Buckley Land Corp. v. Department of Natural Resources

• Decision Date: 16 August 1989
• Docket Number: Docket No. 103854
• Citation: 178 Mich.App. 249,443 N.W.2d 390
• Parties: BUCKLEY LAND CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Defendant-Appellee. 178 Mich.App. 249, 443 N.W.2d 390
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 390

443 N.W.2d 390

BUCKLEY LAND CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 103854.

178 Mich.App. 249, 443 N.W.2d 390

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 8, 1988.

Decided Feb. 28, 1989.

Released for Publication Aug. 16, 1989.

[178 MICHAPP 249] Murray & Pawlowski by George E. Pawlowski and Steven L. Maas, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Thomas J. Emery and Michael C. McDaniel, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant-appellee.

[178 MICHAPP 250] Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and WEAVER and QUINNELL, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We affirm.

Because plaintiff's issues concerning collateral estoppel, laches, adverse possession and perfection of title were not addressed by the trial court, we do not address them on appeal. Joe Dwyer, Inc. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 167 Mich.App. 672, 685, 423 N.W.2d 311 (1988).

We disagree with plaintiff's argument that the trial court erroneously granted summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff's suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Under current Michigan law it is true that notice of a tax sale is constitutionally defective if merely given by publication in the county where the property is situated and that tax deeds issuing from defective tax sales are deemed void. Dow v. Michigan, 396 Mich. 192, 208-212, 240 N.W.2d 450 (1976); Detroit v. John J Blake Realty Co., 144 Mich.App. 432, 437, 376 N.W.2d 114 (1984). However, this was not so at the time of sale to the State of Michigan, and the county-publication notice procedures then in use were subsequently validated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Golden v. Auditor General, 373 Mich. 664, 131 N.W.2d 55 (1964).

The land at issue was sold for unpaid property taxes in 1940 and purchased by the State of Michigan in 1942. The state complied with existing procedures for the tax sales, which procedures were deemed proper until Golden, supra was overruled by Dow, supra, some thirty-four years after the tax sales occurred. Because the tax deeds of [178 MICHAPP 251] 1942 were prima facie valid, the ten-year limitation period began running at that time. M.C.L. Sec. 600.5801; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5801. See also Fitschen v. Olson, 155 Mich. 320, 323-324, 119 N.W. 3 (1909). Upon completion of the ten-year period, the state's title was no longer open to question. See Toll v. Wright, 37 Mich. 93 (1877).

Michigan favors only limited retroactivity when overruling prior law, the retroactive effect of a decision generally being limited to parties before the court and to pending cases. Tebo v. Havlik, 418 Mich. 350, 360-361, 343 N.W.2d 181 (1984), reh. den. 419 Mich. 1201 (1984). See also Moody, Retroactive Application of Law-Changing Decisions in Michigan, 28 Wayne Law Review 439, 508 (1982). Reliance on an old rule, as occurred here, is a strong factor favoring limited retroactivity of an overruling decision. 418 Mich 362-363. In light of the state's proper application of existing notice procedures, exhaustion of the limitation period in 1952, and the Michigan Supreme Court's declaration of procedural validity in 1964, it would be unreasonable to...