Buck v. First National Bank of Paw Paw

• Decision Date: 16 May 1873
• Citation: 27 Mich. 293
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Lucius E. Buck and others v. The First National Bank of Paw Paw

27 Mich. 293

Lucius E. Buck and others v. The First National Bank of Paw Paw

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 16, 1873

Heard May 9, 1873

Error to Van Buren Circuit.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

Foster & Coleman and F. Muzzy, for plaintiffs in error.

Thomas H. Stephenson and Severens, Potter & Boudeman, for defendant in error.

OPINION

Cooley J.

Suit was brought in the court below upon a promissory note given by the plaintiffs in error, in part payment, as it is claimed, of an indebtedness to the defendant in error, of one R. M. Buck. The main facts which led to the giving of the note are not in dispute. R. M. Buck had robbed the bank of a large sum, and had absconded. After a long search he was found, arrested and brought back to Paw Paw. The officers of the bank kept him in custody for a while before handing him over to the authorities, and during this time a large portion of his indebtedness to the bank was arranged by his turning over his own property, and by his mother deeding to the bank a lot to which she had title. The plaintiffs in error were relatives of R. M. Buck, and during the same time they were induced to give to the bank certain notes, of which the note in suit was one. It was claimed on the part of the bank that these notes were applied in payment as far as they would go but that a considerable balance still remained. R. M. Buck was delivered to the authorities on a complaint for the robbery of the bank, the same day the notes were given, and he was convicted on plea of guilty, and sentenced to the State prison. When this note fell due, the makers refused to pay, claiming their signatures were obtained by means of illegal inducements held out to them that R. M. Buck should not be prosecuted, or should be favored in the prosecution if they would give them. The bank brought suit and has recovered judgment, which is before us for review on exceptions.

The exceptions are numerous, and a number of them which we think not well taken and not important, we shall not discuss. As to others, it will be sufficient to state the general principles which were applicable and should have been applied. It is complained among other things that the court excluded questions put to witnesses by counsel for the defense, designed to place before the jury the amount of the indebtedness of R. M. Buck to the bank at the time these notes were given. As it was claimed by the bank that that indebtedness was the consideration for the notes, any evidence which would go to show that R. M. Buck did not owe the bank the sum represented by the notes was clearly admissible for the purpose of showing that on this theory the notes were given without consideration. And in this connection it may be proper to state that we think the court erred in charging the jury that in determining whether there was an indebtedness from R. M. Buck to the bank at the time this note was given, if the jury find from the evidence that upon an accounting between the bank and said R. M. Buck, prior to the giving of the notes, there was a balance agreed by said Buck to be due the bank, then it is not competent for these parties to contest the question of such indebtedness, upon the ground of any pretended unfairness in such settlement, nor upon the ground that Buck was under duress at the time, and that such defense, if the facts existed to support it, could only be urged by R. M. Buck himself. The court in giving this charge treated the case as if it were one of a contract by R. M. Buck to which he might have a personal defense of duress if he saw fit to resort to it, but which the law would permit no one else to make if he did not. This, however, was not such a case. The question involved was, whether R. M. Buck owed the bank the amount of the notes which these parties had given. If he did not, then, on the plaintiff's theory, the consideration for the notes failed. His admission that he did was sufficient evidence of the fact until disproved, but it could conclude no one. Third parties who had made promises on an assumption that the indebtedness existed, were at liberty to show that the admission was founded in mistake, or extorted by fear, or even made corruptly. As it affected them the question was, not whether an admission was made, but whether the fact existed to which the admission had reference.

Evidence was received on behalf of the plaintiffs below, to show R. M. Buck's admission that the lot his mother conveyed to the bank was purchased with money belonging to the bank. This had no relevancy to the present controversy. The fact that the lot was conveyed to the bank in reduction of R. M. Buck's indebtedness, was important, as the fact of any other payment on that indebtedness would be; but what equitable claim the bank might have had to such conveyance was of no concern to these defendants. They were interested to know whether R. M. Buck owed the bank what they had promised to pay for him, but it was immaterial to them on what grounds other persons had seen fit to reduce that amount to its present sum.

The plaintiff below was also permitted to give evidence, in order to raise a presumption that the defense which had been set up was unfounded, that the defendants, or one of them, at a certain interview when interest on the notes was arranged, but before the principal fell due, made no objection to the payment of the notes. We think no such presumption could safely be drawn from this evidence. The notes were negotiable, and if the bank officers should be apprised of an intended defense before they fell due, it would be reasonable to expect they would endeavor to protect themselves by negotiating them. The makers of the notes were consequently interested in keeping silent regarding their defense, and it is as legitimate to refer their action to prudence as to any other motive. The evidence, we think, should not have been received. And for the same reason no inference against the bona fides of the defense could safely be drawn from the mere fact of the payment of interest by the makers of the notes, before the maturity of the principal. To disclose their defense at that time would have been to defeat it, so far, at least, as concerned the principal.

The most important question in the case arises upon the charge of the court that "if the jury should find, as claimed by the plaintiff, that what the officers of the bank stated to the defendants about prosecuting R. M. Buck was, that in case the notes were signed and the loss of the bank thus partially made up, the officers of the bank would be more likely to sign a petition to the court for clemency in the sentence of R. M. Buck, or any thing of like import, then the jury are instructed that such representations or assurances would constitute no defense to the note." And upon the refusal to charge that "if the jury find that after R. M. Buck was arrested, either with or without process, the plaintiff's agents or attorneys made promises to mitigate any punishment which he might be liable to receive, and the defendants were induced by such promises to give, and on account of such promises did give, the note in question, then the note is invalid."

This charge and refusal to charge present the question directly whether it is legitimate, proper and lawful for private individuals to sign petitions to, or use influence with, a court to induce the court to mitigate the punishment of a convicted criminal,...