Buck v. Leggett

Decision Date23 July 1991
Docket NumberNo. 73363,73363
Citation813 S.W.2d 872
PartiesJames A. BUCK, Sr., Appellant, v. Ronald A. LEGGETT, Collector of Revenue, City of St. Louis, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

William A. Shirley, Chesterfield, for appellant.

Anthony J. Sestric, St. Louis, for respondent.

ALMON H. MAUS, Special Judge.

In 1988, the assessed value of Parcel No. 3682-00-02900 of real property in the City of St. Louis was $11,000. In 1989, the assessed value of that parcel was raised to $50,700. In 1990, the assessed value was $19,600. Plaintiff James A. Buck, Sr., paid the 1989 real estate taxes of $3,892.75 based upon the assessed value of $50,700. He claims a refund under § 139.031.5 of that portion of the 1989 taxes resulting from a valuation in excess of $19,600. He asserts that portion of those taxes was "mistakenly or erroneously paid" within the meaning of § 139.031.5. The trial court rendered summary judgment against the plaintiff in his action against the Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis. The plaintiff appealed to this Court.

The plaintiff states his appeal presents the following questions.

"1) whether the laws of Missouri require a taxpayer to appeal an incorrect assessment, and to protest the taxes paid pursuant to a bill based on said incorrect assessment, to preserve the right of the taxpayer to recover the overpayment;

2) whether, in the instant situation, an assessment in the subsequent year may evidence that the assessor incorrectly assessed the property in the previous year; and 3) whether, in the instant situation, a refund should issue."

He contends that the answers to those questions require the construction of revenue laws of this state in this "case of first impression". Therefore, the plaintiff concludes, exclusive jurisdiction of his appeal is in this Court by reason of Mo. Const., art. V, § 3.

This case does involve the revenue laws of this state. However, as hereafter developed, the criteria for reaching the answers to those questions have been established by prior decisions of this Court. The answer to question 1) is "Yes" and the answers to questions 2) and 3) are "No". Those answers are found in cases such as B & D Inv. Co., Inc. v. Schneider, 646 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. banc 1983), and State ex rel. Council Apartments, Inc. v. Leachman, 603 S.W.2d 930 (Mo.1980).

"Given the establishment of such criteria, this appeal involves questions of application of a revenue law already construed by this Court and, therefore, jurisdiction of this appeal lies in the Eastern District of the Court of Appeals." Affiliated Med. Transport v. Tax Com'n, 741 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. banc 1987).

"The conclusion regarding appellants' attempt to raise a constitutional issue would provide an adequate basis for transfer of this appeal to the Court of Appeals. However, in the interest of judicial economy, the appeal will be retained here. Rule 83.06. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Davis, 488 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo. banc 1972)." Atkins v. Department of Bldg. Reg., Etc., 596 S.W.2d 426, 434 (Mo.1980). Much of what is written is redundant and is perhaps unnecessary except to rephrase the rationale of the cases establishing the controlling criteria.

The evidentiary material supporting and opposing the collector's motion for a summary judgment established there was "no genuine issue" concerning the following material facts. Rule 74.04. The plaintiff owns the real property located at 4223 Dr. Martin Luther King Drive and designated Parcel No. 3682-00-02900 in the City of St. Louis. For 1988, the assessed value of that real property was $11,000. As a part of a general reassessment the assessed value for 1989 was raised to $50,700. A "Notice of Change in Assessed Value" for 1989 was mailed to the plaintiff at 5157 Palm St., St. Louis, Missouri 63115. The real property taxes for 1989, calculated upon the basis of an assessed value of $50,700, were $3,892.75. Those taxes were paid without protest by Community Federal from an escrow fund that it held in connection with a loan secured by a deed of trust on that real property. Community Federal subsequently provided to the plaintiff a Mortgage Interest Statement for calendar year 1989. This Mortgage Interest Statement was addressed to plaintiff at 5157 Palm 2E [sic], St. Louis, MO 63115-1532 and advised the plaintiff that Community Federal had paid real estate taxes for 1989 in the amount of $3,892.75. For 1990, the assessed value of the real property was $19,600. On August 20, 1990, the plaintiff made application to the Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis under § 139.031.5 for the refund of 1989 real estate taxes paid to the extent of $2,387.86. That figure was calculated upon the difference between the 1989 assessed value and the 1990 assessed value using the 1989 tax rate. In his application, the plaintiff asserted that a portion of 1989 real estate taxes in the amount of $2,387.86 had been "mistakenly or erroneously paid" within the meaning of § 139.031.5. The Collector of Revenue denied the application for a refund. By his petition in this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover that refund. As stated, the motion of the Collector of Revenue for a summary judgment in his favor was sustained.

