Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City of Cuyahoga Falls

• Decision Date: 06 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-137,97-137
• Citation: 692 N.E.2d 997,81 Ohio St.3d 559
• Parties: BUCKEYE COMMUNITY HOPE FOUNDATION et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 559

81 Ohio St.3d 559

692 N.E.2d 997

BUCKEYE COMMUNITY HOPE FOUNDATION et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS et al., Appellees.

No. 97-137.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1998.

Decided May 6, 1998.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution confer upon municipalities the authority "to exercise all powers of local self-government." Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio Constitution does not limit that authority. 2. In accordance with Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the people of a municipality may, by charter, reserve to themselves the power to approve or reject, by popular vote, any actions of city council regardless of whether such actions are administrative or legislative in nature.

The facts giving rise to this appeal are not in dispute. Appellant Buckeye Community Hope Foundation ("Buckeye Hope") is a nonprofit corporation that develops housing for individuals through the use of low-income housing tax credits. Buckeye Hope is affiliated with Cuyahoga Housing Partners, Inc. and Buckeye Community Three L.P. ("Buckeye Three"), also appellants herein.

On June 12, 1995, Buckeye Three purchased a parcel of land located within the appellee city of Cuyahoga Falls. Appellants intended to construct a seventy-two-unit apartment complex on the parcel. At the time of purchase, the land was zoned for multifamily use. A site plan regarding the proposed development was submitted to the Cuyahoga Falls Planning Commission, which, on February 21, 1996, recommended that the project be approved. Thereafter, in accordance with the Cuyahoga Falls City Charter, the site plan was then submitted to the appellee Cuyahoga Falls City Council for its approval.

On April 1, 1996, city council accepted the recommendation of the planning commission and passed Ordinance No. 48-1996. In Section 1 of the ordinance, council stated, "That this City Council approves the plan for development of land situated in an R-17 Medium Density Multiple Family zoning district in accordance with such district and zoning regulations as stipulated in the Codified Ordinances of the City of Cuyahoga Falls and as approved by the Planning Commission as per the plans and stipulations contained in Planning Commission File P-6-96-SP."

Subsequently, referendum petitions were filed with the appellee Cuyahoga Falls Clerk of Council challenging the passage of the ordinance. The petitions were then forwarded to the appellee Summit County Board of Elections. The board of elections determined that the petitions contained a sufficient number of valid signatures.

In an attempt to keep the referendum off the November 1996 ballot, appellants, on May 1, 1996, filed a complaint against appellees in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County. Appellants sought to enjoin appellees from taking any further action regarding the referendum process. Appellants also requested a judicial determination that, because the passage of the ordinance constituted merely administrative as opposed to legislative action by council, the ordinance was not subject to challenge by way of referendum. Appellants claimed that Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio Constitution prohibited a referendum on actions taken by a municipal legislative body that were administrative in nature.

The trial court conducted a hearing with respect to appellants' request for injunctive relief. On May 31, 1996, the court ruled in favor of appellees, denying appellants' request for a preliminary or permanent injunction. The court held that the classification of action taken by council in passing Ordinance No. 48-1996, whether administrative or legislative in character, was not dispositive of whether the ordinance could be submitted to a vote of the electors. Rather, the court determined that the ordinance could be voted on because the citizens of Cuyahoga Falls had specifically reserved to themselves such a right under their charter.

Appellants appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals for Summit County. On December 18, 1996, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Zeiger & Carpenter, John W. Zeiger, Jeffrey A. Lipps and Michael N. Beekhuizen, Columbus; McFarland Law Office and J. Drew McFarland, Granville, for appellants.

Virgil Arrington, Jr., Cuyahoga Falls Deputy Law Director, for appellees city of Cuyahoga Falls, Cuyahoga Falls City Council, and Cuyahoga Falls Clerk of Council.

Maureen O'Connor, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. Schultz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Summit County Board of Elections.

Malcolm C. Douglas, Cleveland, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, South Solon Homeowners Association, Inc.

