pitch black.' The absence of illumination was attributable to a severe storm about ten days earlier which had damaged and rendered useless the public utility power lines.

The general direction of the railroad tracks lay north-south, and upon leaving the station platform by means of an entrance way provided for that purpose, plaintiff walked in a northeasterly direction across an asphalt-paved area immediately adjacent to the station platform, his objective being to reach the sidewalk which bounded the paved area. According to the testimony, the route taken by the plaintiff on this occasion was customarily used by defendant's passengers as a means of egress from the station. The paved area was owned by the defendant but was leased to the Borough of Ridgefield and was used as a parking lot for the patrons of the railroad and the general public.

As plaintiff neared the sidewalk, he tripped and fell over a curbstone which projected into the paved area. The curbstone, as subsequently proven, lay exactly 1.8 feet beyond the property line of the defendant but between that property line and the sidewalk. The asphalt paving which covered the parking lot extended across the railroad property to the concrete sidewalk, and the property line was not marked or indicated on the pavement. The railroad did not own and did not construct or maintain the curb, the sidewalk or the street lights which illuminated the station area.

For the physical injuries sustained as a result of his fall, plaintiff brought an action against both the municipality and the railroad. At the trial, following the presentation of plaintiff's proofs which established the facts related above, the court granted motions for judgment on behalf of each defendant. The plaintiff appealed only from the judgment entered in favor of the railroad, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The cause comes to us by way of certification. Buchner v. Erie R.R. Co., 16 N.J. 196, 108 A.2d 36 (1954).

The basic question with which we are here concerned is the duty of the proprietor of premises to which the public is invited. The proprietor owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to see that those who enter the premises as a result of the invitation have a reasonably safe place to do that which is within the scope of the invitation. That duty is satisfied when reasonable care has been used to maintain the premises in question in a condition reasonably safe for the invitee's proper use. Bohn v. Hudson & Manhattan R.R. Co., 16 N.J. 180, 181, 108 A.2d 5 (1954).

In the case of a common carrier, the duty imposed requires not only that the transportation vehicle be kept safe, but that a safe means of ingress and egress be maintained for the use of the passengers. That duty was succinctly defined in Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N.J.L. 169, 175, 19 A. 178, 180, 7 L.R.A. 435 (E. & A.1889), as follows:

'The duty of a railroad company, as a carrier of passengers, does not end when the passenger is safely carried to the place of his destination The company must also provide safe means for access to and from its station for the use of passengers, and passengers have a right to assume that the means of access provided are reasonably safe.'

The Appellate Division, while recognizing the obligation of a common carrier to provide a safe means of ingress and egress for its passengers, held in the case at hand that the defendant's duty terminated at the boundary line of its property since the carrier's control over the premises ceased at that point.

Ordinarily, it may be true that the private landowner's accountability for the care he owes to his invitees begins and ends with the boundary lines of his property. However, a common carrier does not enjoy the status of a private landowner in this respect, nor his limited responsibilities. Its liability to the public it invites and serves is not necessarily defined by the physical boundary lines of its property, nor by its actual control of the premises which are held out to the public for ingress and egress. The absence of ownership or control, we have held on numerous prior occasions, is not determinative of the carrier's duty to its passengers.

In the Trautwein case, supra, the passenger fell over an obstrution on the carrier's property while trying to reach a stairway constructed and maintained by private persons as a means of egress from the railroad station. However, in Yetter v. Gloucester Ferry Co., 76 N.J.L. 249, 69 A. 1079 (Sup.Ct.1908), the defendant ferry boat company did not own or control the pier at which its passengers were discharged and which was used by them as a means of egress from the ferry boat to the shore. As here, the carrier contended that it therefore owed no duty to one of its passengers who was injured while walking on the pier after having debarked from its ferry boat. Chief Justice Gummere disposed of this contention thusly (76 N.J.L. at page 251, 69 A. at page 1080):

'The ownership of the pier, however, is immaterial, so far as the defendant's liability to the plaintiff is concerned. It was the landing place supplied by it to the plaintiff, and it owed to her the duty of using care to see that this landing place was safe for her use.'

In Fortein v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 90 N.J.L. 137, 100 A. 194 (E. & A.1917), substantially the same contention was urged upon the Court of Errors and Appeals. In that case a ferry boat passenger was injured when she stepped into a hole in the asphalt pavement which was not part of the premises owned by the carrier but which was used by its passengers as a means of egress. The court concluded (90 N.J.L. at pages 139--140, 100 A. at page 195):

'* * * nevertheless, on the facts stated, it cannot be said, as matter of law, that there was no liability on the part of appellant. It appears from the evidence that the place where the accident happened was a portion of the ferry premises as actually used by the appellant, and with respect to which, therefore, it was the duty of the appellant to exercise reasonable care to make those premises safe for the use of its passengers, of whom the plaintiff Desire Fortein was one.

'The decisions are quite uniform to the effect that such a situation as above described created a liability for accidents happening by the ostensible owner's negligence', citing Delaware, L. & W.R.R. Co. v. Trautwein, supra, and Yetter v. Gloucester Ferry Co., supra.

More recently, this court had occasion to pass upon the question in Horelick v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 13 N.J. 349, 99 A.2d 652 (1953). There the passenger was injured when she slipped and fell on ice present on a station platform which was neither owned nor controlled by the defendant railroad but which was used by its passengers as a means of egress. In the thoroughly considered opinion of Justice Jacobs, the...