To determine the scope of § 139.031.5, that section must be construed in context as a part of the statutory provisions for the assessment, levy and payment of taxes. Xerox Corp. v. Travers, 529 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. banc 1975). Moreover,

"[i]n construing a statute it is appropriate to take into consideration statutes involving similar or related subject matter when such statutes shed light upon the meaning of the statute being construed, even though the statutes are found in different chapters and were enacted at different times." Citizens Elec. v. Dir. of Dept. of Rev., 766 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 1989).

From an overview of Chapters 137, 138 and 139, it is apparent that in regard to the facet of taxation under consideration, the legislature intends to provide a method whereby a taxpayer, who pursues his administrative remedy, may, under protest, pay taxes levied upon the basis of a disputed assessment and preserve his objection and thereby advise the taxing authority, with reasonable assurance, of the amount of its disposable revenue. See B & D Inv. Co., Inc. v. Schneider, supra.

It is clear that if a taxpayer with notice of an increase in assessed value of his property fails to exhaust his administrative remedy to question that increase, he cannot do so in any other proceeding. C & D Inv. Co. v. Bestor, 624 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. banc 1981). He cannot do so in an action to enjoin the collection of taxes based upon that increase. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. Bannister, 322 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.1959). Nor can he do so by paying his taxes under protest and suing to recover them under § 139.031.2. Westglen Village Associates v. Leachman, 654 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. banc 1983). This is true even if he asserts the increased assessment was unconstitutionally discriminatory. Westglen Village Associates v. Leachman, supra.

"Similarly, in a suit against the state for recovery of taxes, statutorily provided administrative procedures must be utilized exclusively, and must be followed to exhaustion even where constitutional claims are raised. Ellsworth Freight Lines, Inc. v. Missouri Highway Reciprocity Commission, 568 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. banc 1978). See, B & D Investment Company, Inc. v. Schneider, 646 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Mo. banc 1983) (where administrative remedies are adequate that remedy is ordinarily exclusive)...." Westglen Village Associates v. Leachman, 654 S.W.2d at 900.

By the same token, "[e]ven though a taxpayer has appealed an assessment to the State Tax Commission, to preserve the asserted error, the taxes, if paid, must be paid in compliance with § 139.031(1). Adcor Realty v. State Tax Com'n., 627 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. banc 1982); Xerox Corporation v. Travers, supra." B & D Inv. Co., Inc. v. Schneider, 646 S.W.2d at 763. (Emphasis added.)

"When a challenge is made to a tax assessment, the procedure as outlined in Xerox Corporation v. Travers, 529 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Mo. banc 1975), should still be followed. That procedure involves 1) paying taxes under protest and filing a statement with the collector, 2) within 90 days filing suit in circuit court, and, 3) if appeal is made to the Missouri State Tax Commission the taxpayer is to notify the collector and the circuit court to have that action stayed until the proceedings are finalized." Westglen Village Associates v. Leachman, 654 S.W.2d at 900. The plaintiff does not question the above principles. However, he asserts they are not applicable to his claim under § 139.031.5 because he had no notice of the increased assessment.

The statutory plan of taxation is a part of government. The officials administering that plan are obligated to follow the statutes. Yet, at least to some extent, landowners are held to know that all real property is assessed and taxed annually and bear some obligation to see that taxes on their property are paid each year. See Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 103 P.2d 303 (1940), and Rains v. Teague, 377 So.2d 924 (Miss.1979). This obligation is expressed by statute.

"Each tract of land or lot shall be chargeable with its own taxes, no matter who is the owner, nor in whose name it is or was assessed. The assessment of land or lots in numerical order, or by plats and a land list in alphabetical order, as provided in this chapter, shall be deemed and taken in all courts and places to impart notice to the owner or owners thereof, whoever or whatever they may be, that it is assessed and liable to be sold for taxes, interest and costs chargeable thereon; and no error or omission in regard to the name of any person, with reference to any tract of land or lot, shall in any wise impair the validity of the assessment thereof for taxes." § 137.170. (Emphasis added.)

This statute has been applied to hold that assessments of...

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