Roger Gupta, Kent, pro se, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Dr. Roger Gupta, Emeritus Professor, Kent State University.

Walter & Haverfield P.L.L., Charles T. Riehl and Fredrick W. Whatley, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Cuyahoga County Law Directors Association.

Fair Housing Law Clinic, Edward G. Kramer, Diane E. Citrino, Cleveland, and Kathy J. Grey, Parma; Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur and Robert D. Anderle, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Coalition on Homelessness and Housing in Ohio.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

The trial court and court of appeals determined that the citizens of Cuyahoga Falls were entitled, by virtue of their city charter, to vote on the passage of Ordinance No. 48-1996. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Cuyahoga Falls, as a charter municipality, derives its sovereign power from Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. Before 1912, the time of the adoption of Article XVIII, municipalities could exercise only those powers delegated to them by the General Assembly. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Munn Rd. Sand & Gravel (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 579, 582, 621 N.E.2d 696, 699. With the adoption of Article XVIII, municipalities were given the power to control matters of local concern. In Perrysburg v. Ridgway (1923), 108 Ohio St. 245, 255, 140 N.E. 595, 598, the court discussed the underpinnings for the adoption of Article XVIII, and stated:

"Prior to 1912 there was no express delegation of power to municipalities in the Ohio Constitution. Under the decisions of our courts, it had been held again and again * * * that municipal power was delegated only by virtue of a statute. Therefore, municipalities of the state, especially the larger ones, were continually at the door of Ohio's General Assembly asking for additional political power for municipalities, or modifications in some form of previous delegations of such power. Such power, being legislative only, could be withdrawn from the municipalities, or amended, at any session of the Legislature.

"Municipalities were, therefore, largely a political football for each succeeding Legislature, and there was neither stability of law, touching municipal power, nor sufficient elasticity of law to meet changed and changing municipal conditions. To the sovereign people of Ohio the municipalities appealed in the constitutional convention of 1912, and the Eighteenth Amendment, then known as the 'Home Rule' Amendment, was for the first time adopted as part of the Constitution of Ohio, wherein the sovereign people of the state expressly delegated to the sovereign people of the municipalities of the state full and complete political power in all matters of 'local self-government.' " (Emphasis added and citation omitted.)

Section 7 of Article XVIII provides that "[a]ny municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government." (Emphasis added.) Section 3 of Article XVIII empowers municipalities "to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." (Emphasis added.)

Further, Section 7, Article XVIII "confers power on the municipality to frame and adopt a charter for its government, and to exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government as provided by section 3. That is, the people of the municipality are given the power to construct the machinery of their own local government and to operate it themselves." (Emphasis sic.) Froelich v. Cleveland (1919), 99 Ohio St. 376, 390-391, 124 N.E. 212, 216. See, also, State ex rel. Hackley v. Edmonds (1948), 150 Ohio St. 203, 212, 37 O.O. 474, 477, 80 N.E.2d 769, 773 ("It would seem from reading the debates that the Constitutional Convention desired to submit to the electorate of this state amendments to the Constitution to give to municipalities, and particularly to those which adopt charters, the broadest possible powers of self-government in connection with all matters which are strictly local and do not impinge upon matters which are of a state-wide nature or interest.").

The words "as are not in conflict with general laws," found in Section 3, Article XVIII, apply only to a city's power to adopt "local police, sanitary and other similar regulations," but not its power to enact laws for "local self-government." See Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. Parma (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 101, 103, 564 N.E.2d 425, 427, citing State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips (1958), 168 Ohio St. 191, 5 O.O.2d 481, 151 N.E.2d 722, paragraph four of the syllabus. See, also, Dies Elec. Co. v. Akron (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 322, 325, 16 O.O.3d 365, 367, 405 N.E.2d 1026, 1028. Additionally, "[b]y reason of Sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, a charter city has all powers of local self-government except to the extent that those powers are taken from it or limited by other provisions of the Constitution or by statutory limitations on the powers...