People v. Smith
| Decision Date | 26 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 156353,156353 |
| Citation | 502 Mich. 624,918 N.W.2d 718 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State Of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Virgil SMITH, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Valerie Newman ) Detroit, for defendant.
William J. Vailliencourt, Jr., for amici curiae, the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Laura Moody, Chief Legal Counsel, and B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, for amici curiae, the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
As part of defendant's plea deal, he agreed to resign his position as a state senator and not seek public office during his five-year probationary term. After reviewing the agreement, the trial court determined that these terms violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and public policy. It struck down the terms but, over the prosecutor's objection, enforced the rest of the plea deal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We took this case to decide whether the resignation and bar-to-office provisions of the plea deal were enforceable, and if not, whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow the prosecutor to withdraw from the deal. We hold that: (1) the question regarding the resignation provision is now moot and we therefore decline to reach it and instead vacate the Court of Appeals' discussion of that issue, (2) the bar-to-office provision is unenforceable as against public policy, and (3) the trial court erred by not permitting the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea agreement under People v. Siebert .1 We would have further held that the validity of the bar-to-office provision must be assessed under the balancing test in Town of Newton v. Rumery .2
While serving as a state senator, in May 2015, defendant fired his rifle at his ex-wife's car and into the air in her presence. He was charged with felonious assault, MCL 750.82 ; domestic violence, MCL 750.81 ; malicious destruction of personal property (worth $20,000 or more), MCL 750.377a ; and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. In February 2016 he entered into a plea agreement that required him to plead guilty to malicious destruction of property in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. The plea agreement included a sentence agreement to a sentence of 10 months in the Wayne County Jail and 5 years' probation. Defendant also had to comply with various other conditions, including the two at issue here: "Resign position as State Senator" (the resignation provision) and "Cannot hold elective or appointed office during full pendency of probation" (the bar-to-office provision).
The plea agreement was put on the record, and defendant pleaded guilty. At a sentencing hearing on March 14, 2016, the court sua sponte struck the resignation and bar-to-office provisions but otherwise sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. In an order, the trial court explained that the struck provisions represented "an unconstitutional interference by the Prosecutor with the legislative branch of government and with the rights of the defendant's constituents." Further, the order stated that the provisions "offend[ ] the Constitution of the State of Michigan, [are] contrary to public policy and compromise[ ] the integrity of this court." In all other respects, however, the trial court enforced the plea agreement.
The prosecution moved to vacate the plea, arguing that defendant had not yet resigned and thus had failed to comply with the plea agreement. The prosecutor further contended that because the court failed to enforce the entire original agreement, the prosecutor was entitled to withdraw from the plea. The trial judge rejected the prosecutor's motion, finding that vacation would not serve the interests of justice.
Defendant resigned his position as a state senator on April 12, 2016. In an opinion issued on April 18, 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot because Smith had voluntarily resigned and expressed no intention of running for office during his probation period.3 The same day the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, defendant submitted petitions to run for Detroit City Council. He came in second place in the August 2017 primary, but he lost the general election in November.
Before the general election, the prosecutor sought leave to appeal in this Court, contending that the case represented an election-related emergency. We remanded to the Court of Appeals,4 which affirmed the trial court in an opinion issued August 22, 2017.5 The Court held that the resignation and bar-to-office provisions were unconstitutional violations of the separation-of-powers doctrine, because only the Legislature could expel its members.6 Further, the plea agreement "invaded the right of defendant's constituents to 'decide upon his moral and other qualifications' when defendant's crimes did not specifically disqualify him" under pertinent constitutional provisions.7 The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the prosecution's motion to vacate the plea because defendant had fulfilled many of the terms of the plea deal and therefore the prosecution should not be allowed a second opportunity to negotiate.8 Judge RIORDAN dissented, finding no violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine and asserting that the trial court had abused its discretion by not allowing the prosecutor's withdrawal from the plea agreement.9
The prosecutor again appealed, and we ordered oral argument on whether to grant the application, directing the parties to brief:
(1) whether a prosecutor's inclusion of a provision in a plea agreement that prohibits a defendant from holding public office violates the separation of powers, see Const 1963, art 3, § 2 ; see also United States v. Richmond , 550 F.Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y., 1982), or is void as against public policy, Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. , 930 F.2d 1390, 1392-1393 (C.A. 9, 1991) ; (2) whether the validity of the provision requiring the defendant to resign from public office was properly before the Court of Appeals since the defendant resigned from the Michigan Senate after the Wayne Circuit Court had struck that part of the plea agreement and, if so, whether it violates the separation of powers or is void as against public policy; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by voiding terms of the plea agreement without affording the prosecutor an opportunity to withdraw from the agreement, see People v. Siebert , 450 Mich. 500, 504 (1995).[10 ]
Questions of law are reviewed de novo.11 Trial court decisions regarding motions to vacate pleas are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.12
The first issue is whether the resignation provision in the plea deal is moot. "It is well established that a court will not decide moot issues."13 A dispute is moot if no controversy exists and any judgment on the matter would lack practical legal effect.14 Courts will not entertain such abstract issues unless they are "of public significance" and are "likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review."15 Here, defendant's resignation has already taken effect and cannot be retracted. If we were to strike the provision, our decision on the issue would lack practical legal effect.
The parties have failed to show that this issue is likely to evade review. The trial court struck the resignation provision from the plea deal before defendant voluntarily decided to resign from office. If defendant had not resigned from office, then the Court of Appeals could have properly reviewed the validity of the resignation provision. Consequently, we hold that the issue is moot and we will not address it. In addition, we vacate as moot that part of the Court of Appeals' judgment holding the resignation provision to be invalid.
The second issue is whether the bar-to-office provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine or is void as against public policy. Since we generally avoid constitutional decisions if nonconstitutional grounds can resolve a case,16 we begin with public policy.
"Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts" and can be subject to the same rules and principles governing contracts.17 One such rule is that contracts contravening public policy are void and unenforceable.18 Public policy can be found "in our state and federal constitutions, our statutes, and the common law," among other sources.19 "Plea agreements are subject to the public policy constraints that bear upon the enforcement of other kinds of contracts."20
The United States Supreme Court has provided a framework for assessing whether certain agreements between prosecutors or government officials and criminal defendants violate public policy. In Town of Newton v. Rumery , the Court explained the "well established" balancing test under which "a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement."21 That case involved a release-dismissal agreement whereby the prosecutor agreed to drop all charges against a criminal defendant in exchange for a waiver by the defendant of his right to pursue any statutory causes of action against the town or its officials.22 The criminal defendant then instituted a civil suit alleging that the agreement violated public policy.23 To determine whether that agreement could stand, the Court held that the above balancing test applied; accordingly, the opinion examined whether the...
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